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THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
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Volume VII

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IN THIS NUMBER

PAUL H. APPLEBY was graduated from Grinnell College and for a number of years engaged in newspaper and editorial work. He was assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture, 1933-40, and Under Secretary of Agriculture, 1940-44. He was assistant director, U. S. Bureau of the Budget, 1944-47, except for a period in 1945 when he was vice president and general manager of the Queen City Broadcasting Company, Seattle, Washington. Early in 1947 he became dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. He is the author of *Big Democracy*.

HERBERT A. OLSON held various city and state engineering positions in the period from 1922-32. He was a member of the staff of the Michigan Municipal League, 1933-37, and director of the league, 1937-44. He joined the staff of Public Administration Service in 1944 and is director of the western office of that organization. He has a B.S. in civil engineering from Kansas University and an M.S. in engineering from the University of Michigan.

EDWIN G. NOURSE has been chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers since its organization in 1946. Prior to that time he had been with the Brookings Institution for a number of years, and had been its vice president from 1942. He has specialized on studies of industrial organization and managerial policy and is the author of a number of books. He is a graduate of Cornell University and has a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.

MILTON J. ESMAN graduated from Cornell University in 1939 and received his Ph.D. in politics at Princeton in 1942. After a few months on the planning staff of the U. S. Civil Service Commission he entered the Army. Following a tour of duty as personnel technician and later as information and education officer, he entered the Far Eastern Military Government program. From October, 1945, to October, 1946, he served as an officer in the government section of General MacArthur's GHQ where he was concerned with various problems involving the structure and functioning of Japanese government, particularly the public personnel system.

MAXINE KURTZ received a B.A. degree from the University of Minnesota in 1942 and an M.S. in government management from the University of Denver in 1945. She was a technician with the Minnesota Civil Service Department, 1943-44, and has been research analyst for the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission, at Denver, since 1945.

FRANCES HARRIET WILLIAMS was with the Office of Price Administration, 1940-46, first as a member of the information staff and then as adviser on race relations. Prior to government service, she was interracial education secretary to the national YWCA in New York. Currently she is assistant to the executive secretary of the President's Committee on Civil Rights. She is a graduate of Mt. Holyoke College and has done two years of postgraduate work at the New York School of Social Work. She has an A.M. degree in political science from the University of Chicago.

MYRON P. GILMORE has been a member of the faculty of Harvard University since 1935, and is currently associate professor of history. During the war he was commissioned in the U. S. Naval Reserve; he left active service in 1945 with the rank of Lieutenant Commander. In war service he was assigned first in communications intelligence, then in the historical office of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, then to a unit studying the postwar organization of the armed services in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and finally in the group working on a report on postwar organization for the Secretary of the Navy. He is a graduate of Amherst College and has a Ph.D. from Harvard University.

HERMAN G. POPE has been a member of the staff of Public Administration Service since 1939 and since 1943 has served as executive director. Prior to that time he had been city manager of Huntington Woods and Rockford, Michigan, and had also held various public and private engineering positions. He has a B.S. in civil engineering from Purdue University and an L.L.B. from Valparaiso University.

JOHN A. VIEG received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1937. Since that time he has been consecutively professor of government, Iowa State College; economic analyst, Office of Lend-Lease Administration; administrative analyst, U. S. Bureau of the Budget; and, since 1945, chairman of the department of government, Pomona College.

Public Administration Review is intended to promote the exchange of ideas among public officials and students of administration. The various views of public policy and public administration expressed herein are the private opinions of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the official views of the agencies for which they work or the opinions of the editors of this journal.

Harold D. Smith—Public Administrator

By PAUL H. APPLEBY

*Dean, Maxwell Graduate School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs*

HAROLD SMITH's death, on January 23, 1947, brought to a close a public service career which, in only twenty-two years, saw him attain eminence at local, state, national, and international "levels." The outline of his record as given in *Who's Who* and brought up to date follows:

SMITH, Harold Dewey, dir. Federal budget; b. Haven, Kan. June 6, 1898; s. James William and Miranda (Ebling) S.; B.S. in engineering, U. of Kan. 1922; A.M. in pub. adm. U. of Mich. 1925; m. Lillian Mayer, Apr. 18, 1926; children—Lawrence Byron, Mary Ann, Sally Jane, Virginia Lee. Mem. staff Detroit Bur. of Govt. Research, 1924-25; staff of League of Kansas Municipalities, 1925-28; dir. Mich. Municipal League, 1928-37; dir. Bur. of Govt., U. of Mich., 1934-37; budget dir. State of Mich., 1937-39; dir. Federal budget Apr. 1939-June 1946; Vice Pres., International Bank for Reconstruction, June 1946-Jan. 1947. Former mem. Mich. State Planning Bd., Northern Great Lakes Resources Com., State Accident Fund Bd., urbanism com. Nat. Resources Bd.; com. on pub. administrn., Social Science Research Council; former chmn. Gov's. Welfare Study Com. Past pres. Am. Munic. Assn.; pres. Am. Soc. for Public Admn., 1941; mem. Am. Polit. Science Assn.; Nat. Municipal League. Served as seaman, U. S. Navy during World War I. Mem. Mich. Engrs. Soc., Alpha Kappa Lambda. Registered professional engineer. Club: Exchange of Ann Arbor (past pres.). Author of *The Management of Your Government*, articles on zoning, tax laws, etc., also govt. reports; editor Mich. Municipal Review, 1928-37; editor of numerous bulletins of Mich. Munic. League 1928-37, U. of Mich. Bureau of Govt., 1934-37.

Behind that outline is the story of an unusual spirit, as well as the story of a career of continuing value to all who are concerned about progressively better government.

My acquaintance with Harold Smith began only when he came to Washington in 1939.

Consequently, no intimate view of his earlier work can be given here. But what he brought to Washington and what he became there surely were only a continuation and a development of what he was and had done in Kansas and in Michigan.

In Kansas and Michigan he could have been no more the fine human being of quick and deep sympathies. He came, of necessity, to have less acquaintance with many who contributed to the work of his organization than when the groups involved were smaller. But this is one change in the dimensions of his job that he never really recognized. For those he encountered he felt the same intimacy and warmth he would have felt if they had been only three or four altogether; he felt and acted as if he knew each one of the whole staff so. Knowledge of a problem faced by the least in rank made that problem his. His eyes misted quickly as a sign of how he was moved, but he indulged in no sentimental generalities; he asked about the facts, and pondered them and worried over them until he could suggest something helpful. His attitude toward his staff—and, indeed, toward anyone—was that of a stanch elder brother.

The sympathy he had was a reflection of his own very extraordinary sensitivity. In one sense he was not exceptionally thin-skinned. He was fairly philosophical and objective about criticism directed toward him, and he had great courage. But perhaps the chief personal desire of his life was for privacy. He lifted only a corner—sufficient for any particular interchange—of the curtain behind which he lived. He did not appear to be withdrawn or to hold himself apart; yet he did always somehow keep protected a deeper self. The most tangible expressions of this inclination were two. One consisted of devices for avoid-

ing preliminary or unfruitful, controversial conferences. His staff rather frequently wondered when he declined to act or to participate in the first instance in some controversial matter that seemed to them already to require his action. He often used other means. When he moved, he did it decisively and effectively. The second expression of his dislike for the hurly-burly of indiscriminate conflict and impersonal, mass human relations was his enthusiasm for his farm. He loved the land. He loved farming. But it was also a retreat. He loved privacy, too.

Many who do especially well in human relations have this kind of sensitiveness. Public administration both attracts such men and wears them hard. Harold Smith had more of this attribute than any other person in my acquaintance.

In Washington, no less than in Michigan and Kansas, he was skilled in the conduct of organizations. Indeed, the scope of organized affairs with which he dealt in Washington put him to the almost ultimate test. Working with people is difficult on any "level," but few even have a chance to demonstrate that at a top level they can act as one should at a bottom level and still have the reach with which to manage affairs of wide scope and great complexity. It is a rare man who, at forty, can make well the great shift in perspective that is required of a state-level generalist in going to a national-level or international-level generalist post. In Woodrow Wilson's phrase, people who come to Washington either grow or swell. To be adequate there they must *not* swell, and they must grow a very great deal. Harold Smith was much better than adequate.

A good deal of what made him an extraordinarily good manager of organizations and things organizational already has been suggested. The imaginative perception of the needs of other people in organizational relationships he had in high degree. It was this in large part that caused him to know especially well, among other things, how to use a deputy—something very few know. But to be a good administrator and to contribute importantly to good administration from a staff position requires much more. For one thing, it requires a sense of structure and recognition of the im-

portance of structure. Harold Smith had that. He would never join with administrative illiterates who say, "Give us the people, and structure will take care of itself." (They might as well say, "Give us the thirteen colonies, and whether we have a Congress or a President will take care of itself.")

He pondered long the question of structure when he first came to the Bureau of the Budget. In the structure he built he expressed a definite and important conception of the bureau.

That conception, in its origin, was this: The director of the Bureau of the Budget needs structure that will give him perspective as he considers the government. He wants not merely one type of examination, one type of analysis, one type of report and judgment. He wants all this from three or four different approaches. Further, the staff of the bureau need structure that will give them perspective—insight and judgment from several functional vantage points. The one point of view needs to be offset and balanced by other points of view. The conception then dealt with the question of what points of view would be most fruitful, and the answer was related to an evaluation of the functions implicit in an adequate bureau program. Smith's answer was: An estimates division to do the things normally associated with the strictly estimates-reviewing function that makes up most of a conventional budget bureau; an administrative management division to look, quite independently of simple first-instance costs and appropriations, at organization and management of the departments and agencies; a fiscal division to look at programs in terms of economic and social content and to help develop alongside the estimates division the over-all budget of the United States, to give it over-all policy consideration by relating it to the economic and social scene generally; a legislative reference division to bring to bear on legislative proposals the coordinated wisdom of the whole executive branch and the whole Bureau of the Budget. Seeing all this in his imagination, seeing these four divisions working together, Harold Smith could look forward to serving the President and the country with perspective, with balance, with all the wisdom

of which he was capable. That structure is sound and important today.

The structural scheme brought out his principal personnel needs. He understood, as too many do not, that "getting good people" is not enough; he understood the difficulty and the great importance of proper placement. He pondered long and worried over every selection that was crucial to him. In his imagination he felt out the various possibilities by asking himself all of the questions he could think of, the answers to which might later be important. He tried for balance in personnel selection, intermingling tried and proved veterans in the federal service with men of similar attitudes from other public areas. He got a yeasty assortment, generally high ability, and, surprisingly often, growing persons.

But a successful man in a high level of public administration needs still more. He needs political sense. He needs a sense of both strategy and tactics. He needs to know when not to move, when not to fight, when and where to advance, when to stand firm, when to retreat, when to fight. In this area we come close to sheer mysticism. No one knows just what it is that enables a man to handle himself and his organization with extraordinary effectiveness in these terms. All that I can do is to jot down some impressions and, possibly, some hints.

Harold Smith was trained as an engineer, but it would be difficult to point to any direct consequences of that in the quality of his performance. I don't even know whether he would have been a particularly good engineer. I am inclined to doubt it. He was not an economist, and couldn't talk economics very clearly. In Washington, certainly, he did not rate as an expert of any kind except as a public administrator. He wasn't very incisive in his statements. He couldn't formulate very sharply what he knew. To some extent he may have developed this into a technique. At all events, he avoided quotably vulnerable remarks; instead he expressed "concern." He often said, "I'm disturbed about this," and his hearer went away impressed by the fact that the director was disturbed, but not knowing exactly why. This was effective only because Smith had made himself strong. He had an

organization that was strong, and armed with impressive information; but he had additional personal strength. Everything he said and did was underscored by this fact. His mild voice and mild words needed no more emphasis. He couldn't have won a debate, but he won most of his engagements, and he never really lost any where the battleground was his.

One of his close friends and associates said in speaking of him last year, "I don't know what he has, but he certainly has something." Harold Smith couldn't have told what it was that gave him this special effectiveness. Neither can I. Instead, I find myself doing as he often did—circumnavigating the subject, as it were—suggesting its content but not at all delineating it. In doing that, it may be surprising that the language about this gentle man has so much military flavor. But in his position he was in the center of great forces expressing popular desires and organizational drives.

He got the essential substantive facts without much effort. He didn't like memoranda, and complained much about them in his easy way. He went far on a small quantity of fact-gasoline. But he did get the essential feeling of the significance of the facts. Then he labored long within himself for the feel of the facts in relation to the situation. When he had that, he was ready to move. The other things, the bread-and-butter business, he let move.

Actions of the director of the Bureau of the Budget are of three general orders. They are with reference to his own organization, with reference to the President, or with reference to department and agency heads. The more specific things that have been said here have had to do with action within his own organization, although a good deal has been suggested bearing on the other relationships. More should be said about them.

Actions with reference to the President and actions with reference to department and agency heads usually involve both; they are complementary applications of the same action, or a conscious selection of application. The key to the role of the budget director, of course, is the presidential character of his office. So long as a policy or an agency exists it is a part of the President's responsibility, the

officials are a part of the President's family, and the budget director's responsibility with respect to them must be like the President's. This means that he must be at once defensive of them and critical of them. The attitude must be much like that of a wise father, trying always to get the best performance possible from all his children. There were never any special hates of agencies, never even any pet peeves against agencies or agency heads. They were facts of the administrative scene, realities in the President's responsibilities. There were no special infatuations, either. The purpose always was that agencies should better merit the esteem of the public they served.

This is a difficult attitude to maintain, but I believe that it was pretty well maintained throughout the bureau under Harold Smith. If he came to feel that an agency head should be displaced, or a program sharply changed or reduced in size, I never saw a trace of personal venom or prejudice in the material coming to him leading to that judgment, or in his own judgment. Much room for differences of opinion there was, and inadequacies of perception and understanding there are always, everywhere. But the responsibility to the President is such that, under good leadership, the bureau is outstandingly fair and objective.

Under Harold Smith, this impartial attitude was supported, I think, by a certain remoteness he maintained with respect to all the departments and agencies. He became really intimate with practically none of the government's principal officers. If there was one, like John Blandford, who went from the bureau to a top operating post, both men respected the difficulty and were especially meticulous about letting their common business be handled "in channels." In general, he avoided becoming personally involved with those with whom he had to deal. He was dealing with them *for the President*, not for himself. That attitude deeply penetrated the bureau. In some degree, for the government at large, Harold Smith was a kind of myth—in the background somewhere, rarely seen, constantly felt.

As I observed him in his personal dealings with two presidents, he had the manner and method he had with his associates within the

bureau. It was a devoted attitude. He wanted mightily to serve the President and through him the public interest. He had a profound feeling about the importance of the presidential office. He deferred always to that office, but he was not deferential. "I don't believe I agree with you, Mr. President." "I think I'd wait before deciding to do that, Mr. President." "There are a lot of things involved in that proposal, Mr. President; it ought to be studied some more." "It's a good thing to do, Mr. President, but I'm not sure I like that way of doing it." "I've been disturbed about that, Mr. President, but I'm not sure that's the right answer." "I'd like to think that one over." "Nobody but you can handle this, Mr. President. I think you have to act." These remarks were typical of his way of advising the President where his advice approached the frontiers of his own primary functions. On bureau recommendations he was much more definite. He argued the case not so much as he took a position; the memoranda he left with the President contained the argument. On involved matters he was not too clear, except about what position he took. Frequently he was not very incisive.

He never reflected excitement or panic. He inspired confidence. He never took to the President anything that was just a can of garbage. If he reported a "mess" somewhere, he either accompanied it with one or two suggestions about what to do, or he reported it as something the President should know, not as something ready for action. Often these reports and suggestions resulted in assignments to the bureau. The President always felt that it was a good place to refer things; there he would get a workmanlike job done; there not much would be overlooked; there no important "boner" would be committed; there the whole government would be considered. Only when political considerations were pronounced and when urgency seemed to dictate sweeping action rather than initial craftsmanship was the reference likely to be made elsewhere.

The amount of general managerial work performed by the bureau has never been widely known. During the war, the presidential load brought such assignments to the Bu

reau to a great peak. The amount of work done was tremendous in terms of its content, scope, and impact, although it would not compare at all with the number of administrative transactions in a great operating department. The vast organization of the government for war purposes had to develop as sentiment and war conditions developed. The bureau was very important in that. Harold Smith carried a great responsibility. He carried it responsibly and coolly, but it bore heavily upon him.

He had his faults as an administrator. His method was slow. It did not permit him to

give personal attention to many things another man would have felt necessary obligations of his leadership. He couldn't often give clear and incisive directions. But he knew how to let a team work, and how to get a superior team product, and at the crucial moment he was a tower of strength.

He was almost painfully conscientious, a thoroughly devoted believer in and practitioner of democratic ways. He was a great public administrator. He was strong, and peculiarly free from vulnerability in a scene where practically everyone in high place is almost always vulnerable.

Harold D. Smith—What He Meant to State and Local Government

By HERBERT A. OLSON

*Western Representative
Public Administration Service*

NONE of us in the naval unit stationed at the University of Kansas near the close of World War I ever suspected that Smith, Harold D., A.S., a shy and pleasant farm boy from Haven, was to become the friend and counselor to a host of city officials, to governors and legislatures, to Presidents and their Cabinets, and to the Congress.

Before he graduated from college as an electrical engineer, he doubted if he would follow his major. He once told me that he stumbled into government (I do not know the story exactly), but in it he found the challenge which persuaded him to make it his life work. Governmental accounting and city planning with the League of Kansas Municipalities and studies in organization patterns and public finance with the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research proved to be the rungs in his ladder of apprenticeship leading to appointment as the executive director of the newly reorganized Michigan Municipal League in 1928.

In the ten years that followed, Harold Smith made a monumental personal contribution to the development of associations of cities. More than any other man, he made the Michigan League what it is today—not only one of the most effective leagues, but a pattern for others. One of his first acts as director was to draft the league's bylaws. In the expression of purpose he laid down a broad-gauged program which only recently helped the cities win from the state courts the right to pay dues to the organization.

"The purpose of the League," he wrote then, "shall be the improvement of municipal government and administration through co-

operative effort." Years later, in writing the report on Associations of Cities and of Municipal Officials for the Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee, he was able to recount that municipal associations had become "a vital influence in our system of urban government since they are instrumental in improving the administrative techniques and procedures of the municipal authorities; in exchanging professional experience and disseminating information concerning municipal practices; in emphasizing public service and curtailing political factionalism; in developing professional standards and capabilities through training programs for municipal officials and through joint technical professional services; in encouraging more liberal legislation on urban problems in questions of home rule, municipal finance, and public works; in transmitting to all levels of government the problems of cities and the facts and experiences upon which to formulate urban policies; and in providing on a national scale the only continuous machinery of contact, cooperation, and collaboration with the local authorities of the country."

Smith's own responsibility for those achievements was very great. When he came to Michigan, he was, literally, unimportant, unknown, and unimpressive; therefore in everything he undertook he had to depend on facts rather than personal status. Those facts became his and the league's fortune. Although he never made a brilliant speech in his life, legislators came to know that every word the man spoke was based on thorough research, on factual knowledge, on sincere conviction, and on hard work. The status he gradually acquired

was based on this reputation for solid honesty. Lawmakers got in the habit of taking his word for it when he told them that the effect of such-and-such a bill would be thus-and-so. They grew accustomed to calling on him when they wanted real information. Perhaps their reliance on him reflected his own conviction that most legislators were not blackguards but, fundamentally, sincere people who appreciate facts instead of bluff.

The result of this cordial relationship was that Smith usually got the legislation he wanted. The cities of Michigan benefited and, indirectly, so did all the cities of the United States, for he had become influential, too, in the activities of the American Municipal Association. He served on its executive committee and, for a term, was president.

The legislation for which he fought, the league activities he fostered, were powered by a set of principles in which he implicitly believed. It has been said that you can read a man through his hobby. Harold Smith's was wood carving. He knew that any wood carver needs a full set of good tools. But I remember his disappointment in one city after the adoption of a well-drafted charter. "We gave them a good chest of tools," he said, "but I'm afraid they have hired a jack-leg carpenter." Many times he pointed out that it takes a cabinetmaker to get the best results from good equipment.

In the monthly *Michigan Municipal Review*, and in some forty bulletins and reports on nearly as many municipal subjects, Smith poured out his philosophy of local government. He was for the manager plan, or failing that, at least a strong mayor form of government with centralized administrative responsibility. He was for a reduction in the number of semi-independent boards and commissions—still a problem in many American cities. He resisted the efforts of the state legislature to chip away local home rule. He believed, above all, that no general improvement of American government was possible without improvement of local government. Increase in efficiency and capacity in the city hall would be reflected in the state capitol and in the halls of Congress.

These tenets are basic today. They were less

so in the days when Harold Smith began to promote them.

Smith's philosophy was translated into specific accomplishments. More city charters were revised in Michigan than in any other state in the period when he served as league director. Until about a year ago, Michigan had more manager-council cities than any other state. Realizing the plight of debt-ridden cities, Smith developed a survey staff to point the way to solvency without resorting to the bankruptcy escape provided in federal legislation. Incensed by the selling tactics (and consequent high prices) of the vendors of certain commodities used by cities, he organized a co-operative purchasing service. Recognizing the inability of all except the larger cities individually to provide an adequate personnel program for their employees, he established a joint service, dividing the cost among those who participated.

Legislative successes and acceptance of the expanded league program led to recognition and respect for Harold Smith's judgment and leadership. He served under four governors as a member of the State Planning Board and the State Welfare Study Commission, among other bodies of statewide scope. Throughout his tenure on the planning body, he tried to sell the idea that the board should be pulled out of the vacuum in which it operated and integrated into the administrative and legislative branches of the government. His ideas were adopted after he left Michigan, and in consequence the board became one of the most effective in the nation.

On the Welfare Commission, Smith advanced a philosophy which led to acceptance of two important new concepts—that relief is not a local but a state and federal problem, and that in any event local jurisdictions tied to the property tax cannot possibly finance relief. In 1947 there is nothing new in these ideas, but Harold Smith was promoting them in the early 1930's, when to many solid citizens they sounded downright revolutionary. The report Smith wrote, as commission chairman, set the mold for legislation governing welfare administration and state-local relationships throughout the depression years.

This comfortable, unassuming man was ap-

pointed Michigan state budget director by Governor Frank Murphy in 1937. He accepted only on the proviso that he would be permitted to set up a real budget control system. Until then, the budget office had been little more than a reporting agency. As for accounting, there were several separate systems in operation at the same time in Michigan state government. They were all different. The pessimism or optimism of the tallies reflected the political faith of the respective account keepers.

With the help of Public Administration Service, Smith installed both unified accounting and a budget control plan. An allotment system was set up for each of the departments, so that the Governor and the state's other elective officials could have accurate, current, month-to-month information on the fiscal position of the state. A separate section of the budget office prepared estimates of state revenues to make possible constant surveillance of both sides of the governmental ledger.

This system gave the budget director considerable power over the day-to-day operation of state government, for through budget control he could dictate how much each department might spend, for what purposes, and when. Many a vital administrative decision was made in Harold Smith's office. But he had the respect of the department heads. They knew that his decisions were based on sound judgment of what was important and what was not. They knew that he made it his business to keep thoroughly abreast of the Governor's attitudes and objectives. They knew that the Governor backed him up.

What Smith did in his two years as budget

director in Michigan helped pioneer the translation of modern budget theory into active governmental practice. Of course, it led directly to his appointment as federal budget director. Casting about in 1939 for the right man for that job, which was then being vacated, President Roosevelt asked a group of public administration specialists to find him a budget director. Unhesitatingly, they chose Harold Smith on the basis of his personal characteristics and his record of accomplishment in Michigan, and the President acted on their advice.

I was with Harold Smith not only when we were naval cadets but later at college. Then, for ten years I worked under his direction at the Michigan League. In other later activities I reaped some of the fruits of the seeds he had planted. His steady, fearless sincerity was leavened not only by heart and sympathy but by a wonderful sense of humor. I never once saw him lose his temper.

When I learned of his death, at forty-nine, I remembered one Thanksgiving morning years ago, when Harold and I were with the Michigan Municipal League. The party at my home had exceeded our seating facilities and I went down to the league office to borrow some of the folding chairs. I found Harold hard at it, dictating. I upbraided him then, as I had on other occasions, for giving up his holiday and wearing himself out with overwork.

"Well," he said slowly, "what I'm doing today seems important. I think it has to be done. To do the things that I consider important, I'm willing, if necessary, to exchange the last ten years of my life."

He did.

Public Administration and Economic Stabilization

By EDWIN G. NOURSE

Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

SINCE August 9, when the Council of Economic Advisers was sworn in, we have been diligently engaged in seeking to get a fuller measure of the significance of the Employment Act of 1946, under which the Council was created. Our *First Annual Report to the President* made clear our realization that it had significance for the political scientist as well as the economist. In addressing the American Economic Association recently on "Economics in the Public Service," I undertook to explore somewhat further my personal views as to how the economic content of the act might best be developed. I greatly value this opportunity of discussing with you some of its public administration aspects.

Nothing could be farther from my thought than to suggest that the economic problems we must face are really separate from issues of public administration or that either can be dealt with understandingly or effectively in isolation from the other. In a paper which, by a strange coincidence, was published¹ only a few weeks before my appointment to the Council, I pointed to the need of marriage—a happy and fruitful marriage—between political science and economics if we are to avail ourselves adequately of professional work in grappling with the problem of organizing a democratic people in a national program for achieving their own material well-being. My gratification at the passage of the Employment Act of 1946 and my willingness to take a part

in the attempt to bring it into effective operation stem largely from my belief that this legislation represents a real and substantial step in the evolution of our politico-economic institutions. It seems to me to promise better coordination between private units of economic enterprise, large and small, and other undertakings—from local to national—which, by reason of the functions involved, need to be organized on a public or governmental basis.

I am sure that before an audience of this sort, I need not belabor this point of the interrelation between our economic system and our governmental institutions. Government is inescapably integrated into the economy. This is not merely by virtue of the fact that the government must establish the legal foundation of property rights which underlie all business life and must establish standards of business conduct and police their enforcement if we are to have a peaceful and orderly business world. Beyond this, there are many activities in which government enters substantively into the business process either through its participation in the distribution of wealth or flows of income (that is, its monetary and fiscal operations) or through its participation in the productive process. This latter may be through the provision of facilities and services (postal, highway, sewerage, or what not), or even of physical goods such as water, timber, and fertilizer. In the final analysis, economic well-being is the major end for which the state exists. If government were denied every power except military, it would still be basically economic as to its ends, either a defensive posse to protect its domain as national resources for productive use or the private property rights of its citizens against the incursions of rival

NOTE: This paper was delivered as a luncheon address at the annual meeting of the American Society for Public Administration at Washington, D. C., March 14, 1947.

¹"Serfdom, Utopia, or Democratic Opportunity?" 6 *Public Administration Review* 177-87 (1946).

users. Or it might become an offensive posse seeking to seize economic resources or trade controls from some rival holder.

With this view, then, as to the thorough interpenetration of the economic process and the political process in modern civilization and specifically in the industrial United States, let us turn to consideration of the Employment Act of 1946 as the latest re-statement of the intentions of the American people as to how public administration can be brought to serve more adequately the purpose of economic stabilization or sustained use of the nation's economic resources.

The Employment Act Is Essentially Within Our Traditions

THE Employment Act of 1946 is faithful both to the political traditions of our republican form of government, with its division of powers, and to our economic tradition of maximum private enterprise, with complementary use of public agencies for economic ends.

Looking first at the political side of the question, it is obvious that the act does not in any way touch our judicial system. It is focused about equally on the legislative and the executive branches of the government. On the legislative side, it of course does not abrogate or restrict in any way the primacy of the Congress in the determination of policy or the devising and enactment of measures through which policy is to be carried out. The device of a joint congressional committee is nothing novel, and the methods by which this committee is to work are the same as those traditionally used by congressional committees, though larger funds have been supplied for its professional staffing and larger use of the facilities of the Library of Congress is contemplated. As to the executive branch, also, the Employment Act conforms to the fundamental traditions of our past. From George Washington down, the President has reported to the Congress on the state of the union and made to it his recommendation of that program of legislation which he believed would best promote the national welfare. This pattern is, we hope, enriched but certainly not altered under the Employment Act. An annual Economic Report of

the President is to be prepared with the assistance and advice of the newly created Council of Economic Advisers, and submitted to the Congress promptly at the opening of its session. This is essentially an extension of the state-of-the-union procedure.

Traditionally also—and constitutionally—the President has been entrusted with the duty as Chief Executive of carrying out the measures enacted by Congress, the major parts of this work being directly administered by department heads who also sit as Cabinet officers advisory to the President. His administrative family has gradually been enlarged through the establishment of a variety of agencies and establishments whose heads counsel the President in special areas and upon occasion sit with the Cabinet. Directly within the Executive Office are the Bureau of the Budget and the White House staff, who help the President's over-all planning and management functions. This traditional system of operation in the executive branch is in no way altered by the Employment Act. The Council of Economic Advisers merely augments the facilities of advice and policy formulation under the President.

In its economic aspect the Employment Act re-affirms and in fact makes more explicit and comprehensive than ever before the national policy of adhering to a system of predominantly private enterprise. At the same time, it states more explicitly and comprehensively than ever before a policy of the national government to follow such lines of positive action as the legislature may see fit to authorize under the leadership of the Chief Executive or on its own initiative, subject to his veto powers. This declaration of residual public responsibility on a foundation of private enterprise simply reaffirms as a matter of conscious policy the traditional course we have followed ever since Colonial times. This is the "mixed" economy under which in federal, state, and local matters we have been accustomed to operate. We of course have never had our socio-politico-economic carburetor rigidly set to any particular mixture; but neither have we ever undertaken to operate either on pure air or pure gasoline.

A century and a half ago, the infant na-

tional government planned the disposal of its public lands; the creation of a system of highway, waterway, and railroad transportation; a scheme of international commercial relations and of internal fiscal, monetary, and banking arrangements and institutions that were expected to facilitate and stimulate the vigorous use of our labor and natural resources and to fit our business life effectively into the changing conditions of the world economy. From time to time changes in the government plan were introduced—from the "internal improvements" controversy of the 1830's to the varied New Deal programs of the 1930's.

The Employment Act of 1946 is strictly in line with the spirit of 1776. It reaffirms the American practice that has been followed again and again as we have found ourselves confronted by new problems. That is, we have, generally speaking, given the individual and the privately organized group the first chance to perform a given economic service and to reap its gains—within general codes of proper conduct. But when it has become clear that private resources are insufficient or private venturesomeness too feeble or the terms of private trade incompatible with social need, we have quite freely invoked community organization, state activity, or federal aid or outright operation. Sometimes—as in the carrying of the mail—the people have prejudged the case and launched a public agency without giving much opportunity for private business to show what it could do. Sometimes, on the other hand, the public has put up with poor service because of a feeling that the field should, as a matter of principle, be left to private exploitation. That view may have been propagated by special interest groups.

In a surprisingly large number of economic functions we have organized along parallel lines of private and of public activity. We have accelerated or checked the expansion of postal, highway, education, health, power, forest, and amusement services as local and temporary circumstances seemed to require. It is nonsense to say that we have had any consistent or rational policy or economic or social theory in these matters. We have been opportunists trying to get something done, and to *preserve freedom of action of the citizen as*

well as the business enterpriser in the process of getting it done.

I strongly suspect that we shall continue these rather unsystematic practices under the Employment Act much as we have followed them for a century or more before its passage. But in conjunction with—and in a sense compensating for—this flexible and easygoing way of business life we have at length enunciated a basic policy of economic action for the federal government, coordinated—so far as they will permit—with state and local governments. This policy is in no way to abrogate or interfere with the embarking of the people in such private ventures as seem to them promising. Nor does it propose any logical or ideological rule or criterion for determining the line between private, publicly regulated, and governmental activity, in the economic area. The one distinctive change in this regard that the act introduces is in defining the concept of a national economic goal, attempting to gauge the amount by which actual performance falls short of that goal, and declaring formal governmental responsibility for seeking every means of closing that deficiency.

Finally, besides being traditional as to the frame of government and the structure of the economy, the Employment Act of 1946 maintains the basic tradition of individual freedom of the citizen in a democratically organized society. The act neither guarantees a job to everyone nor lays upon the members of the labor force any compulsion to accept a work assignment or to abridge the choice of type, location, or duration of work. It simply undertakes to provide a regular process through which maximum opportunities for useful employment for those able, willing, and seeking to work shall be created and maintained. This preservation of individual freedom applies equally to the saver, the investor, and the entrepreneur. But the act does, at least by implication, face the distinction between formal freedom and the actual restrictions of an unfavorable organizational situation. It affirms a responsibility of public administration to remove impediments to maximum production or full employment opportunity, but without trading in the citizen's birthright of individ-

ual liberty for even the largest mess of potage.

Thus we pass to consideration of what more adequate ends the act envisages within the tradition of long-established values. I have suggested that, while basic traditions of personal liberty and freedom of enterprise have not been violated—have indeed in some ways been intensified—the act envisages in all these regards somewhat larger goals than have thus far been attained within that tradition. We shall proceed therefore to consider the nature of these enlargements.

Something New Has Been Added

THE enlarged goal of public and private administration in the economic sector may be defined briefly as fuller and better sustained use of the nation's resources, human and material. With the passage of this act, we ceased to be content, in the ebullient spirit of youth, with bland confidence that the richness of Nature's provision and the spontaneous industry and ingenuity of our people will keep up a vigorous march of economic progress and cause us to recover promptly from any temporary periods of economic recession. The passage of this act reflected a sober realization that, in the state of technological and organizational development to which we have now advanced, it is quite possible for our economic life, once it is thrown out of adjustment, to fail to rebound with the resilience of an immigrant population pioneering a virgin land during the early decades of a technological revolution. It reflects the sombre possibility, revealed during the 30's, that even such smart people as we are could be subject to even more severe spasms of depression or the chronic invalidism of low production, under-employment, and meager purchasing power. It recognizes that if we are to hold the momentum attained under the stimulus of war and convert it into a steadily held high pace of peacetime activity, economic administration must do much by way of conscious and intelligent contriving.

It is a distinctive feature of the Employment Act that among the means it conceives to this end, it places a larger responsibility than has ever been recognized or is perhaps

yet accepted upon private business administration—corporate management, union leadership, agricultural organization, and consumer behavior. Since my assigned topic is "public" administration rather than "private" administration, I may not go into this phase of the act further than to quote a few sentences from an exposition of the matter which I laid before the National Association of Manufacturers at their recent Congress of American Industry:

The war record of industry was a stupendous technological and engineering achievement . . . not, however, an equal economic achievement. To have carried through the bookkeeping and disbursing operations necessary even to this gigantic operation can hardly be considered a solution of the economic problems of self-sustained prosperity in a peacetime economy. . . .

It is pretty generally agreed that in 1947 business will move into a truly, and at many spots no doubt a sharply, competitive market. That will be the testing time of business. It is up to you to show your capacity to do business in a buyers' market. Unless you can allow the full volume of productivity of our capable labor force, our ample plant, and our marvelous technology to continue unabated and can absorb within your long-time accounting, financing, and managerial system such price declines as result, you will not have shown a capacity of the competitive free enterprise system adequately to serve the Nation's needs.

Of course it would be unfair or ineffective to lay full responsibility for the attaining and maintaining of stabilized maximum employment, production, and purchasing power upon private business administration or to expect a high level of performance within the major area which it occupies unless public administration was, within its distinctive area, so conducting itself as to promote the conditions most favorable for the effective functioning of private enterprise. Since my time is so limited, all that can be said here as to the nature of this responsibility is that it is manifest in the operations of government in setting up, improving, and administering the distinctive institutions through which private business operates, and second, through the consistent and economically sophisticated handling of those substantive activities, fiscal and other, which government itself must carry on. What, precisely, this means is not anything which can be written into a single law or that the Employment Act of 1946 undertook to de-

scribe in any specific way. It is its great merit that it left details to be filled in in the subsequent process of legislative and administrative action and did not bind either the Congress or the executive agencies to any individual panacea or particular type of remedy. Instead, it enunciated its purpose in the policy clause of the Act "to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining . . . conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities . . . and to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power."

The very fact that this measure does not authorize the use of a specific remedy, but rather establishes a process for choosing and combining either preventive or remedial measures, emphasizes the responsibility which devolves upon public administration in the broadest sense, legislative and executive, federal, state, and local, to promote the objectives of economic stabilization on a high level of efficiency. What the act does definitely provide is that, instead of the piecemeal and uncoordinated way of going at the problem, to which we have been accustomed in the past, we shall from this time forward have two foci of rationalization—one in the legislative branch and one in the executive. At each of these points, it now becomes incumbent upon the individuals administratively responsible to work out the details of an integrated program through which the purpose of the act may be most steadily and fully brought to fruition.²

The members of the Joint Committee of the Congress are proceeding with their part of this task, and perhaps next year this Association will wish to invite one of their representatives to discuss with you the steps by which they are seeking to bring public administra-

tion to serve the goal of economic stabilization. In the short time which remains to me today, I shall undertake to give you a very brief sketch of the steps which the Council of Economic Advisers have taken toward discovering and occupying their place within the Executive Office of the President and of some questions which yet remain to be answered as to how our work is to be most effectively articulated with other agencies in the government and in the economy.

*Economic Advisers vis-à-vis Administrators
In the Economic Realm*

SINCE the Council of Economic Advisers is set up in the Executive Office of the President, I suppose we are technically to be classed as administrative officials. But we are possessed of no administrative authority or power to issue directives. Ours is a purely consultative and advisory role not merely as to the President individually but also, as a staff arm of the President, to a considerable number of administrative offices in the federal government. This advisory role extends in a way even to state and local governments, and to private business organization through our consultative arrangements. All this is covered in the act through provisions that we "assist and advise the President in the preparation of the Economic Report" and that we compile and submit to the President studies relating to trends and developments interfering or likely to interfere with the achievement of the policy of the Act; that we "appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy declared"; that we "to the fullest extent possible, utilize the services, facilities, and information (including statistical information) of other Government agencies as well as of private research agencies"; and that the Council "may constitute such advisory committees and may consult with such representatives of industry, agriculture, labor, consumers, State and local governments, and other groups, as it deems advisable."

Thus we must live our life and develop our usefulness on the administrative level but in the scientific atmosphere of ends-and-means analysis and comparative evaluation, not in

² Since the cost of the war from which we have just emerged puts the problem of debt reduction and budget balancing much to the fore, it is worth observing that piecemeal legislation and lack of a consistent and usefully integrated national program are among the greatest sources of waste and inefficiency in government. From the other side of the picture, a well considered program for sustaining maximum employment and production is the surest way of maintaining the ability of the economy to bear such tax burden as is needed for carrying the debt and performing the necessary national services.

the rarefied atmosphere of authority. Far from being in a position to issue directives, we do not even voice our own recommendations publicly. To attain a large measure of usefulness we must win, not merely with the President but also among the executive heads of departments, agencies, and commissions, a solid respect for the professional competence of our work—and also for its imperturbable realism. Finally, we must as to these points also win the confidence of the official heads of private economic organizations and of spokesmen for "the public."

If we are to achieve this position of significant influence in bringing public administration in the broadest sense to promote the ends of economic stabilization, without ourselves wielding administrative authority, three general requirements must be met:

1. We must be aware of the far-reaching and deeply penetrating influence of the public administrator in promoting or impeding the stabilization of our economy on a level of high production and consumption.

2. We must give full weight to the particular requirements, difficulties, and potentialities of the locality, the industry, or even the individual organization, corporate or union. But

3. We must, at the same time, manifest a power to grasp the complex interrelationships of a total economy (in its international setting). We must be able to bring to those particular interest groups, public and private, with whom we deal a vivid sense of the solidarity of the system as a whole and the generalized program which will in the long run best promote their own prosperity. This is the most intangible part of our role but one which seems to me clearly written between if not actually in the lines of the act.

Of course the legislative process must be invoked from time to time to modify our institutions in the interest of a better stabilized economy. Likewise legislatures must act in regular course to levy taxes and direct revenues into particular channels of disbursement which, for better or worse, affect the stability of the economy. It might seem from a cursory reading of the Employment Act that the work of the Council of Economic Advisers is focused

primarily, if not exclusively, upon this legislative function. More careful consideration, however, will, I believe, justify the large or even correlative importance I have ascribed to our relationships with the administrative process.

Day in and day out in every part of the nation, public administrators are making decisions and taking actions by which the broad policies and the particularized mandates of formal law become the substance of our economic life. They put flesh and blood upon the bones of a legislative act and are themselves the brain and spirit through which the legislature acts.

Hence I think it would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of the informal but vital relationships which need to be built up between the Council of Economic Advisers and its staff and this great corps of administrative officers. This defines one of the principal matters to which the Council must give its attention—a field whose surface we have as yet only scratched. In cultivating this field we bespeak your studious and friendly cooperation. Time permits me to speak only briefly of three general aspects of this problem: (1) our relationships with federal administrators; (2) our relationships with public administration in the state and local area; (3) our relationships with administrative officers of private organizations mainly limited, of necessity, to national agencies.

Under the provisions of the law, we are a small synthesizing agency close to the Presidential apex of the federal executive establishment. The factual and much of the interpretative material which we must attempt to synthesize into a consistent and sharply focused national program is drawn from the staff work of scores of agencies scattered through most if not all of the federal departments and the independent boards and commissions. Our staff mingles freely with these staffs on the plane of professional cooperation, giving us the broadest and most intimate view possible of the functioning of the economy in its almost infinite complexity. As our interpretation of these materials converges upon broad questions of national policy, it is incumbent upon the Council as such to establish consultative con-

tact with the administrative heads of these agencies at the policy level. It is important to us to make sure that we have not, in attempting to grasp the over-all picture, failed to give proper weight to the distinctive needs and operative difficulties of the functional interest groups of which the economy consists—labor, finance, management, agriculture, consumers, and what-not. At the same time, it is incumbent upon us to challenge the thinking of the top administrators in each of these areas as to whether they have become unduly influenced by the special interests of their clientele and have subordinated the highest productivity and stability of the economy as a whole to the promotion of that particular interest. It will probably occur to you at once that this kind of informal influence toward harmonizing the thinking of interrelated agencies of the federal government is very much in line with President Truman's frequently indicated desire to have all parts of the executive branch working together smoothly as a team pursuing the common goal of national unity.

Turning now to the state and local area, the growth of Big Government at Washington in recent years has made it easy for many people to get a false perspective as to where the true springs of our economic life are located. In fact the statutes of the states and even the ordinances of our cities provide a substantial part of the institutional framework upon which our business system rests or through which it operates. State and local revenues and expenditures ordinarily run at a level something like 40 per cent of federal. And their public works in normal times run twice as large as those of the federal government. Obviously no systematic study of just how the economy as a whole functions and no program for its better stabilization can be adequate which does not give searching consideration to the state and local phases.

We must seek a harmonizing of the thinking and action of state and local administrations into a coherent and consistent pattern for stabilizing the nation's economic activity. It must not, in ignorance or selfishness, be pulling off in all sorts of mutually-defeating directions. The knowledge these state and local administrators have of local conditions

and limitations must be brought in to enrich the over-all pattern of policy and program.

But from the other side, too, we must be concerned that the broad general picture be seen in the proper perspective, and that the general purpose is disseminated into the thinking of all these administrators. If a process of truly stabilizing adjustments is to be effectuated, every administrative ruling and personal act must be directed toward a consistent purpose, comprehensive as to the whole economy. To cite a single example, state administration cannot safely erect trade barriers or devise siphons of capital at the expense of neighbor states. Nor can municipalities safely construct economic walls around themselves after the physical pattern of the Middle Ages.

Finally, what has been said as to public administrators must be said of private administrative officials of business, labor, agriculture, and other organizations of an economic character outside the government. The Council has been giving particular consideration to the problem of building up consultative relations with these quasi-public administrators to the end that we may gain the sharpest insight possible into the true needs and difficulties of private enterprise and at the same time quicken their realization of the complementary relationship of public enterprise if even their own objectives are to be realized in the long run and to the fullest extent possible. We believe that this two-way avenue of communication will, over the years, help to promote a better understanding of the most effective role of government in economic life and better meshing of governmental with private agencies.

In conclusion, then, may I urge all public administrators and students of public administration to study the interarticulated political and economic philosophy of the Employment Act of 1946. A quarter of a century ago we began to develop machinery for a coordinated financial program for the federal government through the Bureau of the Budget. Belatedly we have now launched a parallel agency to aid in developing national economic policy on a similarly comprehensive basis. Deep study and careful experimentation

will be needed if we are to develop democratic but efficient means for interlacing public and private machinery to effect such stabilization of our economy as an intelligent and well-intentioned people should be capable of achieving.

May I invite you as specialists in public administration to propose or to respond to such

consultative or operating relations as may best bring the professional training and business experience of the United States to bear on the perennial and widely ramifying adjustments through which alone our complex industrial economy may be kept running at a rate approximating its potential productive efficiency.

Toward Better Public Administration

By PAUL H. APPLEBY

*Dean, Maxwell Graduate School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs*

I

RECONIZING the fundamental significance of elections in the conduct of a democratic society, career officials generally have a profound conviction of their obligation to shift ground in keeping with the shifts of public sentiment as expressed in elections. I have witnessed the effect of that profound conviction. I have seen career officials honestly and ably transfer their loyalties to changing officials, to changing political climates, changing legislative and administrative situations.

I have seen this, and I have, of course, admired it. It is very much as it should be. Knowing that it is this way, citizens generally can have greater confidence in the vitality of the political processes that are necessary to a democratic society. Knowing that it is this way, politicians, political officials, and career administrators alike can have greater confidence in their respective functions. Ability to make such a shift involves devotion to a very high principle of morality. It has very much to do with superior public administration.

Such shifts are not made without inner strain, of course. Honest and responsible persons like to be consistent, like not to be or to appear too ready to shift loyalties. They do suffer inner stress and social stress. They do suffer from some uncertainty and difficulty always associated with adjustments to changed conditions and with the changing of familiar patterns.

Career officials generally have a tendency to turn away from, to have nothing to do with, anything that is denominated "political."

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They all feel themselves to be technicians in greater or less degree—even generalist administrators. They feel themselves politically unqualified, and often say, in leaving a political judgment to a political officer, "I don't know anything about politics." This, too, is basically as it should be. Career officials are constantly afraid that they will be required or led to do something that has a *partisan* character. They strongly resist this, and they should resist it. Career officials are constantly afraid, too, that they will be required or led to do something "political" that involves the doing of something that "good administration" would not permit—giving special treatment or favor to some citizen or organization because of "pull" rather than treating all on their merits as citizens under the law. This, too, is wholly as it should be.

These two things—actions having partisan character and actions involving special privilege—occur exceedingly infrequently among career officials. The rigidity that in other connections is sometimes charged as a fault of civil servants in these connections surely is a great virtue. No partisan activity of any scope can be organized among these career persons. It is impossible, in any case, to have a political conspiracy among a million persons, or any large group of persons. The integrity and self-interest of career officials are real bulwarks. These facts are great protections, too, for any political officers who are weak or inexperienced and inexpert.

There are, however, two aspects of proper public administration that are political—not partisan at all, but political—in nature. The first already has been suggested. It is in the necessity of subordinating administration to political policy, of orienting administration

toward the general political, the general policy, situation of the time. This means, among other things, subordinating the technical to the general and to the political. It means giving due regard to political efficiency as well as to operating efficiency.

A somewhat narrow, very specific example of this might be the case of an operating head of a great line agency who has much personal prestige, courage, and strength to resist very strong selfish interests, but who may not be doing, according to our professional standards, an equally good job of internal administration. His virtue as a public leader must be properly credited to his account as a public administrator.

In a broader way, the subordination of administration, its orientation toward the political, means leaving willingly to the President and his responsible officers those political things that fall properly within the realm of high administrative discretion and executive policy, and to the Congress those political things that are legislative in nature; it means following and adjusting to those leads. These adjustments are an obligation of public administration, and making these adjustments has to do with superior public administration.

The second aspect in which public administration is political in nature lies wholly within its own field, in the first instance. It has to do with the process of adjusting administration to popular criticism, attitudes, and needs, a process that goes on, and should go on, every minute of every day at every level, within the limits of law and fair dealing. It has to do with the manner, techniques, and spirit of administration, making public administration support and contribute to the reality of a democratic society; it involves broad philosophical perspective to give meaning and significance to action; it involves social understanding, sympathy, and regard for the individuality of every citizen. Public criticism and opportunity must be seen by all concerned not so much as a reflection of administrative inadequacy as a necessary element in the constant perfection of public administration.

One way to describe this aspect of public administration might be to emphasize the fact

that the scene on which public administration takes place is a field on which mighty forces play. Here are great pulls and propulsions: forces of self-interest; forces of idealism and aspiration; forces of habit, convention, and prejudice; forces of personalities at their various vantage points; organizational forces; forces of unorganized sentiment seepage; forces that seem to be expressions of impersonal conditions, time, and place; intragovernmental and extragovernmental forces. Many of these forces tend to be embodied in the governmental organizations that become representative of them. Where these forces contend is a great battleground. It is a political battleground, and one part of it is occupied not by partisan politicians but by administrators.

Another way to describe it might be to picture the area within which public administration takes place as a web of law. Congress legislates on the matters involved in the administration of a program not once but many times. Administrators must take account of all these laws and more—for laws governing other programs modify what can be done and the manner of the doing with respect to any single program. And all these laws together yet require and leave areas of discretion. Many of these areas are new and necessarily large. They have not been sufficiently studied. Adequate administrative principles governing conduct in them are lacking.

Still another way of describing this aspect of public administration is to depict it as a special and important field characterized by the difficulties of working together. These are internal and external—the difficulties of two persons working jointly on a project, of groups and organizations jointly concerned in various ways and degrees, and the difficulties between the "organizations" and the public on which the impact of the joint project falls. Public administration has much to do with cooperation, coordination, integration, synthesis, and with imagination, consideration, and sympathy.

How much do we analyze and ponder public administration in terms of adjustment to popular criticism, attitudes, and needs? How much in terms of the meeting, resolution, re-

conciliation, and sublimation of forces? How much in terms of a web of law? How much in terms of techniques and spirit applied to the great and complex difficulties of working together? In these matters public administration properly has a political character from which we must not turn away. Public administration participates in the creation of opportunity for the fructification of moral ends. These ends are identified by the popular political processes, fashioned by legislative processes, and delivered to administrators for distribution of their values. In administration no less than in the other processes it is demonstrated that virtue must be rewarded in the ways of the sovereign—complicated ways where the sovereign is many.

The finest appeal people of good will can find in socialism or communism is in the apparent concern of those systems for equity. But surely we should know better than any other group that no economic conception or order itself can provide equity. We know that equity under any system is complex and delicate and evolving, and that it depends finally upon the spirit and technique of administration. We know that any adequate conception of equity includes regard for the creative faculties of men which make life not only an escape from brutality, but a movement toward the God that man continually discovers or creates in the image he would hope to become. Public administration must be much concerned with this. On it depends much of the reality of equity. Let us not get so concerned with charts, work measurements, and classification problems that we cannot lift our eyes and see the place where we work, its real nature, its opportunity, and its responsibility.

I am suggesting in these remarks that the term "public administration" has very much more content than is commonly ascribed to it. It is not merely "management" as ordinarily treated in technical terms, or "administration" as ordinarily treated with only a slightly broader meaning. It is public leadership of public affairs directly responsible for executive action. In a democracy, it has to do with such leadership and executive action in terms that respect and contribute to the dignity, the worth, and the potentialities of the citizen.

I have begun this discussion by referring to the political aspects of public administration because those aspects most easily and vividly suggest the incompleteness of the procedural and technical aspects which are dealt with more often. Public administration must be related to and pointed toward the political. It must draw from the social sciences. It ties these values together and relates them in concrete forms and actions so as to give reality to public interest and private rights.

II

BY DIVISION of labor and specialization over areas greatly enlarged by science, technology, and learning, differentiation between individuals has been greatly increased, just as interdependence has been greatly increased and the social relationships and processes have been made more numerous and more complicated. Public administration is enormously affected by these things. A complex civilization is inevitably reflected in complex needs and functions in the field of public administration. All public administration must be oriented toward the complex and evolving patterns of interrelationships of men and affairs. I am suggesting that in this sense the scope of public administration must inevitably *approach* the political, deliberately and with an understanding of democratic values, setting up its part of the bridge from the "strictly administrative" to the "strictly political" in order better to serve the political processes by which democracy lives. It must do this, I think, through more responsive and understanding generalists at various levels, and most importantly at top levels. It means putting more and more emphasis on bringing more complete understanding and resources into focus at successive levels. It means utilizing the values of high specialization and overcoming the limitations of high specialization.

What are the limitations of high specialization? A personnel officer or a section head may call upon and use an administrative analysis, a fiscal analysis, a psychological analysis, an economic analysis, a geographical analysis, an historical analysis, or any other of many possible technical analyses. But the section head or personnel officer can never, I

think, have treated by a process of systematic analysis *all* of the elements entering into each administrative problem or situation. The appropriate methods of analysis will never have been developed for all possible approaches. There never will be time and facilities for all of the analyses that would be theoretically possible and relevant. Not all of the analytical possibilities will occur to those dealing responsibly with the subject. If all of the theoretically possible analyses were made, there would remain two inadequacies in that process alone. One of these would be in focusing and evaluating all of the analyses representing together what might be called the total social-science product. The other would be that the total area of the problem had not even then been covered. The social sum is, and always will be, greater and more complicated than the sum of all the relevant social science parts. And public administration must be oriented toward the social sum.

If this is true at the level of a personnel officer or a section head, it is a truth of even greater significance at the level of a bureau chief. It has even more significance at the departmental level and still more at the presidential. The greatest needs of public administration are at and near top levels and in improving processes making for more adequacy at top levels. For it is at and near the top that the necessities of interrelationships are greatest.

The values of high specialization can be most effectively used when there is variety in specialization, when the various specialists can be better oriented toward each other and together oriented toward the functions of generalists. A good deal of the responsibility for both kinds of orientation rests with the administrators, but not all of it. The experts need to project their thought and materials toward each other and upward toward the needs of the generalists if there is to be any adequate joining of their contributions. There is much too much provincialism and smugness on the part of most technically trained persons.

There are too many persons in generalist posts, too, who don't know enough about us-

ing experts. The greatest need of the public service is for more and better generalists.

In this connection I was interested in a prize-winning story in the current issue of an escape magazine devoted to mystery stories, "The President of the United States, Detective." It is an imaginative flight dated fifty years hence, but in it the author does reveal a good deal of understanding of the nature of the presidential office. The editor of the magazine in an introductory note missed the whole point by referring to this mythical president as an expert. He was not an expert. He did know how to use experts.

It is highly desirable to emphasize this faculty, but it is equally desirable to emphasize the other faculty, that of understanding and being able to deal with society. There is validity in the log-cabin tradition, just as there is fallacy in it. A good generalist administrator derives in some subtle way from society at large; he is sensitive to people in particular and in general; he knows how ordinary people think and feel, when and within what limits they may be moved. He has a faculty of general judgment that can hardly be described as anything but "political sense." That kind of political sense in public administrators is a priceless support to the functioning of politicians and the political processes, even though there are sharp differentiations between public administrators and politicians. Perhaps a chief distinction is that the generalists possessed of the political sense I am talking about, except for political appointees, should not have and would not have personal political ambitions or careers.

The specifications are difficult to draw up, and difficult to fill. Highly educated persons tend, on the average, not to have enough of the common touch of political sense. They have necessarily advanced by means of a series of concentrations of effort different from the efforts of those not equally schooled. Technically trained persons tend, on the average, to have still less of political sense. Yet technically trained persons have to be used importantly in public administration, and generalist public administrators must be so educated as to be able to use experts effectively. This is the fallacy of the log-cabin tradition.

We must bring to bear on social problems more fruits from the social sciences, more fruits of technical processes, more of the knowledge of experts. And we must see the incompleteness of all this; we must develop persons and processes that relate all this to the general scene. If politics is the art of the best-that-is-possible, public administration partakes more and more of that art as it progresses up the hierarchical ladder. It is an especially hard progression for the technically trained.

I should like to repeat then: The greatest need for improvement of public administration is at and near the top where the necessities of interrelationships are greatest, most intricate, and most far flung. How many men and women in a short span of years become as well qualified for these high places as they could be?

The universities and colleges must be concerned about this need. A few, certainly, should give it particular attention in an effort to produce a greater percentage of young men and women better qualified for rapid movement upward. Yet educational institutions clearly cannot turn out young graduates ready to serve or acceptable in top positions. They can hope to turn out larger numbers of young people qualified in the course of years to go higher and to serve better at higher levels. They can hope also to contribute constantly to the widening of horizons, the raising of standards, the elevation of aim.

But operating responsibility in this matter of developing top personnel surely rests with government itself. And up to now government has done practically nothing about it. Individuals within the government have tried a bit. Occasionally, single bureaus or departments have paid a little attention to such a program. But the efforts have been intermittent, and they have not been consciously undertaken in any large or adequate way. Most recruiting still is done lower down and, there, in terms of getting persons qualified to do reasonably well the jobs being immediately filled. No general or widespread effort has been made to recruit or to develop personnel in terms of future top needs. Top jobs are filled on the basis of a very sketchy inquiry and largely in

the absence of any clear notion of what abilities are sought. Much too often they are filled on the nomination of "a fellow I met at lunch a few weeks ago." There is no roster, and no good basis for developing one, of names of persons qualified for top posts.

There is need, both on the campuses and in lower than top levels of government, for more recognition of and understanding of the conditions within which public administration takes place. A great deal of employee frustration, and something very like that among academic folk as they consider the world of affairs, grows out of failure to understand the processes by which things are related. There is a corresponding need at top levels for better understanding of and better utilization of the riches of expert knowledge. These two needs must be reconciled. Top-level judgment should not rest on mere expediency. Expert judgment should not, as such, attempt top-level roles. A prominent geographer recently suggested that the most important function of pure social science may be to help clarify issues. An early sociologist referred similarly to the role of sociology as that of a midwife.

III

RELATED to what has been said is another need—for universities and government to produce more people with political sense and political ability. This is a big subject in itself. General understanding of political institutions and political machinery is pathetic—even on the part of commentators and political leaders. The ability to work effectively in political affairs is rare, and particularly so among persons privileged in education and position.

As I have said, civil servants are inclined to an attitude of panic at the very suggestion that a problem has political character. Citizens are inclined strongly to distrust anything labeled political. Academicians and intellectuals generally tend to be between distrust of and contempt for the nonexplicit processes of judgment. Yet the processes of politics are the processes by which democracy lives.

We are given, usefully at times, to talking about public administration "outside of the political area." What we mean much of the

time is "outside of the partisan area." Valid public administration takes account of specialized and localized sentiments and needs, seeks with flexibility to achieve greater equity, but beyond that it amalgamates or synthesizes these sentiments and needs into a "public" need. It participates, in terms of its limited executive discretion, in the composite development and execution of policy. Breadth and intimacy of contact and depth of insight give greater competence to the undertaking. Sufficient fullness of understanding gives awareness of the meaning of public interest. As here outlined the administrator does through a more subtle process, within the scope of his capability and function, the same overall type of adjustment performed by the more obvious and conspicuous partisan processes. How many public administrators are adequately distinguished by breadth and intimacy of contact, depth of insight, and fullness of social understanding? How often do we discuss and explore their roles in terms of these qualities?

There is need for special understanding of the partisan area, too. It is remarkable how naïve about parties are many who feel themselves especially qualified to speak about government. They assume that the lines between parties should always be clearer and more definite than they can be except, on occasion, about general directions. They fail to see the real virtue of a two-party system as the means by which a great and farflung people are brought close to decision, with the area of their choice clarified and narrowed. They fail to understand parties as great complexes of sentiment, habit, interest, and location that provide serviceable but not too logical common denominators of a nature higher than "higher mathematics" or the strictly logical. Major parties importantly and immediately useful in enabling a democracy to arrive at agreement on a course of action are fortunately not themselves too far apart and are not simple and logical, but are great, complex conglomerates, subject to *policy slanting*.

All of this suggests, among other things, another need for more attention to the development of superior line administrators. More has been done by the colleges and universities and by government toward professionalizing

staff officers; those in the line have been brothers of Topsy. Technicians—agronomists, biologists, economists, physicians, lawyers—have been used as (I do not say they have become) administrators. Staff officials have moved into the line. And some political officers have developed into more-or-less career administrators. By giving thought to it we should be able to add a few cubits to the stature of line administrators.

Of a different order is the need to vitalize thinking in the social science fields. Some of the dynamism must be engendered on the campus; some should come to the campus from public and private administrators. The Hawthorne Plant experiments and studies, for example, while extremely limited, have opened fields rich in suggestion to psychologists. Indeed, much new work in both social and individual psychology is one of the great needs associated with all that I have been trying to say. In economics, both government and the campus are still much too limited by Smith, the Mills, and Marx. Common notions about economic efficiency, like notions about other efficiencies, need to be challenged by relating them to realities and to more penetrating conceptions of social efficiency. Governmental economic thinking is too much a simple application to societies of concepts of individual economics. International economic thinking is rudimentary; it must be developed rapidly to support needed development of international political thinking. Much research would be fructified by relating it to administrative problems.

In this connection I can report one highly encouraging phenomenon. We have heard a good deal about the mature zeal of G.I. students enrolled in the colleges. We have not heard enough about G.I. faculties. Experts exposed thoroughly to fast-moving affairs in government and the military services are today yeasty factors of great importance to our society.

IV

SOME of these needs might well be restated. There is need in the government and on the campus for a special orientation of all the social sciences toward each other, toward citi-

zenship, and toward public service broadly viewed. There is need for a special orientation of all university training—the natural sciences, law, medicine, engineering, business administration, fine arts, architecture, education—toward the cooperative business of living and working together. There is need both for more general and more intensive study and understanding of organization and the psychological and structural relationships between individuals and their organized undertakings. There is need for special orientation toward world collaboration, world functioning. There is need for new understanding by experts and administrators of the ways in which expert knowledge can be used to make for better administration.

My plea today is for a broader, more humanitarian, and more deeply democratic approach to public administration, the recognition of its whole content, its finally general nature, its conduct dependent in high degree on generalists. To think thus broadly about public administration, we have constantly to come back to the kind of society with which we are concerned. The political aspect of public administration does not call simply for realistic recognition of forces operating on the field within which public administration takes place. Good government is not simply a pool ball taking the direction determined by impacts of all the other balls on the table. Superior public administration is not a matter of being able in advance to approximate that direction. Good government must be realistic, but it must be idealistic, too. It must respect and nurture and serve the people whose instrument it is. In particular, it must serve their aspirations, their upreachings. The cynic sees only the self-interest of pressure groups. One who believes that the universe has signifi-

cance and that life has meaning sees man's undeniable and growing capacity for compassion and altruism.

There is danger here of sentimentality, of course. I am inclined to think sometimes that many of the efforts "to secure citizen participation" partake of that. Sometimes they are mere press-agentry presented in terms of pseudo-profundity. Administrative devices dressed up with citizen participation may confer special privilege on some citizens, may really be syndicalism, may confer responsibility on persons not really responsible, may rely on representatives not broadly enough representative. Tripartite boards and committees are a frequent example of the oversimplification of representation which assumes that citizens are only farmers or workers or businessmen, or only some few other things. We must remember that *there is nothing so fully democratic as the totality of the political processes in a free society*. These processes are going on every day, everywhere in this land.

Certainly, we cannot find an adequate, truly democratic, general guide in conscious and specific "citizen participation." The number of citizens involved is too great, the number of our concerns is too great, time presses us too hard for decision. Officials as especially responsible citizens who always can be but do not always have to be, controlled, must, with intricate coordination representative of divergent interests, on a field where all interests play under super-krieg lights, go ahead in an effort to make public administration ever better.

The guide that does seem to me a generally applicable one is this: that government shall be so devoted and so considerate that citizens generally need never fear it. This aspect of the freedom from fear I would hold before you as a superior guide to superior public administration.

Japanese Administration— A Comparative View

By MILTON J. ESMAN

I

EXPERIMENTATION has been the major theme of American administration. American administrators characteristically meet their problems according to the requirements of immediate situations and tentative standards established by experience. This practical approach to administration is frequently modified, however, even eclipsed, by such factors as traditional practice and legal formalism. Timid officials seeking to avoid responsibility for decisions and lawyers interpreting administration as a dependency of statutes and regulations frequently ignore the empirical approach to public problems. Yet their attitude has seldom gained widespread support because the American community itself evaluates administrative performance primarily by pragmatic standards. Students, critics, and practitioners, from their earliest exposure to administrative problems, absorb so much of the prevailing climate of pragmatic thought that they seldom realize how completely it serves as the criterion of their judgment and the automatic governor of their behavior.

The pragmatic approach to administration does not characterize all administrative systems. This main current in the United States and in the British Commonwealth is in most of the administrative systems of the world a rather modest eddy. Administrators in some countries judge their work primarily by its faithful perpetuation of traditional practices, its strict conformance to political dogmas, or its logical subordination to legal regulations. For Americans an introduction to an administrative system such as the Japanese, in which achievement is not evaluated by familiar prag-

matic standards, may serve to clarify the more prominent features of American administration. A comparative analysis may also provide some insight into the intimate dependence of American administrative thought and behavior on the distinctive social values of American life.

Before its recent defeat, Japan's highly organized administrative machine controlled the intimate detail of life for a highly disciplined society of seventy million Japanese, as well as the colonial destinies of additional tens of millions throughout East Asia. This relatively honest and outwardly efficient public service, with its high *esprit de corps* and its extensive responsibilities, never operated according to the pragmatic standards that Americans recognize. When the architects of the Meiji restoration began in the late 1870's to construct a modern administrative system, they selected Prussian models, just as Prussian models were chosen for other major institutions—the schools, the army, the courts. With the Prussian administrative prototype came the *Rechtsstaat* ideal which had imparted to Prussian administration a predominantly legalistic bias, and to this ideal Japanese administrative scholars and practitioners applied themselves with characteristic energy and determination. For them it served a dual purpose: to convince westerners that extraterritoriality was not necessary in Japan, and to strengthen the status of professional officialdom in Japanese society. In a few years Japanese officialdom adopted a more exclusively legalistic approach to public problems than even the Prussians. Though many concessions to traditional native practices and values were incorporated into the new admin-

istrative system, the dominant tone of Japanese administration became legalistic to the virtual exclusion of practical values. It has remained so until the present time.

What is the legalistic approach to administration? Administrative legalism establishes the major premise that every official act must be authorized in advance by a specific statute or regulation. Official acts not so supported become prospective misdemeanors. Before an official act may be undertaken it must undergo the exacting test of legality. According to this principle, personal rights are thus protected. Its inevitable corollary is an intricate formal set of rules designed to govern every conceivable administrative situation. The safe official, before acting, looks for specific authorization in the laws or regulations. Regardless of the emergency nature of specific situations or social necessity, he construes the absence of specific legal authority as full justification for failure to act; and regardless of common sense, he follows regulations to the letter. This dependence on legality resolves all new operating problems into legal problems which can be met only by the issuance or amendment of regulations. The code of regulations thus increases in bulk and complexity. To those trained to understand them, the provisions of the code become surrounded with an inviolability which frequently overrides in importance the situations they are designed to settle.

The discharge of public business increasingly depends on the interpretation, publication, and amendment of regulations. A consistent legal code becomes an end in itself which only highly trained administrative lawyers can manage. Higher administrative positions in government become the monopoly of administrative lawyers since only persons legally trained can deal adeptly with codes of regulations which become the principal technical business of public administration. Though operating problems are left to subordinate personnel, concern with the formal legality of actions pervades every level of the administrative hierarchy. Scholars and critics of administration work principally in the field of administrative law. Officials instinctively react to public problems according to the wording and the categories of administrative regulations to which they impart a higher order of value than

to the situations themselves. Entangled in administrative law, public officials become increasingly estranged from the real problems of living; their thinking and behavior are governed by the legal rather than the pragmatic approach to administration.

Though legalism has dominated the public service in many countries and has affected many American officials and agencies, nowhere has it gained more influence than in Japan. And nowhere have pragmatic values in administration been more thoroughly disparaged and more effectively subordinated even by institutional arrangements.

Indoctrination in legalism begins in the universities. Young men aspiring to the higher administrative service compete for admission to the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial University. Since the prestige of this faculty is the highest in the Orient, it attracts the most promising young men in Japan, and certainly the brightest among those who seek a career in government. It prepares more than 75 per cent of those who finally enter the higher administrative service. Those who fail of admission to Tokyo Imperial University may receive adequate preparation at the Law Faculty of Kyoto Imperial University, but their chances of success in the all-important higher civil service examination are somewhat less favorable. Those who fail to be admitted to either of the major Imperial Universities usually abandon hope for a career in the higher administrative service. A few of their number annually make the grade, but the odds against them are so disheartening that only the most persistent and optimistic continue to strive.

The course of study at the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial University is three years. The faculty is divided into two departments, law and political science. Those who intend to enter the Ministry of Justice as judges or public procurators or to practice law privately enter the law department. The content of this curriculum is overwhelmingly legal. Of the twenty-three courses offered, nineteen are technically legal, two deal with the history of law, one with the philosophy of law, and one with political economy. It should be noted, however, that persons admitted to the higher administrative service with this training are eligible, after two years service in the Ministry of Justice, to oc-

cup higher administrative positions in any national ministry. Quite frequently they find their way into other ministries in very responsible, nonlegal positions.

Most aspirants for the higher administrative service enroll in the political science department. Its curriculum is as follows:

First Year

Compulsory courses:

- Constitutional law
- Civil law (general principles, law of real rights)
- Public international law (peace)
- Principles of economics
- Political science
- Political history

Elective course:

- Criminal law

Second Year

Compulsory courses:

- Comparative constitutional law
- Administrative law (general part)
- Public international law (war)
- Civil law (liens, law of obligations)
- Diplomatic history

Elective courses:

- Commercial law (general provisions, companies, commercial transactions)
- Economic policy

Third Year

Compulsory courses:

- Administrative law (special part)
- Civil law (family, succession)
- Public Finance

Elective courses:

- Commercial law (insurance, bills and notes, maritime commerce)
- Private international law
- History of Japanese law
- History of political science
- Science of administration
- Social politics
- Sociology

Students must pass examinations in all the compulsory courses and four of the electives.

The legal emphasis of this curriculum is im-

mediately evident. Of the fourteen required courses, nine deal with legal subjects. Even among the ten elective courses, five are legal. Among the other courses, two in economics and one in public finance prepare students for coveted positions in the Ministry of Finance. Diplomatic history helps to train prospective Foreign Office officials. Social politics and sociology, elective concessions to modern social thought, have been looked upon as potentially "dangerous" by the police and conservative educators. Political history is a broad political survey of world history while the history of political science actually treats European political theory. Among the nonlegal courses this leaves only political science and science of administration.

Political science, a required first-year course, has traditionally treated the theory of state, the philosophical definition of state power, the locus of sovereignty, and such problems as the juridical and moral sanctions of obedience. More recently this course has moved somewhat closer to the American approach to government and politics, introducing the study of political institutions and behavior. It still contains, however, a large residue of conceptual speculation which remains the standby of Japanese political scientists.

To the legal scholars who dominate the Law Faculty the *bête noire* of the nonlegal courses has been the third year elective, science of administration. It represents a simple adaptation to Japanese conditions of familiar American survey courses in public administration. It is perhaps the only course in this curriculum which attempts to analyze political and administrative problems as empirical rather than philosophical or legal phenomena. And because it appears to poach on the hallowed preserve of administrative law, it has been regarded with no little suspicion and even contempt by many of the pillars of the Law Faculty. Since it has never been elevated to compulsory status, relatively few students have taken this course and most of them fail to offer it as an examination subject. Therefore the great majority of graduates—the core of the higher administrative service—have never been exposed to a course in scientific public administration. They lack even academic insight into administrative realities.

No student could emerge from this curriculum without a heavy legalistic bias, even an automatic predisposition to reduce most situations to formal legal propositions. This situation prevails equally at other universities, imperial and private. In fact, other universities, less well endowed than Tokyo Imperial, are unable to waste their meager resources and the time of their students on social politics and science of administration, courses which fail to pay off. Except in occasional political science courses, the government curricula of other Japanese universities adhere rigidly to philosophical and legal formalism.

The legal scholars who early gained control of the study of government entrenched themselves in an almost impregnable position by a unique device, the higher civil service examination. By grafting onto the traditional Chinese civil service examinations the Prussian emphasis on legal studies, they have established, with themselves at the pivot, a closed system of legally slanted political thought. The higher civil service examination became a prerequisite to entrance into the higher administrative service and to the corps of successful candidates was reserved all the higher positions in the career service.¹ This examination is planned and administered by the higher civil service examination committee composed predominantly of professors from the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial University and high government officials, themselves graduates of the same faculty. The subjects required in this examination closely parallel the curriculum of the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial University.

By controlling this examination, the Law Faculty effectively determines the selection of higher administrative personnel. Through this power it controls the political science curricula of all the Japanese universities, since the principal purpose of these curricula is the training not only of higher officials, but also of subordinate officials, municipal officials, and businessmen able to speak the prevailing legal language of Japanese government. They thus exert a decisive influence on political and ad-

ministrative thought. There is no parallel in modern history to this device by which the faculty of one institution, administering the examination which controls entrance to all the higher career positions in government, effectively imposes its own view of public administration on the educational system of a major nation. This explanation does not account entirely for the domination of legal thought in Japanese administration. The underlying causes, later to be discussed, are more complex than a mere conspiracy of legalists. But this distinctive technique has decisively strengthened the grip of formal legalism on Japanese political and administrative thought.

It profits the aspiring higher official to be a bright administrative lawyer. He has, in fact, little alternative. Since no question on science of administration has ever appeared on the higher civil service examination, time devoted to that course has been time wasted, subtracting from the time that might otherwise be spent memorizing the legal codes and commentaries essential to success in that difficult, but all-important examination. The legal courses have been the ones that pay off, not only in the examination, but later in the ministries where a young official is most likely to be appreciated for his ability to draft and interpret administrative regulations. Pragmatic administrative thought has been as much out of place in government agencies as in the University curricula and the ambitious young official can ill afford to devote much time to it.

II

THIS situation accounts directly for the aborted development in Japan of a systematic science of public administration. There are no professional societies of public administrators. Even in political science, a more respectable branch of study for Japanese, the small Political Science Society at Tokyo Imperial University is the only association of any consequence. Its principal contribution is the monthly publication, *Kokka Gakai Zasshi*, which contains scholarly articles in jurisprudence, political science, and occasionally administration. *The Journal of Legal Science*, published monthly at Kyoto Imperial University, denotes by its title its principal interest in jurisprudence, but has from time to time

¹ For a detailed account of the Japanese public personnel system, see Hugh H. MacDonald and Milton J. Eman, "The Japanese Civil Service," *7 Public Personnel Review* 213-224 (1946).

carried articles on administration. These two outlets have more than satisfied the modest output of professional articles in public administration.

The production of books in public administration is limited to a mere half-dozen volumes, all very general studies. Contrast this with the shelves of compilations, general and specialized commentaries, on administrative law. The significant books in administrative science represent the pioneering work of Masamichi Royama, formerly professor of the science of administration at Tokyo Imperial University. After studying extensively in England and the United States, Professor Royama introduced into Japanese thought the pragmatic approach to administrative problems. Before his premature retirement in 1938 from the faculty of Tokyo Imperial University, he had published four volumes which virtually exhaust the catalog of Japanese textual writing in administrative science.

Though no general administrative research organizations have been established, the specialized field of local government has produced two. The Tokyo Bureau of Municipal Research was founded in 1922 by the late Mayor of Tokyo, Viscount Goto, who secured substantial endowments for the institution. Dr. Charles A. Beard was commissioned to "assist the Institute in organizing its programme library and research methods."² The bureau's battle for municipal home rule collided abruptly with the Home Ministry's drive for increased centralization of local administration. The bureau continued to fight a losing battle against the growing power of the Home Ministry, but after 1931, with the gradual demoralization of its leadership, the Bureau's influence waned. Its monthly publication, *Problems of Tokyo (Toshi Mondai)*, treats political as well as operating phases of municipal government.

The Osaka Research Institute, founded by a group of local businessmen in the 1920's, worked closely with the Osaka municipal government on specific operating problems until

² Beard, Charles A. "The Government of Tokyo," New York, 1923, p. 1. In this monograph Dr. Beard treats the organization and early problems of the bureau and proposes substantive reforms in the municipal government of Tokyo.

its dissolution in 1944—a wartime casualty. At one time it was closely associated with the Osaka Commercial College which opened a School of Local Government. This promising development was abandoned in 1940 after a ten-year trial because so few students enrolled that its continuation could not be justified. Its demise left only one course in local government in all Japan.

The prestige of local government employment is far below that of the national civil service. Local officials are not considered members of the Imperial service; their social and professional prestige suffers accordingly. Their ranks are generally filled by unsuccessful candidates in the higher civil service examination and by college graduates in political science and economics who prefer not to compete in the examination. Local officials are looked upon by national officials as socially and intellectually inferior. Local government service which is not regarded as a first-class career is paid correspondingly poorly. The prestige of Imperial service and the intellectual authority of the legalistic tradition have prevented the development of a respectable profession or a systematic study of local government.

III

JAPAN'S failure to develop a science of administration is reflected in the management of public affairs. To support this statement fully would require a detailed administrative survey of the Japanese government which is not available at the present time. Succeeding paragraphs, however, represent composite conclusions resulting from first-hand observations of the author, the experience of several American colleagues, and the comments of Japanese officials, scholars, and private citizens.

The great arbiter of Japanese administrative practice is precedent. Because of this reverence for established ways, a precedent once set can only with painful effort be revised. Japanese, especially in official circles, habitually rely on established authority and feel uncomfortable in the face of experimentation. Decisions are usually predicated less on the merits of alternatives than on the weight of established practices. This tendency, common to all organizations, is usually the controlling factor in Japanese government.

Japanese administration therefore is encumbered by a network of procedures which are generally unrelated one to the other but continue in effect because, once established, they have never been reexamined or reappraised. These procedures are seldom written down; no Japanese agency has anything resembling a manual of procedures. Procedures are retained in the heads of lower-grade officials who frequently have no conception of the purposes these procedures serve beyond their own desks or offices. Higher officials—trained only in legal subjects—seldom remain in one position long enough to grasp or to reappraise and modify operating procedures even if they were interested in operating problems. Each new decision superimposes a new layer of procedures on those already in effect. Japanese officials are untrained in administrative management and none of them at an effective level of management are interested in operating procedures.

Japanese higher officials have not developed administrative standards. Higher administrators usually draft regulations which meet the requirements of internal consistency. But disdaining administrative details, they leave the effectuation of their regulations to poorly educated subordinates who lack the professional incentive, training, authority, and understanding of over-all operations necessary to systematize administrative procedures. They prefer to honor familiar precedents and, wherever possible, avoid the burden of initiative and decision.

The difficulty of securing decisions, a chronic plague of large organizations, severely afflicts the Japanese government. This situation has not been discouraged by higher officials. Since so many of their decisions involve the interpretation or amendment of legal regulations, they hesitate to trust such matters to subordinates less competent than they in administrative law. By insisting that all but the most routine decisions pass through the administrative hierarchy before final approval, higher officials retain strict control of the legal form of their operations. These delays, added to the sluggish flow of documents, increase the time the public must wait for administrative action. Until August, 1945, the long-suffering public had no recourse but to grumble privately. Higher officials have recently been dazed by the shock of

widespread, vigorous criticism on the part of private citizens and groups.

Japanese officials have no understanding of public relations. The idea of public service and responsibility is unfamiliar to them. Before the Allied occupation the problem of pleasing the public, of soliciting advice, or explaining decisions never arose. It was rather the citizens' duty to solicit, explain, and please. "Civilians" are still commonly regarded by higher officials as troublesome and unworthy recipients of administrative guidance. Procedures are usually designed for the convenience of administrators rather than the public—less from spite than from sheer neglect. Before the occupation no serious effort was made to determine trends in public opinion or to explain to the public the reasons underlying administrative decisions. With increasing press censorship in the 1930's and the muzzling of the Diet, the last effective avenues of independent expression were silenced. Only the most powerful and influential economic and social groups were able to win occasional hearings. The participation of these groups and the advice of their leaders was occasionally imposed on the bureaucracy, but rarely solicited. The Japanese bureaucracy thus succumbed to a common failing of officialdom, the assumption of omniscience. A privileged class in the community, they have honestly regarded themselves as the only group in Japan capable of contributing anything constructive to the management of public affairs. Interference from outsiders has been stubbornly and successfully resisted. This ill-concealed attitude has alienated from the bureaucracy every section of Japanese society. Unaccustomed to the need for rapport with the community, unfamiliar with the administrative techniques and daily behavior essential to effective public relations, Japanese officialdom now for the first time feels the need for devices calculated to win public understanding and support.

In the development of personnel specialization the Japanese have not kept pace with the demands of modern government. At the clerical level the absence of administrative analysis and position classification and the retarded mechanization of operations have resulted in the arbitrary assignment of undifferentiated clerical personnel. In the higher reaches of ad-

ministration, policy-making positions were, until April 1, 1946, reserved to the elite who entered the government service through the higher civil service examination. These specialists in administrative law are considered qualified for higher positions in any bureau of any ministry. The prevailing policy of frequent changes in positions prevents the development of subject-matter specialization among these officials, whose pre-entry training has been limited to legal subjects. Subject-matter specialization has been common only among technical officials and executives who before April 1, 1946, were systematically relegated to subordinate positions. Technically trained personnel, even in railway and communications enterprises, have been restricted to subordinate posts. This arrangement has provided Japan a higher career service tightly controlled by a corps of amateurs.

Even when government deals directly with the public, specialized personnel have seldom been employed. These operations instead have been assigned to the ill-trained but energetic and willing national police. The following is a selected list of operating functions performed by the national police prior to the occupation:

1. *Economic controls:* Enforcement of economic control measures including price ceilings, sales practices, inventory restrictions, etc.; allocation and rationing of scarce consumer commodities; enforcement of restrictions on banks and other financial securities and commercial exchange institutions; supervision of weighing and measuring machine businesses, the fertilizer industry, agricultural warehouses, sericulture, rice imports and exports, wholesale markets.

2. *Labor activities:* Encouragement of business paternalism, discouragement of unionism, and detection of dangerous thoughts among workers; arbitration of labor disputes; recruitment of workers through supervision of labor exchanges; factory inspection to ensure enforcement of health and safety regulations.

3. *Political functions:* Censorship of books, newspapers and magazines, plays and films; licensing of theaters and actors; surveillance of political parties; control of public gatherings through advance registration and surveillance; supervision of election machinery

through enforcement of the election law; surveillance of individuals and groups suspected of "dangerous thoughts."

4. *Licensing and regulation* of brothels, geisha houses, lunch rooms, cafes and bars, restaurants and tearooms and tea houses, hotels and lodgings, mineral sponge baths, women's hairdresser shops, barber shops, mah jong clubs, amusement places, halls for hire, scribes, stevedores, taxis, carting and draying, rickshas, horse carriages, buses and stages, pawn brokers, business and employment agents, horse and cattle dealers, commercial credit bureaus, guides, offshore merchants, second-hand dealers, printing shops, bicycle shops, stamps and seals, compressed gas, gunpowder, firearms, gas and electric shops.

5. *Public charity:* Discovery and reporting of needy cases and supervision of administration of aid.

6. *Public health:* Enforcement of food, drug, and sanitation laws; supervision of midwives, masseurs, acupuncturists, druggists, and dealers in poisonous chemicals; inspection of annual compulsory house cleaning; sanitary inspection of insane asylums, hospitals, restaurants, inns, public baths; inspection of incoming vessels.³

Police also performed all the public safety, traffic control, civilian defense, criminal investigation and apprehension functions normally associated with police work. Fire prevention, fire fighting, building inspection, and even flood control were in police hands.

With this impressive catalog of duties the police were an indispensable arm of the administrative amateurs who governed Japan. The latter issued administrative regulations and left their enforcement to the police. However unworkable these regulations, however remote from reality, the police provided their own rough-and-ready implementation. Armed with legal authority but unencumbered by delicate considerations of personal rights, unrestrained by courts or public criticism, the police saw that essential public services and

³This information, corroborated by observation, is digested from Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Report 2758, "Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation," 1945, and Army Service Forces Civil Affairs Handbook on Japan, M354-14, "Public Safety."

regulations were carried out. "The sheer weight of police power solves many problems by permitting overwhelming concentration of personnel on urgent situations. Recent Japanese administration has been a succession of breakdowns restored by energetic police action."⁴ Without the energetic and reliable police, Japan's administrative amateurs could not have maintained their position. This dependence on the police became clearly apparent in the floundering incompetence of the government once the police were stripped by the occupation forces of the bulk of their operating functions.

IV

IN RECENT American administrative thought a reliable gauge of efficient management has been the development of alert central administrative services. These auxiliary and staff agencies provide specialized services required in common by operating units and perform systematic planning and control functions for the echelon to which they are attached.

The secretariats attached to Japanese ministries contain, usually, sections on personnel, accounting, and archives and documents. In such a highly organized ministry as Finance the central administrative agencies contribute to the development and execution of relatively coherent operating programs. Most of the ministries, however, have adopted the pattern of the Cabinet secretariat whose sections perform only routine transactions in personnel management, accounting, and document control. In Japan line officials continue to perform, unaided, functions which in the United States have become highly developed staff specialties. This lag reflects the failure of Japanese scholars and administrators to develop a science of administration emphasizing staff co-ordination and professional specialization. The effect of their absence in Japan can be illustrated by a brief survey of the principal central administrative services at the Cabinet level.

The Budget Bureau, as in England, belongs to the Ministry of Finance. It draws up the annual budget after hearing general justifications by the claimant ministries. The bureau,

however, has no objective standards by which it evaluates proposed expenditures for materials or personnel. Breakdowns for activities and for objects except in the gross are not attempted. Cost accounting has not been introduced. Many years ago the bureau accepted the stipulation, imposed by political superiors, that once an agency has been authorized a "recurring administrative expenditure" in the so-called general account, that item will be accepted as a binding precedent and will not be challenged in future budgets. On the estimates side the bureau has confined its activities chiefly to very general program analysis. It has not prescribed standard estimates forms nor has it developed techniques for scientific analysis of expenditures. Observers generally agree that the budgetary accounts maintained by the bureau are so intricate that nobody outside the bureau can understand them. Doubts are frequently expressed that the bureau officials themselves can comprehend them. To rationalize the budget on the estimates side, General MacArthur's Headquarters was obliged to direct the Japanese to systematize their budgetary accounts according to agencies, projects, purposes, and objects of expenditures in order to make the budget understandable to Japanese legislators and Allied officials.

Once the Diet has adopted the annual budget, the bureau's duties for that fiscal year, except for routine accounting chores, have been discharged. The bureau does not administer the budget. Funds are not allocated periodically to spending agencies nor are expenditure programs surveyed or authorized by the bureau. Spending agencies control completely the disposition of funds and disburse them at any rate they desire. Usually the accounts sections of the various ministerial secretariats provide monthly allocations to operating bureaus. But no control whatever is enforced by the Budget Bureau. Top level budgetary administration in the American sense is not practiced.

No central purchasing agency exists. Despite tremendous expenditures even for nonmilitary materials and supplies, the government has made no effort to coordinate purchasing. Ministries bid against each other on the open mar-

⁴ MacDonald and Esman, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

ket, and bureaus of the same ministry, prefec-tural governments, and their departments compete for available supplies. No standards have been established for government purchasing, and no central control whatever is exer-cised over this phase of government participation in economic life.

In organizational and procedural analysis nothing has been accomplished. This is the branch of management work which above all others depends on a body of systematic thought derived from detailed analysis of closely ob-served experience. Having failed to recognize administrative science as a respectable subject of study, the legalists controlling Japanese admin-istration have exhibited little interest in this kind of work. None of the ministries have assigned personnel to the study of organiza-tional or procedural problems. The elaborate apparatus that has recently been developed in the United States for work load analysis, proc-ess charting, and unit surveys is entirely un-known in Japan. Even at the Cabinet level specialized administrative analysis is not per-formed. Japanese officials, self-avowed disciples of "efficiency," regret in not unfamiliar terms that so poor a nation as Japan cannot "afford" to allocate personnel to such a residual, nonproduc-tive assignment as administrative analysis.

The imperial personnel system does not in-clude a central agency. The ministries and prefectures fill their personnel requirements, including technicians, without the benefit of examination according to very general edu-ca-tional standards laid down by imperial ordi-nance. Positions have not been analyzed or classified, the salary scale is not dependent on duties, and the elaborate hierarchy of personal rank is not directly related either to duties or to pay. The training and service rating func-tions of personnel administration have not been developed at the Cabinet level. Matters involving personnel are generally reduced to imperial ordinances or Cabinet resolutions and reserved to the operating line for implementa-tion. In some ministries a personnel section is set up in the minister's secretariat, but none of these sections are staffed by professionally trained personnel technicians. Their chiefs usually occupy these positions for only a few months before moving to other assignments.

The duties of personnel sections are usually confined to routine instructions to operating units and processing the details of personnel transactions. Personnel matters, governed by detailed legal regulations and unwritten rules which vary widely from ministry to ministry, are managed by line officials without the bene-fit of specialized staff assistance.

The Higher Civil Service Examination Com-mittee is administratively an adjunct of the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation. Its permanent members, high career officials, approve the educational qualifications of certain classes of higher officials, mostly technicians, who are re-cruited directly by the operating ministerial bu-reaus and appointed without examination. The permanent members of the committee, supple-mented by faculty members drawn principally from the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial Uni-versity, prepare and administer the higher civil service examination. Success in this examina-tion is prerequisite to high position in the ca-reer service.

It is no accident that the Higher Civil Service Examination Committee is assigned to the Bu-reau of Legislation and that the chief of that bureau is ex-officio chairman of the committee. At the Cabinet level the only central control agency, the only coordinating organ of any con-sequence, is the Bureau of Legislation. The principal function of this bureau, as its name implies, is the clearance for content and form of all proposed legislation, including Imperial ordinances, originating in the various minis-tries. This bureau is known even in Japanese official circles as a conservative, legalistic body. Its business is the precise analysis of prospective laws and regulations; its higher personnel in-cludes only legally trained officials. Far re-moved from the operating levels of govern-ment, remote from life's daily problems, its officials view administration as the automatic se-quence of regulations. This bureau, wedded to administrative legalism, has become the main staff coordinating unit of the imperial government. Because of its strategic position in the Cabinet and the prestige of its legal emi-nence, it has gained control of many functions which in the United States would be assigned to nonlegal, specialist staff agencies. Personnel administration is one of them, administrative

organization and management another. Since Japanese thought and practice dismiss these functions as formal elaborations of legal imperatives, they fit logically into the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Legislation.

V

SUPERFICIAL similarities between recent Japanese administrative management and the pattern prevailing in agencies of the United States federal government in the 1890's or in backward state governments today may lead to hasty and unfounded conclusions. The opinion is frequently heard that Japan remains a generation or two behind the West and has not yet "caught up." In the exploitation of technological devices this lag is quite evident and readily explained—the Japanese started late.

The same cannot be said of administration. The Japanese are not helpless babes in the administrative woods. They can boast an administrative tradition based on centuries of experience. Administration is essentially the management of human relations; to brand the Japanese as "backward" in human relations merely reveals a western prejudice. According to the social values that govern their society the Japanese are subtle artists at human relations. Far from "primitive" they have lived in and operated a highly controlled and complex social organization. Unlike the federal government of the 1890's or backward state governments today, both of them performing only a handful of executive functions, the Japanese government for years has dealt in a myriad of functions closely regulating economic, political, and intellectual life. These have for a generation or more exceeded the catalog of functions performed even by wartime American administration.

Students of German administration and jurisprudence draw many parallels between German and Japanese practice. Much in Japanese political organization has consciously been copied from Prussia and Germany. Prince Ito's Constitution of 1889 was modeled after German practice of the previous decade. Political institutions and the legal code were consequently set up with Prussian models in mind. The ideal of *Rechtsstaat* inevitably followed with its legalistic approach to public affairs

managed by an exclusive official caste. Japanese universities, as previously noted, were founded on German lines. The curricula of Japanese law faculties where government is taught parallel almost course by course the German *Rechtsfakultäts*. Dozens of Japanese scholars and officials, moreover, studied in the famous German universities. Much German experience in education, law, and government was incorporated into Japanese thought and practice. Many of the forms of modern Japanese legal and administrative organization, hastily established to achieve "modernization" and eliminate extraterritoriality, were faithful copies from the German.

Some Japanese therefore hold that the structure and procedures of Japanese administration, including its legalistic tone, can be explained fully by their German origins. This explanation at first blush appears plausible because so much inescapable evidence can be summoned up to defend it. But explanations of social phenomena based on origins alone are usually deceptively simple and seldom complete. They fail to demonstrate how some foreign importations thrive in their new soil while others quickly wither. This is precisely what happened in Japan. While many features of German administration were successfully transplanted, others never took root. The long, painstaking, carefully organized in-service training of young officials, carefully cultivated in Germany, was never adopted in Japan. Nor were Germany's highly integrated budget system and its flexible central departmental staff organization accepted. Japanese administration cannot therefore be adequately explained by the German origins of some of its major institutions, but rather by the factors in Japanese life which proved so hospitable to some German elements and hostile to others. The true explanation lies in Japanese society.

Administration is never an apparatus functioning independently of the community. It is instead an intimate part of the complex of obligations and expectations grounded in daily life. Administration may guide and even modify these community expectations, but it cannot safely depart from them and remain effective. Administration which is not imposed by outside force, which has enjoyed reasonable

continuity and community support, reflects the social values of the society in which it functions. This applies as well to Japanese as to other administrative systems, national and local, political, economic, religious, public, and private. Comparative administration must therefore take account of comparative social values. Differences between American and Japanese administrative structure, procedures, and thought faithfully reflect fundamental differences in the political and social values of these two societies.

To define in their ultimate refinement the dominant social values in American life far exceeds the scope of this study. The most learned analysts of American society have never agreed entirely among themselves. Despite their differences, however, observers of American life generally agree on a few of the basic values which over the years have struck the predominant tone in American society. They will be mentioned here to indicate the context of values in which American administrative thought and practice have developed and to register their contrast with the basic values of Japanese life upon which, in turn, the Japanese approach to administration depends.

The political equality of all members of the community protected by inalienable natural rights has been a main current in American thought. As a corollary, government is continuously responsible for all its acts to the citizenry whose welfare it is created to serve. Executive power is an inherently evil force, potentially subversive of liberty, which must be circumscribed by strict limitations and constantly supervised by a vigilant community through its legislative and judicial arms. Working within these limitations, alert administrators have developed objective standards to defend their stewardship and to justify requests for new appropriations and for renewed authority to operate. This has stifled the development in America of a self-contained officialdom and has forced administrative personnel to think and to operate on the pragmatic level which potentially hostile, hard-headed, economy-minded, nonspecialist legislators could clearly understand.⁵

⁵The spoils system and machine politics, while contributing little to efficiency in government, have offered

This tendency had been strengthened by another powerful value current—utilitarianism. This arises from an optimistic faith in the possibility of personal and community improvement in this life through work. Eager for quick results, impatient of obstacles that delay the fulfillment of desired ends, utilitarianism emphasizes the most direct, pragmatic approach to situations. The American view of efficiency—minimum use of personnel, materials, and time to achieve results—exorcises formalistic impediments in its emphasis on getting the job done.

Japanese civilization recognizes an entirely different scale of values. Japan is conceived as a self-contained family state in which each individual is expected to contribute his utmost within the opportunities assigned him by the class of society into which he is born. In this stratified status system individuals have never been recognized as qualitatively equal. Officialdom comprises a special class in the community sharing court precedence with the military and nobility. Officials owed no obligation to the community but only to their feudal lords, and after the Meiji Restoration this allegiance was transferred to the crown.

In the hierarchy of values resulting from this status system, utilitarian factors have occupied a very minor position. The principal function of government, despite the encouragement of technological progress, has been to preserve the customary ways of behavior and prevent subversion of the social status quo. Reverence for traditional behavior has been an unfailing imperative. To please one's ancestors and one's superiors, to behave toward one's equals in the customary manner, have been the deeply rooted and strictly enforced requirements of Japanese conduct. In this atmosphere utilitarian values have been almost the last considered.

One of the paramount values in Japanese society has been the traditional respect for and dependence on established authority. To do things as they have formerly been done has traditionally been the safe course of action. Innovation and experimentation have always en-

little scope for the development of a secure class of officials. Their training and the expectations of their communities have disposed them strongly to a pragmatic view of administration.

tailed risks far beyond the rewards that might accrue to the adventurous. It was the right of the warrior Samurai to decapitate any peasant or artisan discovered doing anything that contradicted established patterns of behavior. That practice has left its legacy in Japan. Observers of Japanese education comment that most of the educational curriculum is practice in memorization. Even at the university level students are encouraged and rewarded less for thinking constructively than for learning to quote authorities accurately.

Before the Meiji restoration, administration was controlled by the class of Samurai scholars educated in the Chinese tradition. Educated and cultivated Chinese have traditionally looked with contempt on the details of life, including the details of government. Such vulgarities, beneath the dignity of scholars and officials, should properly be left to half-educated clerks, artisans, and aggressive men of affairs. This tradition was accepted by educated Japanese who added to the moral and philosophical speculations of the Chinese the construction of logically consistent codes of conduct within the authoritative purview of customary practices.

After the Meiji Restoration the Samurai retained their control of public administration and even strengthened their position as their feudal superiors were eliminated. The Samurai and their children retained control of administration for many years during which time the structure of the modern Japanese state was planned and solidified. It was this group with its philosophical predisposition, its contempt for administrative details, and its need for an authoritative guide to action that accepted the German legalistic approach to administration and adapted it energetically and enthusiastically to the peculiar requirements of Japanese government. Thus the gap between thought and action which invariably accompanies the legalistic approach to government fitted comfortably into the familiar patterns of Samurai behavior.

The concept of *Rechtsstaat*, it has been noted, was adopted primarily to convince the western world that because all acts of Japanese officials were regulated by a strict rule of law, extraterritoriality could safely be withdrawn.

Legalism, however, had other important uses for Japanese officialdom. It provided them a detailed and intricate mystery which only initiates into the legal priesthood could properly understand. By making of government a complex web of administrative regulations, by thus establishing the indispensability of legal learning, the Samurai and their successors have protected their monopoly of higher administrative positions and preserved the power of the bureaucracy against possible assault by the military, the nobility, the financial clique, or the political parties.

Though the development of technology and the introduction of western ideas increased the influence of utilitarian values in many sectors of Japanese society, they were never able to gain a dominant position in Japanese thought, least of all in government where the trend was actively resisted. The forces in society which contribute to a practical view of public administration were not sufficiently powerful to outweigh the prevailing reverence for traditional behavior supported by police authority and an entrenched officialdom motivated primarily by fear of social changes. Thus the Japanese view of efficiency in government—to preserve the established ways—has had little in common with the American doctrine of efficiency—maximum service with the minimum expenditure of personnel, materials, and time.

VI

EVERY advanced administrative system develops characteristic techniques and critical standards embodied in a philosophy or science of administration. These, in turn, are used to reduce the many possible approaches to administrative situations to a few manageable alternatives consistent with socially recognized values and prevailing administrative patterns. The next generation of administrators is trained according to these standards and administrative performance is judged by them. Every society has its own social values, many of which it may share with other societies. The closer the values of two societies correspond, the more likely they are to meet problems by similar techniques, to develop similar critical standards, and to exchange ideas and informa-

tion. Conversely societies serving radically different values are likely to meet problems through dissimilar techniques and to develop divergent standards. This holds especially in the realm of human relations of which public administration is the most highly organized expression.

Some enthusiastic students of administrative management claim that the true science of administration which they are fashioning can disclose universally valid laws governing administrative relationships. Efficient, thoroughly tested administrative techniques, they hold, can be separated from political values and applied with equal effectiveness in all political and social contexts, in Nazi Germany or Inner Mongolia as well as the United States. They confidently believe they are building, chiefly from American experience, a body of administrative science which transcends differences in social and political values and applies with equal assurance of success to all situations subject to administrative action.

In their enthusiasm, however, they have failed to take into account an established axiom in science—that laws established by experimentation retain their validity only in situations governed by the experiments and defined in the laws themselves. Under altered conditions such laws may become entirely irrelevant and useless for prediction or control. Like all general conclusions claiming scientific validity, the principles developed by American students of administration remain dependable

only within their original context. They may, in the United States and in societies recognizing similar social values, successfully surmount political considerations and even matters of important social policy because the pattern of obligations and expectations in these communities is not likely to be radically changed. But applied to societies which respect social values not contemplated in the experience from which the rules were derived, such rules lose all reliability for prediction or control.

It is a reasonable prediction that the current widespread Japanese acceptance of American administrative techniques and concepts will outlast the Allied occupation only if social values similar to the American gain ascendancy in the minds and in the behavior of the Japanese. How quickly and efficiently the Japanese assimilate the social values of their conquerors will determine the extent to which they find American administrative techniques meaningful and useful—even understandable.

Comparative administrative study may serve more purposes than the description and analysis of separate approaches to administrative problems. Under favorable circumstances studies of this kind may contribute to the cross-fertilization of administrative systems with techniques and ideas developed elsewhere. On the other hand, comparative analysis, by stressing the social context of administrative behavior, may indicate some of the sobering limitations of reliable generalization in the field of administrative management.

The Tri-County Regional Planning Commission

By MAXINE KURTZ

Research Analyst

Tri-County Regional Planning Commission

URBAN decentralization is one of the most difficult problems confronting public administrators today. A suburban fringe of residential communities, incorporated and otherwise, surrounds every major city in the United States. Multiplicity of unifunctional units of government, need for urban services, limited ability to raise revenue, and lack of integrated development with the central city and with neighboring suburbs—all characterize these communities to some extent.

Metropolitan Denver is not exceptional in its pattern of growth. The city proper is surrounded along most of its periphery by urbanized communities, only a fraction of which are incorporated municipalities. Three counties—Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson—abut Denver city and county and collectively encompass the entire suburban area.

The tri-county region contains far more land area than the urbanized satellites of Denver. Adams and Arapahoe Counties extend seventy-two miles eastward from Denver, and Jefferson County extends approximately forty-eight miles to the southwest. The far eastern portions of the region are agricultural; the far west and south edges are mountainous and devoted primarily to mining, livestock raising, and recreation. Denver lies in the junction of the L-shaped area. Suburban communities spread in a circle extending roughly ten miles beyond the city limits.

Denver is the natural commercial and cultural center of the region. A heavy industrial area to process meat, grain, and oil is located in the northeastern part of Denver and extends north into Adams County. Brighton in Adams County, Englewood in Arapahoe County, and

Golden, Arvada, and Lakewood (unincorporated) in Jefferson County together with Denver provide the financial services. Brighton serves as a distinct shopping center for the northern farming portion of the region. Englewood and Lakewood are increasingly providing commercial services as many large Denver stores establish suburban branches.

Culturally, Denver provides almost all of the facilities other than schools, small libraries, neighborhood-type theaters, community centers, churches, some recreational parks, and the fairgrounds of each of the three counties.

To a great extent the suburban communities are "bedrooms" for a commuting population that works in Denver proper. They have the usual local enterprises—grocery stores, barbershops, restaurants—but are far from being economically self sustaining.

The war period accentuated both the trend toward decentralization and the problems attendant upon it. In 1930, 81 per cent of the dwelling units in the four counties (Adams, Arapahoe, Denver, and Jefferson) were located in Denver; in 1940, 79 per cent were located within the city. A study of the permits for dwelling units for the year ending August 31, 1946, reveals that 43 per cent were in the suburbs and 57 per cent were issued in the city itself.

All of the needs of the city—domestic water, sewerage, zoning, subdivision regulation, building codes, parks, roads, traffic control, utilities, fire protection, policing, education—are found in the satellite communities. The suburbs have, as units of government, three counties, thirteen municipalities of varying size, two domestic water districts, three sanita-

tion districts, eight fire protection districts, and sixty-eight school districts (including two union high school districts). Despite this large number of local governmental units, many communities are served only by the county and school district in which they are located. The powers of both types of unit to meet urban needs are limited. Denver, in contrast, has a unified city-county government and a single school district coterminous with the municipal boundaries.

Planning Background in the Three Constituent Counties

WITHOUT a basis in law, planning for community development tends to be ineffectual. Planning for municipalities was authorized by the state legislature in 1929,¹ although municipal zoning was permitted in a 1923 statute.² The County Planning and Zoning Act became law on March 30, 1939.³

The County Planning and Zoning Act permits the establishment of three types of planning commissions: district, county, and regional. A district planning commission has jurisdiction over the unincorporated portion of a county specified in the resolution creating the commission and is primarily concerned with zoning. No district commissions are operative in Colorado at this time.⁴ A county planning commission has jurisdiction over an entire county and is in part a staff agency for the board of county commissioners. Seven such commissions are now active in Colorado—in Adams, Arapahoe, Jefferson, Boulder, Mesa, El Paso, and Montrose counties. Finally, a regional planning commission may be formed to serve two or more counties or counties and municipalities. The Tri-County Regional Planning Commission is the only organization

in Colorado falling in this third classification.

The county planning commissions in the region were created on the following dates: Jefferson County in May, 1939; Arapahoe County in June, 1939; and Adams County in March, 1940. The Denver Planning Commission is, of course, a much older body, having been organized in 1926. Almost simultaneously with the organization of the county planning commissions, Denver officials joined with the boards of county commissioners and planning commissioners of Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson Counties in the formation of an informal agency known as the Upper Platte Valley Regional Planning Commission. This body had no appropriation or staff, and served primarily as a means for the several constituent governments to consult on problems of mutual interest. With the establishment of the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission in 1944, the Upper Platte Valley organization lost most of its reason for being; it has been dormant since 1945. Finally, five municipalities located in Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson Counties have appointed city or town planning commissions.

In the case of the counties, the primary interest lay in zoning, and to that end consultants were employed to write the resolutions and draw the maps. Jefferson County adopted zoning in a portion of the unincorporated area in February, 1941, and Arapahoe County followed suit in December of the same year.⁵ In Adams County, the zoning resolution was adversely received by the public in 1943; the Adams County Planning Commission then became inactive until 1945, when another attempt at county zoning proved successful.

County planning commissions are empowered to prepare plans for roads, parks, airports, utilities, and public buildings, to mention but a few of the facilities. Subdivision regulation is an indispensable adjunct to these plans, since it is the means whereby some control is exercised over the dedication of land to public use. Under the County Planning and Zoning Act, subdivision checking becomes a responsibility of a county planning commission upon its creation. Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties soon developed standards for judging subdivisions, although no written statement of them was prepared until 1945. Almost no subdivision

¹ *Colorado Statutes Annotated, 1935*, Ch. 163, Sec. 165 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, Ch. 26, Secs. 19-22.

³ *Session Laws of Colorado, 1939*, Ch. 92.

⁴ The Red Mesa District Planning Commission "zoned" a small area in Mesa County in 1946, but since that time has not been active.

⁵ Prior to this date, the Cherry Hills District Planning Commission instituted zoning under the act. Since then, however, part of the district has been incorporated as a town, and the balance is now zoned under the general county resolution.

took place in Adams County between 1940 and 1945, and the inactive status of the planning commission until 1945 precluded effective activity paralleling developments in the other two counties. The subdivision regulations of the other two counties had been prepared in written form when the Adams County Planning Commission resumed operations, and the commission adopted them almost immediately.

All three counties adjoining Denver faced the problems of providing urban services to heavily populated unincorporated areas. The problems fell into several categories: (1) policing, (2) health, (3) planning, including zoning, subdivision regulations, building codes, highways, recreation, airports, sanitation, and utilities, and (4) programs for various types of public services and facilities.

Several steps toward joint action by the three counties containing the Denver metropolitan communities were taken before the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission was established. The three boards of county commissioners met jointly to discuss their problems. Formal agreements were adopted relative to issuance of liquor licenses and to the closing hours of taverns. Numerous other matters were subjects of informal joint action, the most frequent probably being road problems.

Organization of the Tri-County Commission

THE boards of county commissioners of the three counties and the members of the county planning commissions recognized that in order to be effective the planning activities of each needed the continuing services of a full-time professional staff. Some assistance, primarily in the form of mapping, had been provided by the State Planning Commission, but more work was needed than the staff of that body could supply. No single county was able to finance a satisfactory program. After numerous conferences with the director of the State Planning Commission, the boards of county commissioners of Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson Counties entered into a formal agreement in August, 1944, to create a regional planning commission. The primary purpose of this organization was to provide a staff for the three county planning commissions. The Regional Planning Commission began its work by adopt-

ing bylaws covering the details of administration and by employing a director on September 1, 1944.

In establishing the regional commission emphasis was placed on the provision of a staff for the several counties, and representation on the commission was based on the relative amount of service each county anticipated it would require. Adams County has one representative, and Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties have two each. Customarily, commission members are also members of their respective county planning commissions.

Originally, financing was on the same basis as representation, but now the apportionment of the total annual appropriation among the three counties is fixed by mutual agreement. During the first year, Denver University assisted the Regional Planning Commission by providing rent-free office space in its Government Center. Since then, the commission has been entirely self sustaining.

The professional staff at the present time is stabilized at four positions. The director supervises and coordinates the work of the commission and carries on research. The research analyst makes legal and statistical studies and social and economic analyses. The chief engineer is responsible for field work, including checking maps and subdivisions, designing parks and fairgrounds, and advising on water and sanitation problems. The draftsman is responsible for the mapping projects.

Relationships with County Government

POPULATION patterns and economic status in the counties present a wide range—from the densely populated community of Lakewood with a population of 14,000 to the sparsely populated cattle ranching areas; from the country estates of the wealthy to the slum dwellings of the foreign-born farm workers. Attitudes range from great enthusiasm for planning on the part of some realtors to opposition by "embattled" local interests who cite every battle from Lexington and Concord to Guam and Guadalcanal in their arguments, and emphasize their points with sawed-off shotguns.

The Tri-County Regional Planning Commission provides the staff for the three county planning commissions, and informally has also

become a research agency for the county commissioners in their legislative role. In addition, it works with and for a large number of other county officials.

County Planning Commissions. The final decision on all planning matters within a county rests with the county planning commission. The members of this body review, amend, and eventually adopt all plans prepared for their use by the staff of the regional organization.

The first and most basic task for the three counties was mapping. Quarter-township maps of the metropolitan area, prepared in 1941, were borrowed from the State Planning Commission and field checked and corrected for changes in roads, utility lines, and subdivisions. As they are recorded, new subdivisions are added to the base maps, and the staff is now engaged in redrawing the maps on tracing cloth for the permanent use of the Regional Planning Commission.

So far as possible the property lines of unsubdivided property and the location of irrigation ditches and reservoirs are also shown. Not only is this practice valuable in locating proposed subdivisions, but there is also a favorable psychological effect on rural landowners when they can identify their land and that of their neighbors. The correct portrayal of property lines and irrigation systems has usually served to increase public confidence in the commission's work.

Special maps of municipalities, school and other unifunctional districts, and various other subjects are prepared as needed.

Keeping zoning current is one of the most pressing needs of a metropolitan area, particularly if urbanization is increasing rapidly. Arapahoe County, although growing at a fast pace, did not need extensive revisions of its zoning because the suburbs for the most part were incorporated. Therefore, its zoning was transferred to reproducible prints of the uniform base maps without change. In contrast, Jefferson County zoning needed revision and extension of both resolution and maps. This was completed and adopted on May 6, 1946. In January, 1946, Adams County zoned a residential suburban area adjoining Denver, and subsequently extended the zoning to a limited degree.

Success in selling county zoning is the first test of most county planning in Colorado, and Adams County proved no exception. The proposal that county zoning be instituted stirred up a veritable hornet's nest. Two minorities were especially vocal—local residents who did not understand zoning, and certain commercial interests that had established themselves on the outskirts of the central city to escape city regulation.

The best technique for dealing with the problem seemed to be to throw away the dictionary and write a popular explanation of zoning in "words of one syllable." Special emphasis was placed on what zoning does—and, more importantly, what it does not do—to existing structures. Distribution of this statement quieted most of the immediate excitement. After two or three months, the populace discovered that no buildings were being torn down and no one had been put out of business. Public opinion was rapidly won to the support of zoning, and subsequent extensions and changes have been accomplished with no unusual excitement.

Throughout the war and immediate post-war periods, the Denver region has been rated as the first or the second most acute housing shortage area in the nation. The inevitable result was an unprecedented rush of land subdivision as soon as the war was ended.

When in 1945, the county planning commissions in Arapahoe and Jefferson counties proposed that written subdivision regulations be formulated, the suggestion won strong support from realtors and other subdividers. After numerous conferences with local groups, the standards were issued in a form agreeable to all parties concerned. Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson counties then adopted the regulations in virtually identical form. Several municipalities have followed suit to achieve further uniformity within the region.

Subdivision regulation and a road plan go hand in hand, and a road plan project was undertaken in the summer of 1946. The obvious steps in starting the road plan were to classify existing thoroughfares (and probable extensions) in terms of the volume of present and anticipated traffic, and then to ascertain the present widths of right-of-way as a guide to the

county planning commissions in the acquisition of further land through dedication in subdivisions. After the rights-of-way acquired through dedications and deeds had been checked, the preponderant amount of mileage in the county road system was still unaccounted for. A check into Colorado road law (dated 1887) and subsequent Supreme Court decisions revealed that confusion reigns supreme relative to the criteria for ascertaining when a road is public and when it is used by the public but is privately owned. The road plan is now temporarily dormant pending action of the Colorado General Assembly on legislation designed to clarify the situation.

The basis for recreation planning in the three counties is a survey conducted for the Regional Planning Commission by one of the graduate fellows of the department of government management of Denver University. An initial attempt was made to conduct the survey at the regional level, and after several months' trial this technique was proved completely unsuccessful. After a conference with several local community leaders the plan of survey was reversed, the data being collected directly by local community organizations. This phase of the plan was completed late in 1945.

Unlike most parts of the country, recreation facilities in suburban Denver communities are established through an interesting combination of official governmental activities and extragovernmental community activities. Acquisition of land and continuing maintenance costs are a governmental responsibility. Supervision is sometimes governmental and sometimes community, but capital improvements are invariably financed through community enterprise. Money is provided by community festivals, raffles, and similar means.

While this pattern of providing recreation has much to commend it from a psychological standpoint, uncoordinated community activity is wasteful. The Tri-County Regional Planning Commission has prepared site plans for four recreational parks and two of the three county fairgrounds. (The third fairground was built in 1902.) In addition, the movement on the part of organized groups interested in the various projects to unify their efforts has been encouraged.

Sanitation in metropolitan Denver is almost inseparable from the water and sewage disposal policies of the city itself. In 1945, a survey of sewage collection and disposal needs of the various sections of the metropolitan area was conducted for the Tri-County Planning Commission by one of the graduate fellows of the department of government management of the University of Denver.

Subsequently, several cities started the construction of disposal plants adequate to serve the surrounding unincorporated urbanized areas. However, several cities and towns are financially unable to provide independent systems. Other areas are so situated topographically as to make an independent disposal plant wasteful of money since the only result would be duplication of Denver's facilities (in some cases these plants could be located only within the corporate limits of the city). Finally, water is essential to sewage disposal, and many communities must depend completely on Denver water. Without an increase in the water supply, public sewerage facilities are impossible. In the interim, the Tri-County Planning Commission is working with subdividers to make private disposal facilities as adequate as possible.

The three counties have most of the airports that serve the region located within ten miles of the common boundaries with the city. In addition to the Denver municipal airport (a large field serving both commercial traffic and small planes) and two large military fields, seven smaller airports for private fliers and training schools are located in Adams and Arapahoe counties. The principal service rendered to these private facilities by the County and Regional Planning Commissions is the protection against flight obstacles afforded by zoning. (No separate airport zoning as such has been found necessary; the provisions of the general resolution are adequate to control height of structures within the flight lines.)

At the present time, an airport survey is being conducted jointly by the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission and the city and county of Denver. Because of the nature of the project, this survey is included in the subsequent discussion of relations of the Regional Planning Commission with Denver.

County Commissioners. As the only depart-

ment supported in common by the three counties and having a trained staff, the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission has almost inevitably acquired certain tasks which are not of a strictly planning nature, but which directly affect the pattern of growth and development in the three counties.

After five years of experience with zoning in Arapahoe and Jefferson counties, the need for the additional protection afforded by a building code was clearly defined. Enabling legislation for county building codes, sponsored by the senators from these two counties, was passed by the General Assembly in 1945.⁶ Subsequently, the boards of county commissioners asked the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission to prepare a code suitable for use in the unincorporated areas.

The initial draft of the code, known as the *Uniform Building Code of Colorado*, was prepared by the first director of the Tri-County Planning Commission, who was an architect by profession. Subsequently, the code was reviewed by the Denver building inspector, by a number of local architects, engineers, investment bankers, and attorneys, and finally by representatives of most of the major trade associations having an interest in building materials. All were generous in their assistance, and at the end of a year the code was ready for adoption.

Formidable procedural difficulties hinder the adoption of building codes, both by unincorporated areas and by municipalities. However, three unincorporated areas in Arapahoe County have adopted the code. Most of the municipalities in the region are also considering its adoption.

Obviously, aspects of county administration other than planning require uniformity of action. This is achieved by two means. The chairmen of the three boards of county commissioners are ex-officio members of the Regional Planning Commission, and the three men usually attend the regular monthly meetings. Quarterly, the nine county commissioners meet with the Regional Planning Commission and the county clerks and county attorneys. Establishment of county dumping grounds, uniform road excavation permit resolutions, re-assess-

ment practices, routing of intercounty roads—these are typical examples of the problems of common interest discussed, and frequently solved, at these meetings. (Dumping grounds to serve Denver were also established as the result of joint conferences among the three boards of county commissioners and Denver City officials.)

Other County Officials. All county officials are involved in the planning function if the process is to be carried out properly. Exchange of information, reciprocal use of records, and mutual rendering of assistance are all phases of the work with these other officials. Among the county offices most frequently called upon for help are the following: county clerk and recorder, county attorney, county assessor, county treasurer, county surveyor, county superintendent of schools, sheriff, and county building inspector.

Relationships with Municipalities

THE cities and towns in the tri-county region are small—one has a population of 14,000, but that is twice the population of the next largest city. Most of the thirteen municipalities have populations of from 2,000 to 5,000. Cities and towns of this size are closely integrated with the surrounding unincorporated area and can well adopt regulations identical to those governing the surrounding area.

One of the outstanding results of county planning was an awakening or revival of interest in planning on the part of the incorporated municipalities. The boards of county commissioners authorized the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission early in its first year to work with the cities and towns in the region. Cooperation with the municipalities has been a continuing process, paralleling closely the county activities. The time of the staff spent on services to the municipalities in a county is a contribution by the county to the welfare of the citizens of the cities and towns and to the unified growth of the region. However, counties are reimbursed by these units of government for expenses such as mileage and supplies.

Selling zoning, building codes, and planning in general to municipal officials requires a thorough familiarity with municipal govern-

⁶ *Sessions Laws of Colorado, 1945*, Ch. 90.

ment. To put the situation differently, the group trying to effect municipal reform has to be in a position to point out to the city or town officials facts about their government that they do not already know. Some unusual ordinances have been unearthed. For example, one city unintentionally required that the inside of chimneys be lined with shingles. Another city prohibited every type of construction other than sheet metal in a relatively poor section.

Once the ice has been broken, the municipal officials seem to be willing to accept suggestions on a variety of subjects. To date, most interest has centered in zoning ordinances and building codes. The reason is obvious—the municipalities find themselves with less control over building than the county exercises over the adjacent unincorporated area.

The primary emphasis in municipal zoning ordinances and building codes is in keeping them current. A second major consideration is integration of these regulations with those of the surrounding unincorporated areas. Building codes are adopted without reference to planning commissions, and zoning may be effected with or without such bodies. As far as possible, the local authorities are encouraged to create a continuing machinery to review these ordinances and keep them up-to-date.

Occasional assistance has also been rendered in such municipal activities as subdivision regulations, street plans, sanitation systems, and recreation.

Unending patience is required in dealing with small cities and towns. After insisting that a given proposal be completed in a minimum amount of time, the municipal officials are apt to let it gather dust for a period varying from several months to more than a year. (An exception to this general rule is the administration that is going out of office and wants to accomplish its objectives while still in power.) However, when officials do decide to proceed, a project is apt to be adopted with the utmost dispatch. The reasons for this situation are not clear, but the facts must be accepted in order to accomplish the desired end.

Legislative Program

BIENNIALLY, the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission works with the county commissioners, county attorneys, and municipi-

pal officials in the formulation of a legislative program. Two regular sessions of the Colorado General Assembly have been held since the Tri-County Planning Commission was organized. A wide variety of bills has been sponsored in both sessions.

While municipal and county planning acts are not model statutes, no attempt to amend them has been made. The various statutes governing planning have been found workable, and the composition of the legislature has been such as to deter any attempt to amend the laws.

At the request of the boards of county commissioners, the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission prepared a bill authorizing county building codes. The proposal was passed in the 1945 session of the General Assembly, although a compromise needed to secure passage of the bill made the adoption procedure very difficult. A bill to simplify the procedure has been introduced into the current session of the General Assembly, and has been printed. The proposed procedure is identical to that in county zoning, providing that the area to be covered by the code should be suggested by the county planning commission.

Because of the exorbitant printing cost involved when a city or town adopts a code as an ordinance, a bill has been introduced into the 1947 General Assembly session to permit adoption of codes by reference. The proposal is supported jointly by the Colorado League of Municipalities and the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission. This bill has been printed, and should be reported out of committee in the near future barring unforeseen circumstances.

Two bills pertaining to highways have been introduced into the General Assembly. The first is designed to create explicit standards for ascertaining when a county acquires a prescriptive title to a roadway. The second relates to the bridging of ditches. An 1887 statute requires that ditch companies build a bridge twenty feet wide over ditches where the ditches cross a public highway. Obviously, the result is the creation of bottlenecks in otherwise satisfactory highways. The present bill proposes that the type of structure (culvert, bridge, or other) and plans for its installation should be specified in an agreement between the ditch

company and the board of county commissioners. However, the structure must carry the water "from shoulder to shoulder" of the roadway.

A bill authorizing the creation of special taxing districts in unincorporated areas of counties for the purpose of providing recreation programs has been introduced into the 1947 General Assembly. This has been done primarily at the request of local citizens benefiting from county parks in Jefferson County. One outstanding feature of the bill is that the boundaries of districts are to be suggested by the county planning commission.

An attempt was made in the 1945 General Assembly to pass the FPHA-NHA sponsored urban redevelopment bill. The legislators refused to accept the proposal, and the Denver city attorney drafted a compromise measure. Cooperative efforts of the Denver officials and the Tri-County Planning Commission succeeded in securing the passage of the compromise bill. (The change required to secure passage was transfer of the power of rebuilding a blighted area from a public housing agency to private enterprise.)

One of the greatest causes of ill-feeling between Denver and the surrounding suburbs was the welter of annexation statutes under which Denver proceeded to annex surrounding areas. Since the situation was equally distasteful to Denver and to the surrounding counties, the county attorney of Arapahoe County and the Denver city attorney's office drafted two statutes designed to govern all future annexations by cities and towns in Colorado, and repealing all of the numerous earlier statutes. One of the new acts was to govern annexation of unincorporated areas; the other pertained to annexation of incorporated cities and towns. The measures had the support of Denver and the three surrounding counties and received the approval of the General Assembly in 1945. Subsequent experience under these acts has proved entirely satisfactory to all parties concerned.

An attempt to introduce a metropolitan district bill into the 1945 General Assembly failed because of a freakish mishap. In the intervening two years, interest in metropolitan districts has spread throughout the state. Four

titles have been introduced into the 1947 General Assembly, and several attorneys are working on drafts of a bill which will satisfy the various groups interested in the proposal. The following seven points will be included as proper subjects for metropolitan cooperation: airports, fire protection, planning, police protection, recreation, sanitation, and domestic water.

Because of general antagonism to public housing, a bill to permit counties to engage in rural public housing was defeated in the 1945 General Assembly.

A proposal for a limited village corporation was also killed because of the opposition of municipalities enforcing prohibition under local option laws.

In Colorado, counties are classified on the basis of population for the purpose of fixing fees and salaries. By a reclassification act adopted in 1945, Adams County was placed in the category just below Arapahoe and Jefferson counties. Feeling that the coherence of the region will be increased if officials holding the same position in all three counties are paid identical salaries, the three counties are supporting a measure to reclassify Adams County.

Relationships with Denver

IN ORDER to achieve unity in the growth of the metropolitan area, plans of the Tri-County Commission must be integrated with plans for Denver. Exchange of data, including maps, is a continuous process. However, no actual cooperative planning projects have been undertaken.

Two major factors account for this situation. First, the position of full-time professional director of the Denver Planning Commission is not now filled. As a result it has been almost impossible to establish the continuing contacts needed for cooperative planning. Second, the plans that have been formulated under the direction of the chairman of the Denver Planning Commission have been primarily internal—for example, redevelopment of the warehousing district in the center of the city.

Coordination of specific plans has been accomplished by working directly with the official responsible for the function, usually the director of parks and improvements.

Comprehensive coordination of the county road plans with the Denver street system has not progressed far beyond the extension of the naming and numbering system into the counties. Excellent cooperation has been secured in solving specific problems such as controlling the number of new county subdivision roads intersecting a Denver-owned speedway between the city and one of the mountain parks. Several joint road maintenance and repair projects have also been successfully completed.

Subdivision regulations in the unincorporated areas of counties are the responsibility of the counties. In one instance, a half-square mile area in Arapahoe County had been ordered annexed to Denver, but the annexation was not to be effective for a period somewhat in excess of six months. Close cooperation between the Denver officials, the county planning commission, and the board of county commissioners permitted the development of the subdivision in the form desired by the city prior to the date of annexation.

Denver and the suburban area have experienced a marked increase in the number of private planes in the last few years, and some estimates predict a fourfold increase within the next ten years. This situation calls for a belt of supplementary airports around Denver since private planes are already creating hazards to scheduled flights from the principal Denver airport.

In the past, Denver's activities in locating sites for such airports caused some irritation on the part of suburban areas because of the failure of the city to consult local officials before condemnation proceedings were undertaken.

Eligibility for federal aid to airport development depends in part on the existence of a metropolitan airport plan. No airports located in the metropolitan area other than those owned by Denver are eligible for federal assistance, but the counties have agreed to cooperate. An airport survey is under way at the present time, and in general it is serving to eliminate residual antagonism.

The principal unsolved problems at the present time are water and sewage. Water is the subject of a highly complex body of law. Since Colorado is fundamentally arid, water

has been allocated by the filing of water rights—and rights filed after the 1880's are almost useless because they can be claimed only in flood periods.

At the present time, Denver is the only governmental owner of substantial ground water rights in the metropolitan area. Inadequate storage capacity for filtered water has precluded further extension of the domestic water distribution system beyond the corporate limits. Supplementary shallow and artesian wells have been provided in several localities, but danger of contamination is high because of lack of public sewage disposal. At the present time, Denver is progressing rapidly on plans for additional filtered water storage reservoirs, and it is anticipated that the problem of suburban water supplies will be on the way toward solution in the near future.

The Denver sewage disposal plant operates at full capacity during peak periods. As a result, extension of sewage disposal service has been impossible. However, if water is available, satisfactory arrangements for sewage disposal for suburban areas can be provided in most cases.

No plan has been evolved for metropolitan recreation facilities. The city of Denver has developed a series of mountain parks located in Jefferson County.

Relationships with School Districts

SO FAR as possible, the planning for the region has included consideration of the status of the school districts concerned. Not only are the indirect aids of zoning (preventing congested development in districts with low assessed value), subdivision regulations (persuading large subdividers to dedicate land for future school buildings), and road planning employed, but the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission has provided the required certification of applications for federal aid (advance planning funds) and assisted architects by supplying data on multifunctional school design. Consolidation of school districts has been encouraged, and aid in the form of maps, information, and some procedural outlining has been rendered to districts contemplating such a move.

Relationships with Special Districts

DOMESTIC water, sanitation, fire protection, and soil conservation districts are all found in the three counties. The Tri-County Regional Planning Commission has assisted these units of government by providing maps and information about the region in general, and about the individual jurisdictions in particular. Conversely, these districts have aided the staff of the Planning Commission by making available records and various other data pertaining to their operations, such as aerial photographs.

Relationships with Other Public and Quasi-Public Agencies

PLANNING commission must work not only with local governments, but also with federal and state agencies and with the various utility companies. This is vital because the activities of these organizations form an integral part of the development of the region, and their assistance can simplify the solution of many problems. The cooperation is reciprocal, of course, with the Regional Planning Commission providing maps and various other data relating to the region. The most frequent contacts are maintained with the following: U. S. Army Engineers (flood control), U. S. Bureau of Reclamation (transmountain water diversion), U. S. Bureau of Public Roads, U. S. De-

partment of Commerce, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, State Planning Commission, State Water Conservation Board, State Highway Department, State Public Utilities Commission, State Tax Commission, State Legislative Reference Office, various bus and tramway companies, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, Public Service Company of Colorado (which furnishes gas and part of the electricity for the region), and the various suburban electric companies.

Services for the Public

THE major function of a planning commission in relation to the general public is in providing information. Current zoning ordinances of all zoned municipalities as well as of the counties, subdivision regulations, maps of all kinds, and a large file of data pertaining both to the region and to the general field of planning are kept in the office of the Regional Planning Commission at all times so that inquiries may be answered promptly, completely, and accurately. Prints of many maps are available at cost, and assistance is rendered in securing copies of maps, reports, and other materials which are not stocked in the office. The commission also gives advice on problems of zoning (or more often rezoning) and designing of subdivisions. It is borne in mind at all times that public support is indispensable to effective regional development.

Minority Groups and OPA

By FRANCES HARRIET WILLIAMS

*Formerly Adviser on Race Relations
Office of Price Administration*

I

THE Office of Price Administration at the peak of its activities dealt directly or indirectly with every citizen in the United States. One-tenth of these citizens are American Negroes. There are also Spanish-speaking Americans, Chinese-Americans, Japanese-Americans, and American Indians. These groups and certain low-income groups made up of various European and Oriental people are all subjected to some discrimination at various times and places in the administration of our laws.

Depending in part on delegated powers and forced by Pearl Harbor into acting almost overnight, the OPA found itself administering rapidly expanding programs in over 6,000 local communities. These communities included groups of minority people of various sizes. To what degree were these programs impartially administered?

The Washington staff which drew up the blueprint for the rationing and price programs had no specific instructions as to what was expected in the way of impartial administration. They were, however, American citizens brought up on the American ideas of justice and equality. They were working in an agency which, at the time the first rationing program was introduced, was hiring workers from various racial minorities and which, in its consultation with national leaders, had followed a policy of including all groups. But they were also subject to all the conflicts between theory and practice which is part of the American scene.

The first overt evidence of the point of view of the national OPA staff as to whether its major programs were to be impartially administered is found in the policies and procedures

which accompanied the issuance of Ration Book No. 1 known throughout the country as the "sugar book." At the time of registration each citizen was required to furnish certain identification data on height, weight, sex, and color of hair and eyes, but not on race.

The omission of the question of racial identity probably went unnoticed by many Americans. For them, membership in a particular racial group has little conscious intellectual or emotional connotation. But to groups in the population whose experience has taught them to fear discrimination, this omission, though seldom mentioned, had meaning.¹

The national office selected as its instrument for the distribution of Ration Book No. 1 the public schools—an institution greatly prized by democratic America but one which in practice is not without its discriminatory features.² The request for aid in the distribution of ration books went to the central school authority. The task was enormous. One hundred and thirty million people had to be reached within a few days. The city or county superintendents of schools and the teachers proceeded to get the books out. They utilized their usual channels of communication. Newspapers and radios told the people they must register at the nearest school. The people went. The program it

¹ Members of such groups, alerted by the treatment of Jewish citizens in Nazified countries, have faced the implications of such identification data on birth certificates, death certificates, marriage licenses, school records, employment blanks, and United States postal savings.

² Public schools are locally controlled and follow, rather directly, local thinking and custom. In a few northern, some borderline, and all southern communities there are by custom or law, in part or whole, two sets of public schools—one for white children and the other for Negro children. They operate under a single authority.

self, however, in certain instances pushed those who administered it toward nondiscriminatory practices.

For example, in Washington, D. C., where there is no single Negro community and where Negroes live in clusters throughout the city, the school nearest to many Negro residents is attended by white children. The radio and the morning paper said register "at your nearest school." A goodly number of people took this literally, so the lines that formed in some neighborhoods were Negro and white. No unpleasant incidents were reported. On the contrary, quite a few Washingtonians, black and white, said that they went home with their ration books feeling for the moment the impact of a total America of which they were proud to be a part.

Again, in the deep South where racial lines are tighter some communities entered into new and enlarging experiences while issuing Ration Book No. 1. For example, in one rural county where there is a dual school system, the county superintendent of schools called a meeting of all teachers in the court house. There was not time for two meetings. When the teachers arrived, black and white sat according to convenience and the work moved forward.

As the needs of the rationing and price programs began to multiply, the Washington staff recognized that there must be a group of permanent volunteers to administer the program in local communities. Governors and mayors were asked to cooperate, and the first rationing panels and early nuclei of war price and rationing boards followed, in large measure, the notion of democratic participation held by these elected officials.

If the country were politically literate, this arrangement would have gone a long way toward insuring democratic administration of these programs. But the country is not politically literate. Even where all the people can vote, the belief prevails that most of the people expect to participate very little in their government. While there were some outstanding examples of communities with representative boards,³ the general failure to secure such

³ For example, in voteless Washington, with 28 per cent of its population Negro, local boards from the beginning included representatives of all the people. In

boards was soon apparent. The Washington staff of OPA settled down to the task of making the blueprint to govern the selection of the membership of these boards as well as to determine the nature of the programs they would administer.

II

THE basic idea agreed upon was that the boards were committees of neighbors and that the membership should reflect the kind of people who lived and worked in the respective areas. The original draft plan specifically mentioned the need to include representatives of minority groups in areas where such groups lived. Some members of the OPA field staff, however, objected to the inclusion of this provision. In addition to the opposition from some parts of the South, it was said that the boards in certain areas of concentrated Negro population in the North would, under the definition of representative boards, turn out to be made up entirely of Negroes. This did not seem to be desirable to some members of the staff who felt that such boards might be looked upon as discriminatory.

The Washington staff that made the decision on the blueprint for board membership had no precise knowledge of or acquaintance with Negro communities, northern or southern. If at this time this staff had included Negroes in technical jobs where they could affect policy, or if the agency had had an adviser on race relations to help the administrator and his top staff to see the implications of policy decisions in terms of practical situations in local communities, the decision at this point and its implementation might have been different. But the agency at this time had neither type of resource.⁴ The staff, desiring effective operation

Chicago, where boards were organized according to ward lines, Negroes participated. The war price and rationing board in the second ward turned out to be completely Negro.

Mr. Henderson, the administrator, had considered the possibility of having an adviser on race relations in the agency. His experience in the NRA, however, where he worked with representatives of Negro groups, made him hesitate. He understood that representatives of Negro groups, as of all groups, necessarily have their major orientation in the interests and concerns of the people they represent. He questioned whether the proper integration of the interests and concerns of any group into the price control program could be achieved

and being inexperienced in dealing with the possibilities suggested in the discussion, therefore agreed to omit specific mention of minority groups. The order, when issued, stated that local boards were to be representative. It specified that to be representative they should include businessmen and consumers, farmers and housewives. It gave no indication of the agency's position on minority group participation.⁵

Another interesting omission was any specific reference to representation from organized labor, although no other group in the country had so many members who were conscious of the importance of price and rationing programs to the country and to the people generally. Organized labor immediately protested and the blueprint was amended. At least one Negro group also protested—the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People—but nothing happened immediately.

The anti-discrimination committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations took up the cudgel for Negro participation on war

best through advisers from these groups. He advocated the presence of members of various groups serving as professional workers on technical staffs throughout the agency. In this way, he thought, their knowledge and acquaintance with the groups they knew best would become part and parcel of the day-by-day decisions of the agency.

Some rank and file members of the agency, not associated with this program but interested, did try to make available to this staff by memorandum the experience of selective service with local boards. Selective service at this time had a goodly number of interracial boards in both northern and southern communities. Experience with these boards was satisfactory. In addition, in the North there were a few all-Negro boards in areas that had both Negro and white registrants. Experience with these all-Negro boards had also proved satisfactory.

⁶Something of the consequence of the decision of the Washington staff not to include specifically some indication that members of minority groups were expected to participate in the program was seen in the early operation of the board in St. Louis, Missouri. When the chairman was asked why there were no Negroes on the board in a city with some 100,000 Negroes in its population, he said, "I never thought of it." Then he added, "It wasn't in the directive, was it?" The need for such participation became clearer to this chairman as he reviewed his experience. He said, "You know, I keep a close watch over the counter. When I see a Negro coming in, say for tires, I sometimes call the clerk into my office and review the case before the decision is made. Often I find that because the applicant is a Negro, the clerk tends automatically to say 'No.' "

price and rationing boards. One year after the original blueprint for local boards went out, the agency amended it to read, "The membership of each board shall be such as to represent the community as a whole. Selection of all members of any one board from the same political party, sex, religious faith, race, economic level, social level or occupation, shall be avoided except as under special circumstances such selection may be necessary and unavoidable. . . . When appropriate, board membership should include a housewife and members from labor, agriculture, business, the professions and consumers, and various minority and racial groups." The CIO further urged that a Negro be assigned to work on the Washington staff which had responsibility for local board activities, carrying not racial but general duties. This suggestion was in line with the thinking of the agency's first administrator, Leon Henderson, but Mr. Henderson was no longer with the OPA when the original order was amended, and the suggestion of a Negro staff member was not adopted at this time. Achievement of representative boards progressed slowly because no specific training opportunities, formal or informal, were provided for the staff given this new assignment.

There is in government, however, such a thing as the cross-fertilization of ideas and skills. This occurred frequently in OPA. The information department, which had Negro members working on its staff, had established the policies and practices which insured that all information programs reached the communications channels especially designed to stimulate action in the Negro communities. The Negro press carried news of rationing and price programs. Radio programs sponsored in various communities by Negro businessmen carried OPA spot news. Newsreels especially designed to interest the patrons of theaters in neighborhoods where Negroes lived carried shorts on OPA programs. These shorts, which featured first Leon Henderson and later Chester Bowles and Negro members of OPA's national staff, urged the participation of all the people in OPA programs. Approximately twenty-five national Negro organizations not only endorsed price control and rationing, but carried news of current programs in their pub-

lications which reached local communities throughout the country. These activities made the Negro public think in terms of participation in local board programs.

The Washington information staff also furnished the Common Council, a national organization working with foreign-language groups, with news of current programs. The council, in turn, translated these programs into nineteen different languages and sent the translations to the nine hundred foreign-language newspapers it services.

Meanwhile the morale and work of the local boards was influenced by the bitter and lengthy controversy in the national office over the capacity of ordinary citizens to check compliance in local stores; the discussions over the advisability of attempting to control prices at the retail level; the question as to which commodity group was most important to an effective enforcement program.

The weight of Chester Bowles, as administrator, was seen not only in the final decision to use volunteers but also in the character of the staff which gradually came into leadership in the board operations program. In addition, in November, 1944, Mr. Bowles issued a major policy statement that emphasized impartial administrative practices in the agency and gave specific direction to the work of the special assistant to the administrator. This position had been established July 15, 1943. As stated at the time it was created, it was designed to avoid criticism of OPA's relations to Negro citizens, to insure reasonable and fair participation of Negroes in the OPA program, and to take all possible steps to enlist their support and cooperation for the agency's program. In practice, the office tended to be a second personnel office concerned chiefly with the interests and needs of Negro employees. The Bowles policy statement centered the work of this office in the impartial administration of the agency's major programs—price, rent, and rationing—and returned to the personnel office the responsibility for carrying out the agency's fair employment practice policy written in February, 1943.

The policy statement provided that all OPA programs shall be administered fairly and without discrimination because of race, creed, nationality, or color. It emphasized that it was

the responsibility of the entire staff to see that OPA programs effectively reached every community and every segment of every community in the country. It specifically mentioned that the Negro is the largest minority group, with a population of thirteen million or 10 per cent of the total population of the country, and that if OPA programs failed to reach this large group or other minorities one duty of OPA as a national agency had not been fully met. It charged each employee with general responsibility for full cooperation with this phase of the agency program. The special assistant to the administrator was to help facilitate the day-by-day activities of the heads of the operating units as they put their policies and programs into action.

Mr. Bowles further emphasized his belief in the need for full participation of all the population groups in OPA programs by his appointments to his own advisory committees and by his firm support to those staff efforts which were directed toward having programs democratically administered. He appointed two Negroes each to his labor policy committee and his consumer advisory committee.

III

THE importance of public participation in price programs to obtaining compliance at the retail level became increasingly apparent to the agency. The Washington staff which carried direct responsibility for local board programs was urged at times by the administrator, his special assistant, other parts of the agency, and the Negro public to consider seriously whether they were administering their programs in a manner to secure equally effective price control in comparable Negro and white neighborhoods.

As a check on effectiveness of administration, three studies of local compliance in comparable Negro and white neighborhoods were initiated at various times. None of these studies was adequately planned or executed, however, nor were their findings fully utilized.

In the first study, which was made prior to the Bowles policy statement of 1944, a number of district offices having large Negro constituencies were directed to break down the results of one of their regular food surveys so that the

figures would reveal comparable compliances. Only a few districts bothered to send in reports; and the Washington staff failed to analyze these and did not press delinquent districts to conform with its request.⁶

A second similar study was launched a year later, after the Bowles statement. This time the staff followed through so that reports were received from all districts. However, the staff working with local board programs did not take time to analyze the results, and the reports were passed on to the office of the special assistant to the administrator in charge of race relations for analysis. While the reports varied in some detail, on the whole they told a story of poorer compliance in Negro than in the white neighborhoods.⁷ They also suggested that the understanding and participation of neighborhood people in a given board's program was an important factor in successful compliance and that when this resource was utilized compliance could be improved.⁸

⁶ One report stated that the office had made a study of compliance in two predominantly Negro areas (one downtown and the other suburban) and two nearby white areas of approximately the same size and economic level. The results showed the percentage of violations in Negro areas to be about twice that found in white areas.

⁷ For example, the Detroit report contrasted two board areas in the residential section of the city. The Negro area, with 50,000 people, was served by eighty-one grocery stores. Seventy-one of these stores were checked in the survey. Nine were found to be in compliance. Eighty-nine grocery stores served the 55,000 people in the white area. Each of these stores was checked in the survey. Forty-six were found to be in full compliance.

The Philadelphia report indicated that in six board areas within the city the Negro population constituted an important part of the buying public. In the survey 7,000 of the 12,338 food dealers in the city were checked. Of the 524 food stores largely patronized by Negroes, 404 were surveyed. Of the stores serving white persons 71.1 per cent were found to be in full compliance, while only 60.3 per cent of the stores serving Negroes were in full compliance.

⁸ The Washington, D. C., report stated that similar study had been made a year earlier. The results had shown that the percentage of violations in Negro areas was higher than in economically comparable white areas. The report of this study was given to the boards in the Negro areas and an intensive educational campaign was planned for each area. Additional price panel assistants from the neighborhood served were recruited, trade meetings were organized, information meetings were held with civic, church, and trade unions groups, and the number of price clerks working in the board

In a third study, initiated by the deputy administrator and the special assistant in charge of race relations, arrangements were made with the Bureau of Labor Statistics to study the percentage of prices reported at levels above, at, and below published ceiling prices in independent stores patronized by Negroes as compared with those patronized by whites in nine OPA district office cities. Pressure of time and economy resulted in the use of prices already collected. A sample of fifty-four Negro stores was obtained. Summary figures for the nine cities showed a slightly lower percentage of over-ceiling prices among stores patronized by Negroes. The bureau, in transmitting the results of the study to the OPA, stated: "We regret no definite conclusions can be drawn from the study due to its limitation in scope." The apparent results of this study troubled members of the national staff of OPA. Some interpreted them to indicate that special efforts were not needed to secure compliance in neighborhoods where minority groups lived. Others were not so sure. The findings of earlier reports remained clear in their minds. There were letters in the files from responsible private agencies, such as the National Urban League and the YMCA, calling the attention of the national office to conditions in local communities which seemed to verify the findings in these studies. Some national staff members had observed district staff members who were indifferent to or even rejected the offers of volunteers from minority groups who were needed and who desired to help.

The situation was finally resolved into the question of whether additional money should be spent for a more adequate study or whether the agency should rely on the evaluation of experience it already possessed. The agency decided in favor of the latter.

Since an examination of the reports from the second study seemed to indicate a rather definite relationship between the degree of compliance in neighborhoods where Negroes lived and the extent of Negro participation in the

was increased. Later a comparable study of these same board areas was made. The compliance record in the Negro areas at this time compared favorably with that in the white areas.

programs, the national office decided to find out the number of Negro volunteers working with local boards throughout the country, what they did, and the sort of people they were. The data were gathered by the staff in charge of boards and analyzed by the administrator's special assistant in charge of race relations.

The survey showed 687 Negroes serving as regular members of war price and rationing boards. All regions had some participation of Negroes on boards, yet no district seemed to have exhausted the volunteer manpower available from this segment of the public.

In examining the types of responsibilities carried, it was clear that the Negroes, like other members, worked on rationing, price, and information panels. They came from housewife, labor, clerical, and professional groups.⁹ In addition to the 687 Negro board members, 1,560 Negroes worked with local boards in other volunteer capacities. Some of them served as clerical aides for rationing and price panels, some checked stores as price panel assistants, others helped their communities understand OPA programs through information work.

This report on Negro participation in the work of war price and rationing Boards went to all regional offices in the hope that the district and regional staffs would be stimulated to further recruitment and use of representatives of minority groups in the volunteer work of the boards.

In addition to finding out about volunteer participation of Negroes in local board activity, the national office tried to find out what was happening in regard to other minority groups. Many interesting stories were sent in. One board in the state of Washington was composed, except for two members, of American Indians.

Some districts translated pertinent regulations into Spanish, others into Chinese, others into Greek. These districts reported that this effort to get the program to all the people resulted in better compliance, not only because the merchants understood the regulations better, but also because the Spanish, Chinese, or Greek-speaking communities appreciated this special service.

*There were 242 professional people, 75 clerical, 34 trade union workers, and 87 housewives.

The Washington staff was never completely successful in convincing some of its field officials of the need to recruit representative board members. For example, one official in a large Spanish-speaking community said, "After they (speaking of Spanish-Americans) argued and argued with us, we finally took some of them in." Another official in a community where there are a large number of Chinese said, "We had a brilliant young Chinese working with us, but we kept assigning the work in such a manner that he had less and less to do, so he finally left." Another official working in an area where there were a number of returning Nisei said, "They will never have a part in our volunteer program."

The quality of the work done by representatives of minority groups seems on the whole to have been of a high order. For example, in Cleveland, Ohio, a three-months chart showing improvement in compliance in a board area where the population is predominately Negro was carried on the front page of the regional news letter as an illustration of what a working board could accomplish. The majority of the members of this board were Negroes. The study made no mention of the racial character of the people in the area or the members of the boards.

Again, in Baltimore, Maryland, where originally the Negro leaders had requested a separate racial rationing board, the district staff was loathe at the time of consolidation to part with either the paid or volunteer workers at the Negro board. Their work had been outstanding. Also, during the period the Negro people who had worked with the district office had come to trust and to have confidence in their white fellow citizens. The members of the segregated board were invited to join the city-wide consolidated board and accepted the invitation.

As the local board program closed with the ordering of decontrol of most items bought by consumers at the retail level, the Washington staff found that it had learned something of the bigness of America, a good deal about the richness and variety of its people, and a sizable "know how" as to what might be the people's part in the administrative processes of government.

Reviews of Books and Documents

Strategic Intelligence

By Myron P. Gilmore, Harvard University

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN SECRET INTELLIGENCE, by GEORGE S. PETTEE. Infantry Journal Press, 1946. Pp. ix, 120. \$2.00.

EVERYONE knows the story about the old encyclopaedia in which intelligence was classified as human, animal, and military. It has now been many years since this classification was revised in articles for encyclopaedias, but in the realm of fact there has sometimes unfortunately persisted a divorce between those qualities ordinarily associated with human intelligence and the operations of the military intelligence departments. Nor has this gap existed in the armed services alone. Too often in the history of this country the entire enterprise of collecting and using that body of material which is perhaps best known as strategic intelligence—an enterprise in which almost every department of the federal government has participated—has been faulty in organization, indecisive in execution, and feeble in result. Many of our most dramatic failures remain fresh in the public mind from the experience of the recent war and the period preceding it. Our successes—for we have also had successes—have been due to brilliant improvisations in periods of great emergency. Professor Pettee now comes forward with a brief but sensible plea for revising our thinking about strategic intelligence and creating a sound organization to provide it.

The most comprehensive subject raised by Mr. Pettee's argument is the nature of the process by which our national foreign policy is formed. This is a matter of great fascination and complexity and it may well be said that no problem in the whole field of national administration is more acute than the establishment of effective means whereby our national policy can be kept in line with both our power and

our commitments. The difficulties are great. If our foreign policy were susceptible of *exact* definition at any given moment and if, in addition, we were perfectly clear about who had the responsibility for making such a definition, these difficulties would be much diminished. Unfortunately this cannot be so. A national policy, especially in a democracy, is not a static thing but a process whereby a very complicated set of relationships, internal and external, are approximately defined. Under present conditions of domestic and world politics the day-to-day decisions of the United States government on questions of foreign policy are necessarily taken by a small group of people in the executive branch. The need for secrecy, efficiency, flexibility makes this inevitable. The direct intervention or participation of Congress is practically limited to the great milestones in the history of our relations with other countries, although individual members may have been frequently consulted and kept informed at all stages of discussion. In the background is public opinion, of enormous importance in the long run in conditioning the thinking of the government but unable to exercise a continuous control. In this general situation, it is imperative that those who are responsible for taking decisions which finally create cumulative commitments should be supplied with all the relevant information that can be accumulated.

Such information is for the most part not secret. No dramatic deeds of cloak and dagger espionage are required to procure it. What is required may be simply summarized from Mr. Pettee's book. There must be an able and comprehensive management which will pose the right questions and define in the most general way the areas of investigation. There must be patient and mundane research in accumulat-

ing masses of factual information. Such information must be so ordered and catalogued that it can be used by analysts. Finally, the results must be interpreted, condensed, and disseminated to the appropriate authorities.

Analysis of all the reasons why our government has not had regularly in the past an organization to perform these services would be a long and complicated task. On the one hand this analysis would have to touch such large subjects as the attitude of the American people toward their position in the world. As long as isolationism in any one of its many forms prevailed, as long as there was a general failure to realize that great power imposes also great responsibility, there was bound to be an unfavorable climate for the growth of a sound intelligence agency. This has been manifest in the unwillingness of Congress to appropriate money for these purposes. At the other end of the scale we would have to consider such matters as the recruitment and training of the civil service personnel in this country and the system of education which has prevailed in the armed services.

Mr. Pettee has principally concentrated on those reasons for past failure which impinge more directly on the problem of the nature of modern intelligence. Some of these, while fundamental to the development of a successful organization, are not primarily organizational questions. For example, it is likely that there will always be important differences in the qualities required for success in academic life and in government intelligence work. The emphasis of university training is upon suspension of judgment until all the evidence is in. At the opposite extreme we are aware that the successful administrator or the military commander in the field has to learn to spend most of his time making decisions on insufficient evidence, but we do not always remember that in evaluating strategic intelligence, which seems in some ways much nearer the academic, an executive habit of mind must also be cultivated.

Other subjects of immediate relevance to the establishment of a successful intelligence unit are the present state of the social sciences and the character of expert personnel in this field. Each of the social studies—history, geography,

economics, political science, psychology, sociology—has an important contribution to make to the assembling and evaluation of strategic intelligence; collectively they supply almost the entire foundation for such work. Controversies, whether of method or substance, within and between these disciplines, although they may stimulate original thinking will also often hamper practical achievement. Similar difficulties may be expected from the present imperfection of techniques for determining expertise in these matters, and perhaps above all for predicting the success of an expert trained in one department of the social sciences or even in one narrow subject when he is called to widen the range of his attention and transfer his training to related subjects.

The widest problems of organization affecting the establishment of an intelligence agency are common to almost every department of the federal government. The nature of coordination is a subject which all who have had experience in Washington will have occasion to ponder. Many will be disposed to agree with Mr. Pettee that in the vast majority of cases involving more than one agency coordination is limited to liaison and clearance. It becomes, in other words, nothing more positive than a rule of unanimous consent which is only prevented from having the effects that a similar rule had on the Polish Diet by the fact that each organization concerned is, after all, a part of the executive branch and subject to pressure from the Office of the President. Another problem closely connected with the subject of coordination is the proper definition and limitation of spheres of authority and responsibility. It is no less true of a strategic intelligence unit than of any other organ of governmental administration that it must have positively a clear definition of its function and negatively an understanding of what it is not.

Even after an intelligence agency is established in a proper relationship to the environment in which it is to function, there remain important questions of internal management. These include the development of techniques for the handling of a highly specialized personnel, methods for filing and classifying materials, and the creation of conditions most favorable for the work of the analyst. The ne-

cessity for the development of a positive professional doctrine is emphasized by Mr. Pettee in this connection.

In any discussion of the administration of intelligence work it is difficult to refrain from appealing to the example of that nation which more than any other in modern times has discharged world responsibilities. We are now in the process of inheriting many of the old responsibilities of Great Britain and we are adding some new ones. In spite of many differences in the operations of governmental machinery which make it dangerous to suggest direct analogies between England and the United States, British administrative experience is full of valuable example and nowhere more than in this matter of intelligence.

When the Committee of Imperial Defense was established in 1904, it was recognized that one of the principal factors on which depended the coordination of military and foreign policy was the centralization of information and intelligence. At the highest level this function was to be discharged by the small permanent secretariat with which the committee was originally provided. Over the years and through all the modifications of the original constitution of the committee in two world wars, this secretariat has continued to prove its indispensability. The long tenures of Lord Hankey and his successor General Ismay have provided continuity of policy and direction. Habits of thought and habits of working together have thus been developed to create a situation in which it is unthinkable that any one department of the British government should retain information relevant to the work of others or initiate action in a matter of general concern without others being informed. Attention may also be directed with profit to British joint intelligence work at lower levels. Such work, of course, in its final summarized form reaches the Cabinet and has a direct effect on deliberations on national policy. Altogether, in the quality of its personnel, in the character of its administration, and in the high value put upon its re-

sults we may find useful lessons in studying the British intelligence organization.

In spite of inevitable confusions which attended the end of World War II, there have not been wanting hopeful signs that a sounder view of the nature and importance of strategic intelligence may prevail in this country. The recommendations of the retiring director of the Office of Strategic Services were not accepted, but the valuable lessons provided by the experience of that office will hardly be altogether lost. The creation of a National Intelligence Authority by Executive order, the place given to a statutory central intelligence agency in the present bill for the organization of national defense, the recent reorganization by General Marshall of intelligence work in the State Department are all indications of progress. Professor Pettee's book is a useful contribution to the climate of thinking in which these and other reforms can be achieved.

It should perhaps finally be pointed out that we ought not to hope for too much. No matter how perfect an intelligence agency may be created, it cannot by itself ensure the development and maintenance of a sound national policy. Here again we may appeal to the experience of England. The weakness of the British position in 1939 was not due to the failures of intelligence; it was the product of a far more fundamental factor—the whole temper and outlook of the British people in the two preceding decades. Judge Learned Hand has eloquently said of liberty that it lies in the hearts of men and women and that if it dies there, no court, no constitution, and no law can do much to save it. Similarly it may be said that a national policy lies in the hearts of men and women. It represents the agreement of the men and women of a nation on fundamental issues. If there is no agreement, if the will dies there, then no intelligence agency or any other organ of government can save a national policy, though it can do much to guide it and make it effective if the will exists.

Terminal Airport Management

By Herman G. Pope, Public Administration Service

TERMINAL AIRPORT FINANCING AND MANAGEMENT, by LYNN L. BOLLINGER, ALAN PASSEN, AND ROBERT E. McELFRESH. Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1946. Pp. xiv, 385. \$4.25.

THIS volume is essentially a report on a research project conducted by the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration and financed by several air transport companies, aircraft manufacturing companies, and the Association of American Railroads. Studies were made of fifty-one selected airports and information and views were actively solicited from numerous interested and informed persons and groups representative of various industries and public agencies. Of the fifty-one airports considered, apparently thirty were found to have records which were usable for comparative purposes.

The report includes a great deal of factual material related to terminal airport capital costs, operating expenses, and revenues, and the data are subjected to detailed compilation, analysis, and interpretation. They should be of considerable value to all persons interested in airport financing and management. Particularly worthy of comment is the fact that the authors have managed to avoid imputing to their statistics a degree of refinement and validity which the raw media they were compelled to use might not support. The sensible scheme of categories accepted or established by the authors in their presentation and analysis of data in terms of segments of physical plant, activities, and classification of expenses and revenues should in itself exert a favorable influence in the improvement of airport records; in addition, it should contribute to the orderly thinking of persons concerned only generally with the airport management problem.

The book develops and recommends detailed rules for the setting of rates and charges to the various users of airport facilities. These include hangar rentals, terminal building charges for aviation activities, terminal building concession rentals, and landing area charges. The last charges are considered in de-

tail with respect to the several groups who use the landing area, including commercial air carriers, military aircraft, private fliers, aircraft service operators, and aviation suppliers and vendors. The foundation for these rules is essentially an engineering cost-accounting process whereby the municipality would recover its net "prudent" cost in proportion to the utilization of as much of the physical plant as the user might require were it constructed specifically to meet the user's needs. One conspicuous exception to this rule is suggested, namely, that terminal building concession rentals and related revenues should be the maximum possible with a view to minimizing and perhaps eliminating landing area charges. The authors then, perhaps with some optimism, test the rate-setting formula they have established against an assumed representative airport and summarize the results of this test in hypothetical income statements through 1954, by which year they estimate the aviation industry will have attained maturity and, consequently, a well-managed typical airport should be operating on a fully self-supporting basis.

While the book concerns itself in large part with the presentation and analysis of extensive fiscal data relating to selected terminal airports and with the establishment of a rate setting machinery to govern the revenue structure for airports, the authors also explore in considerable detail a number of other aspects of the airport management problem. They examine the interests and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments in airport financing and management and, somewhat less completely, the interests and responsibilities of commercial air carriers. They arrive, quite convincingly, at the conclusion that airports are essentially public utilities. After some consideration of the analogy provided by railroads, highways, and sea and river ports, they conclude that commercial aviation like other means of transportation should, in the best public interest, be on a self-supporting basis. They also conclude that the majority of terminal type airports can be made self-supporting within a comparatively few

years without an undue burden on aviation if a high standard of management efficiency is achieved and if a sound financial plan is established and all revenue sources, including terminal building concessions, are aggressively developed.

Considerable space is devoted to the problem of organizing for public airport administration and in examining the question of whether the municipal airport should be a division of the public works department, a separate department, should be supervised by a special commission, or should use the device of a special authority. Many public administrators and students of public administration may well be disappointed in the treatment given centralized municipal staff services for accounting, budgeting, purchasing, and other elements of financial administration, personnel administration, planning, and legal services. No real encouragement is given civil service. It is at least hinted that the basic nature of airport fiscal records is too different from that of other governmental enterprises to admit of centralized municipal accounting. Airport budgeting and its relationship to the problem of over-all municipal budgeting has a less than satisfactory treatment; in fact, it even seems to be assumed that the establishment of a separate airport fund precludes appropriation and budgetary control by central municipal authorities. The problem of integrating planning for airports with the over-all municipal planning and zoning job is likewise passed over all too lightly.

The authors could have explored further and with profit not only the relationship of the head of the airport organization to the chief administrative officer and the legislative body of the city, but also his relationship to the several centralized staff agencies. In so doing they might have discovered that some of the advantages credited to the centralized management services of the joint air terminal corporation they propose already are available in centralized staff agencies of many municipal governments. The book's oft-repeated view that airport management is "different" from other municipal management problems is essentially the same and in some respects not so convincing as the views with which public administra-

tors are already familiar with respect to schools, libraries, recreation, police, fire, public works, utilities, welfare, health, and all other public services.

The book concludes that revenue sources at most airports are not fully developed and in order to insure their further development suggests clarification of the division of responsibilities between public and private groups. It also concludes that, while a strong argument can be developed in favor of private financing and ownership of terminal airports, it is probable that public ownership and financing of airports will continue and that the landing area operations involving the supervision as well as the physical maintenance of the landing area also may properly be retained by municipalities. Business activities in the terminal building area, however, are a type of function which cannot be performed efficiently by municipal officials and must be carried on by private interests in order to achieve the authors' objective of "maximizing" revenues from this source.

To accomplish this objective of maximizing revenues from the airport terminal area, the authors recommend the creation of a national joint air terminal corporation. This corporation would be owned by the major air carriers collectively and would relieve cities of the task of managing the terminal building, its adjacent area, and related functions. It would assume such financial responsibility for the air carriers' share of airport charges as might be determined in each case by contracts negotiated with each city.

The authors report that their suggestion has met with varying views and, it might be added, their own reaction to these views also seems varied. They conclude that "the greatest difficulty such an organization might encounter is seen in the fact that most individuals who expressed definite objections to such a plan were those who might thereby lose some authority or control over jobs (p. 301)." They are led to believe, however, that ". . . public acceptance of such a plan would not appear to be precluded simply because some public job holders and their friends might register active opposition (p. 302)." After taking this candid view of the reaction of some public officials to the suggested plan, the authors turn a somewhat more

kindly eye toward the airline industry in explaining why that group is less than unanimous in its approval: "Apparently the airline industry is still in that stage of pioneering and rapid expansion which brings 'rugged individualism' to the fore in top management (p. 302)." Also, while they are quite unqualified in urging the plan upon public officials in broadest terms of applicability, it is suggested to air carriers that "the corporation might make available on a *voluntary* basis joint services such as ramp operations, aircraft air conditioning, baggage handling, fueling, flight crew quarters, and the like (p. 312)." It occurs to the reviewer that some further treatment of this area of operations would have been interesting and useful and might even have produced a pertinent conclusion that in none of the fifty-one airports studied is the municipal government concerned countenancing in its own operations the degree of overlapping and waste generally characteristic of air carrier ground operations in the same airports.

The reviewer concurs in the authors' view that airport revenues can be and should be expanded and more effectively administered, but sees in corners where apparently the authors did not look the possibility of serious abuses in the proposed plan were it to be administered with the unbridled zeal of special interest enthusiasts. He finds it difficult to accept the authors' basic premise that terminal concessions must be operated so as to produce the greatest possible revenues with a view to minimizing and perhaps eliminating the landing charges that might otherwise be assessed against air carriers. He can see no reason why one portion of a public physical plant should be provided free to a special user group while another portion of the same physical plant should be so operated as to exact the greatest possible tribute from the public. He feels that broad public interests may easily counterbalance whatever logic there may be in the economic theory that revenue from the terminal building is a by-product of aviation activity and creditable to aviation expense. As airports are usually located at some distance from other similar facilities, the restaurants, telephone and telegraph services, news stands, rest rooms, and other conveniences constitute in fact a monopoly

made possible with public funds. It seems to the reviewer that municipal officials have a very real responsibility to see to it that the public, in using such a public monopoly, gets reasonable service at a reasonable price and that this obligation is quite as strong in the terminal building as on the landing area.

The authors suggest as one argument in support of private management the view that "even if it were true, that the public treasury might be built up by the city's retaining business operating privileges for itself, such a practice appears inconsistent with the purpose for which local corporate governmental powers were created (p. 297)." The reviewer fails to see how it would be more appropriate for a city to accomplish the same end through the device of delegating the job to a private group not representative of the general public or, for that matter, of all airport users, and he does not subscribe to the at least implied philosophy that public officials' responsibilities for the general public interest are discharged merely by assuring "the reimbursement of public expenditures." The suggestion that aviation users are entitled to deduction of the full, and one suspects, even potential, concession revenue from total airport costs before their share of net costs is calculated does not make the solution more attractive. Neither does the suggestion that all airport costs above "prudent costs" must be borne by the public treasury, though this can perhaps be justified by the fact that, in the final analysis, the public will bear these costs anyway, though perhaps in a somewhat different way from that in which it must bear costs above "prudent costs" incurred by air carriers in developing their services.

The extent to which the reviewer's notions vary from the authors' seems to have its genesis in the fact that, once having accepted the authors' philosophy that airports are touched with a broad public interest and hence are public utilities, the reviewer has read the book with this thought always in mind, whereas the authors at times seem to have become so intrigued by the interesting chore of resolving a variety of subordinate and conflicting special interests that the general public interest in each problem is the one which receives the least specific

attention. As a consequence, the reviewer has not been convinced of the necessity or, perhaps, desirability of eliminating landing area charges and, having accepted the authors' philosophy of government subsidy to infant industry, believes that the air carriers' capacity to pay may have some relevance in rate setting. The fact that public agencies have taken the risks involved in building a billion dollars worth of air fields and in shouldering the many millions of dollars annual operating costs on these fields reduces his concern over public assumption of the relatively minor risks involved in terminal building operations. The reviewer does not share the authors' view that airport operation is something so different from normal governmental enterprises that government structure cannot be devised to handle it; he believes that a broader and more thorough appraisal of the record and management techniques of local governments in the matter of providing other utility and general services

would disclose that the differences between airport operations and some other accepted public services are less significant than they seem to aviation enthusiasts.

These and other points on which the authors and the reviewer differ have contributed to rather than diminished the latter's interest in reading the book. In spite of these differences, the book is one which the reviewer finds most useful, as should all persons concerned with airport management. Its practical usefulness is undoubtedly due in no small part to the yeoman effort made to produce specific answers to specific questions and to the conscientious desire to resolve conflicting interests of special groups concerned. Its factual material and related analysis are in themselves a valuable contribution. Many of its conclusions and recommendations are sound; others, less convincing, at least provide a foundation for more intelligent discussion than has generally characterized airport management debates to date.

Due Process of Inquiry

By John A. Vieg, Pomona College

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS, by CARL MARCY. King's Crown Press, 1946. Pp. viii, 141. \$2.00

THE MORELAND ACT: EXECUTIVE INQUIRY IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by J. ELLSWERTH MISSALL. King's Crown Press, 1946. Pp. x, 146. \$2.00.

I

COMMITTED by its creed always to act in the light of knowledge and of reason, democratic government knows no necessity more inconsistent than that of finding the facts relevant to the decisions it must make. It is therefore of serious significance that, after more than one hundred and fifty years of our national experiment in democracy, we have yet to reach full agreement on what constitutes "due process of inquiry" with regard to the ways and means by which the political branches of our several governments obtain and assay the information they need to perform their functions.¹

¹It is not assumed that all is perfect with respect to that form of due process of inquiry practiced in the judicial branch; this essay simply happens to be confined to

It was bad enough not to have such agreement in the period before World War II when, though they presented plenty of difficulties, the problems of government were by the acceptance of Rooseveltian leadership in effect rendered a little less complex than they have since become. But it may open the door to disaster to neglect to develop such agreement for the post-war era. We have tougher and more tangled questions to resolve and, at least as yet, no prospect of agreeing upon leaders whose answers to those questions will satisfy a continuing majority. Therefore our best hope is to endeavor to improve the process by which, relying on whatever representatives we have, we inquire into the issues destined to confront us as a body politic so that, whenever official findings and recommendations are made, there will be a disposition to accept them as based on full information and fair analysis.

a consideration of the problem of getting and weighing information in the legislative and executive branches, particularly the latter.

Our vaunted due process of law comes down in the final reckoning to open, honest, direct, and timely methods of inquiry, whether the facts sought are to be used in legislation, administration, or adjudication. It is always a proper question—and especially appropriate today—to ask what we have done to perfect such a process of inquiry in this generation. Within the national government there was accomplished in the years immediately preceding World War II a measure of executive reorganization which contributed substantially to a rationalizing of responsibilities for gathering and analyzing information essential to the conduct of administration. Yet the need for further improvement is plainly implicit in the continued unreadiness of people, both inside Washington and out, to accept the facts officially collected and reported by federal departments and agencies as affording an adequate informational base for governmental action, particularly if some departure in policy is involved.

Likewise with the Congress. We are now enjoying the first fruits of the only major effort at legislative reorganization since the "revolution of 1910." The simplification of structure and procedure which became effective with the opening of the Eightieth Congress promises to insure not only greater visibility in the legislative process but also more rationality with respect to the compilation and evaluation of data bearing upon issues of public policy. Nevertheless, everyone having the slightest acquaintance with realities on Capitol Hill knows that many more changes will have to be made before due process of legislative inquiry will have been perfected.

In the states and cities the situation is generally even less satisfactory. Some of the more progressive among them have organized their executive and legislative branches so that, broadly speaking, their people have the benefit of an intelligent and trustworthy process of inquiry. Yet on the whole they have even farther to go than the nation in perfecting machinery and methods for getting the information they need in forms suited to their use.

Some knowledge—and some respect for facts—is indispensable for every government, no matter what its faith. None can hope to succeed, or even to survive, without adapting its

operation at least partially to the facts of life and nature. Democracy's attitude toward facts, however, is far more than a grudging admission that they cannot safely be ignored. Rooted in respect for man as a reasoning being, democracy needs them for its daily meat and bread. It cannot hope to thrive except on truth, that is to say on reason disciplined by knowledge, for it lives and is sustained by a continuous appeal to the informed minds of men of good will.

Facts, therefore, our legislatures and executives must have—facts beyond number; reams of them; mounds of them; facts by the pound; facts by the yard! There is utterly no substitute for them whether in legislation or administration. Insistence on this point should afford no encouragement, however, for the naïve assumption that, once corralled, facts will speak for themselves. Given an attachment to common values (by the people whose lives are concerned), sometimes they will. But more often than not they are unable to tell much of anything until they have been analyzed.

There is no substitute for fact; there is equally no substitute for thought. Endless accumulations of information can as easily lead nowhere as to the gates of wisdom. Due process of inquiry must therefore include both the collection of objective data and the analysis or evaluation of such data in the light of the aspirations of society. It presupposes that talent will be available not merely for compilation but for the much more difficult task of disinterested judgment. And it recognizes beyond this that some issues in politics have to be decided in the light not of objective truth (which perchance is not to be had) but of that different kind which Frank Knight has called critical truth. It is, in fine, not only possible but proper to conceive of democracy as an institutionalizing of the process of inquiry.

II

WHAT then is the theory of inquiry incorporated within the American system of government? In contrast with the British who believe that the public will be best served by a single "Grand Inquest into the State of the Nation"—Parliament—we hold it preferable to maintain simultaneously two "grand inquests into the state of the Union" (and into the state

of our states and most of our cities), one under the auspices of an independent legislature and the other under the direction of an almost equally independent executive.

The original framers of the American plan seem not to have expected that the executive department would be called upon to serve as a primary agency of inquiry on public problems. But they did contemplate an effective government, and the need for presidential leadership in the initiation of policy having quickly become apparent, the executive has for years been acknowledged to have quite as significant a responsibility for the development of policy as for its execution. This need, together with the constitutional requirement that "he shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," has, in conjunction with his authority to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices," had the effect of making the Chief Executive a central figure in inquiries into political matters. Meanwhile his responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" makes him the very head of whatever is needed in the form of a system of administrative inquiry.

Except for judicial questions, therefore, these two departments institutionalize the American idea of due process of inquiry.² The theory is that each branch inquires in good faith and by means appropriate to the matters at issue so that each will be equally certain to find the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The theory is that each will be so organized as to be prepared through its regular staff and procedure to inquire into and decide upon all but the most extraordinary questions—and that when such questions arise they will consider together what special agencies of inquiry may be needed.

In the case of the Congress this means, in

brief, that, doing their best not to permit any question of their relative prestige to come between them, House and Senate will allow their part of the process of inquiry to run first through whichever are appropriate of their regular committees (they now have nineteen and fifteen respectively), next through their own bodies (aided by the required conference committee), and then through the minds of the President and his advisers at the White House, overriding his veto of their action only if persuaded that his opposition derives more from partisanship than from objections of merit. They will arrange for corresponding committees to meet jointly whenever that promises to expedite discussion of public business. They will confine their inquiries to matters political and undertake investigations of administration only when lacking assurance that the will of the people is being done. They will not confuse the public by creating special committees of inquiry when the subject to be investigated falls plainly within the province of a standing committee—and under no circumstances will they condone the establishment of committees which in the name of solemnly investigating the safety of the Republic devote their time and energies to witch-hunting. Finally, the theory is that no fact will be collected, no witness heard, and no analysis proffered save in the genuine pursuit of truth.

In the case of the Executive the theory runs something like this. Making the best of the organization of his branch as he inherits it, he endeavors so to use its powers and resources as to be able to "run the country"—or the state or the city—and to conduct the necessary inquiries into the nation's problems. Where he finds them deficient or inadequate, he makes appropriate changes forthwith if the law says he may and he has the requisite funds. Otherwise, he asks the legislature for authority and for whatever appropriation may be necessary for the staff he needs. Generally that will include three kinds of personnel: advisory staff to help him think, both about organization and program; operating staff to see that the main job gets done; and auxiliary staff, mainly concerned with money and with manpower, to make certain fundamentally that operating officials have the resources they need for efficient work

²Thanks to the chastening of the judiciary in 1937, they are not presently in the condition of having to be almost as much concerned about the legal aspect of problems as about the problems themselves. The process of inquiry has consequently become an easier and surer one than it was prior to that time.

but to make sure incidentally that they have none to waste. There is a difference of view as to whether the auxiliary staff should include a permanent division of investigation. Paul Blanshard makes a rather strong case for a permanent commissioner of investigation, with staff, in his *Investigating City Government Under the LaGuardia Administration* (New York, 1937) but Missall's conclusions from his study of *The Moreland Act* point rather in the opposite direction.

It is conceded that occasions may arise when some special agency of inquiry may be needed within the executive branch either because no existing group is prepared in terms of prestige to develop recommendations which the legislature and the public will accept or because some group has tried and failed. This is the case par excellence for a presidential commission, or for a joint legislative-executive committee in the unlikely event that the former should arouse objection.

III

CARL MARCY'S *Presidential Commissions* reports on the way in which the normal processes of executive fact-finding and analysis in the national government have been supplemented in the twentieth century by the device of temporary *ad hoc* commissions, boards, and committees appointed by the Chief Executive either on his own motion or by arrangement with the Congress. From the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt to Calvin Coolidge, inclusive, 471 such bodies were created. Herbert Hoover appointed 62 during his first sixteen months in office, and Franklin Roosevelt created more than 100 during his first two terms. The frequency of their appointment may come as a surprise in view of what has been said in the preceding section 'anent a formal or accepted theory of governmental inquiry. The explanation lies partly in the rough handling Presidents and Congresses have given that corpus of theory but also, and importantly in the cases of Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt, in the turbulence of the periods in which they served.

Faced with a need, real or imaginary, to create a commission, no President will be embarrassed for lack of power. Marcy lists seven sources of legal authority for such action, only

two of which derive from Congress. His difficulties, if there be any such, are more likely to turn on the need for funds to finance the commission. Irked by what seemed to them Theodore Roosevelt's cavalier method of appointing *ad hoc* commissions, the House and Senate included in the Sundry Civil Act of 1909 a stipulation which has put every President since that day on notice that no public moneys are to be used "for the compensation or expenses of any commission . . . unless the creation of the same shall be or shall have been authorized by law." This has doubtless been a useful safeguard, but in Marcy's estimate it has also had certain adverse effects, to wit:

In the absence of congressional appropriation, it forces the President to rely on private sources for the support of commissions and in the presence of an appropriation it subjects the Executive to the leverage of a political body; secondly, the President is encouraged to seek methods of legal evasion of the terms of the act; and, finally, the act discourages the creation of presidential commissions which may be badly needed (p. 18).

From the standpoint of purpose the commissions have fallen into three broad classes: *First*, fact-finding and opinion-guiding bodies of which probably the best examples are the following: National Conservation Commission, 1908, Country Life Commission, 1908, Commission on Industrial Relations, 1912, Research Commission on Social Trends, 1929, National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1929, and Temporary National Economic Committee, 1938. *Second*, administrative commissions, which have served several types of purpose. Some of these have acted as agents for the execution of policy, e.g. the Isthmian Canal Commission, 1904. Some have served to coordinate the execution of policy, e.g. the Federal Traffic Board, 1921, established to "prevent overlapping of service and duplication of effort in the conduct of the traffic business of the government." Some have been created to advise the President how to effectuate a given policy, e.g. the (Morrow) Aircraft Board, 1925, which was instructed to "study the best means of developing and applying aircraft in national defense." Others, notably the Commission on Economy and Efficiency, 1910, and the Committee on Administrative Manage-

ment, 1936, were designed to diagnose ills in the whole administrative process and to prescribe changes for its improvement. *Third*, boards of inquiry into alleged wrongdoing, of which perhaps the Roberts Commission to investigate negligence in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor is as good an example as any.

Many of these commissions which have been named by the Presidents over the years have contributed significantly to the solution of important public problems. Indeed it is hardly too much to say, in view of the circumstances under which some of them were created, that without them the nation would often have been at a loss to know just which way to turn. But the course of wisdom is not to create more and bigger commissions and to appropriate more generously to the President for their support. Nor does Marcy, despite his love for his subject, make that proposal. The effort we ought to make is twofold. We ought, first and foremost, to stress the importance of more faithful and intelligent observance of our basic theory of political inquiry and to try to perfect the process in which it is incorporated. Thereafter, but only thereafter, we could well concern ourselves with exalting the character of such commissions as may still be needed by making them more analogous to their British counterpart.

In accomplishing this second purpose there would be nine points to watch. Marcy quotes with approval eight suggestions of A. Mervyn Davies and adds one of his own: (1) The prestige of a presidential appointment should be conserved by not allowing commissions to become too common. (2) Members of commissions should be motivated by a sense of public duty rather than by thought of compensation. (3) Commissions should be created only when there is a public demand for them or when a need clearly exists. (4) Their personnel should either be disinterested and impartial or generally representative of the main interests involved. (5) Each commission should have its terms of reference explicitly stated. (6) It should have wide discretion with regard to its methods of procedure. (7) Especial care should be taken in the naming of a chairman. (8) The commission ought to be able to crown its work by having its findings and recommendations ac-

cepted. (9) It ought to be provided with an efficient secretary.

IV

J. ELLSWERTH MISSALL'S *The Moreland Act: Executive Inquiry in the State of New York* makes a fine companion study to Marcy. It reviews and appraises the experience of the greatest state in the Union, over nearly forty years, with a law enabling its Chief Executive, whenever he deems it expedient, to order "independent, comprehensive, objective, and speedy investigations" into the conduct of any administrative agency within the state.

The main provisions of the measure run as follows:

The governor is authorized at any time, either in person or by one or more persons appointed by him for the purpose, to examine and investigate the management and affairs of any department, board, bureau or commission of the state. The governor and the persons so appointed by him are empowered to subpoena and enforce the attendance of witnesses, to administer oaths and examine witnesses under oath and to require the production of any books or papers deemed relevant or material. Whenever any person so appointed shall not be regularly in the service of the state his compensation for such services shall be fixed by the governor, and said compensation and all necessary expenses of such examinations and investigations shall be paid from the treasury out of any appropriations made for the purpose upon the order of the governor and the audit and warrant of the comptroller. (Section 8 of the Executive Law, Chapter 539 of the Laws of 1907 as amended by Chapter 131 of the Laws of 1928.)

Enacted originally for the purpose of strengthening the hand of a reform Governor, Charles E. Hughes, who owed his election to the public indignation evoked by his exposure of abuse of trust by the Equitable and New York life insurance companies, this statute has, in Missall's view, guaranteed "a distinctive kind of managerial strength." Thanks to the practice of supporting the law with regular annual appropriations, the governors of the commonwealth have been equipped "to scrutinize any part of the administrative process at the slightest provocation" and in addition, when they have been imaginative and resourceful,

"to examine issues of public interest" only indirectly related to administration.

The ways in which the act has been used naturally show the results of other laws which have affected the powers and organization of the executive department. As long as the Governor was handicapped by the lack of auxiliary services for budgeting, accounting, purchasing, and personnel administration, he was forced obliged to draw heavily upon the authority given him under the Moreland Act for the appointment of inquisitorial commissions. But as the creation of such services within the executive department and subject to his direction have given him the means of maintaining close and continuous supervision over the bureaucracy, he has endeavored increasingly to capitalize on its broader and more creative possibilities.

From 1907 to 1927, the year of the reorganization of the state government, thirty-one Moreland investigations had been undertaken (mostly by one-member commissions), the majority aimed at the discovery and disclosure of administrative incompetence or corruption. Between 1927 and 1944 there were but ten employments of the Act and these have revealed less of a concern to detect wrongdoing than to examine administrative practice with a view to bringing "its problems into the open and to offer recommendations for its improvement."

Of \$1,235,000 which was appropriated under

the act between 1907 and 1944, only \$954,000 was actually expended. Thus the average cost per inquiry amounted to the modest sum of \$23,000. As a matter of fact, many of the forty-one commissions expended far less than this amount, for among more recent inquiries have been two involving expenditures of \$200,000 each. The principal result of the work of inquisitorial commissions has been, naturally, the removal or resignation of officials proved corrupt or incompetent—and of such there had been, by 1944, no fewer than 62 clear instances. The values latent in the broader type of investigation do not lend themselves to easy or precise measurement but they can be substantial for all that. Frederick E. Crane's investigation of the letting of printing contracts, Robert M. Benjamin's monumental report on administrative adjudication, and Archie O. Dawson's survey of the Department of Mental Hygiene are indicative of what can be done to examine defects of system rather than of personnel.

In summary, the Moreland Act has contributed significantly to the development of due process of inquiry in the government of the commonwealth of New York. It is to be regretted that Missall's supplementary analysis of comparative state legislation can show only four other states—Idaho, Montana, New Jersey, and Wisconsin—which have sought in any similar way to perfect their processes of executive inquiry.

A Letter to the Editor

Chicago, Illinois
January 19, 1947

Editor, *Public Administration Review*
1313 E. 60th St., Chicago 37, Illinois

DEAR SIR:

In a recent book entitled *Mr. Adam* by Pat Frank,¹ a man named Stephen Decatur Smith makes some serious errors in the field of public administration which I believe should be pointed out to your readers. In a sense this book is an administrative case history of a serious national emergency. It deals with the short-lived agency known as the National Rerfertilization Project in which Mr. Smith was Special Assistant to the Director. This Project was set up at the time when the gamma ray had temporarily threatened the survival of the human race. Since I served as Senior Administrative Analyst to the Administrative Assistant to the Executive Office of NRP I think I can speak with considerable authority on its affairs. In fact, on one or two occasions I was actually in attendance at meetings of the NRP Planning Board on days when my four immediate superiors were unavoidably absent on maternity leave. As none of the documents in my office had a higher restriction than "Top Secret" I feel that I am not violating any confidences in writing this letter. However, I want to make it entirely clear that I am speaking only my own views and that they are not necessarily those of the twenty-three government agencies which were involved in the Project.

The lax and inaccurate and unscientific manner in which Stephen Decatur Smith treats this case history of an important government agency again demonstrates the evils of poor personnel administration. Mr. Smith was a journalist with no preparation for public service, no knowledge of lines of organization or of method and procedure, and not qualified to

hold the important administrative post he was given in the Director's office. Furthermore, he was not qualified to write a documentary case history as he lacked both training and experience as an archivist or as a political historian. His appointment to an important post during an emergency without being certified as one of the top three of a civil service register based on a competitive examination smells to heaven of patronage and of pork.

The first palpable error is the locus of the narrative which is primarily the Shoreham Hotel in Washington. The function of space allocation is, of course, one of the basic elements in the higher science of public administration and every CAF 5 Junior Administrative Technician knows immediately that this part of the Stephen Decatur Smith narrative is pure invention. There is a fundamental rule that government space must be used for government functions (MCM Comptroller General 1001), and the dining and wining and telephoning of Stephen Decatur Smith and Homer Adam at the Shoreham Hotel can by no stretch of the imagination be construed as a government function. An equally well established rule is that government accommodations are provided for the convenience of the government, not for the convenience of the employee. What convenience is there to the government to have Smith and Adam at the Shoreham Hotel in the fifty-cent taxicab zone which is at once too near and too far from the NRP headquarters to qualify as official travel for reimbursement on an expense voucher? Furthermore, it is well known that in times of peace (including times of limited emergency) the Shoreham Hotel is part of the legislative branch of the government. Even in times of unlimited emergency, classified employees of the executive branch may not live there unless their status is "dollar-a-year" or "W.O.C." No! This whole operation, I can now reveal, was not conducted at the Hotel Shoreham but at the Du Pont Circle Apartments. This first error

¹J. B. Lippincott Co., 1946. Pp. 252.

raises serious questions about the accuracy of the entire document.

The second major error is the administrative nonsense contained in the exposition of the organization plans for NRP. Just to quote a single item, page 69 of this book,

You see, policy flows down to the Chief from the top group, and then down to the Planning Board, which is composed of our own heads of branches and divisions. The Planning Board issues the directives and passes them down to be implemented. Right off the Planning Board, here, we have the Advisory Committee which is composed of leading physicians and biologists and such from all over the country. They aren't in government, of course. They're just to give us backing when we need it.

It is well known among administrators that planning boards never consist of heads of branches and divisions of an agency because they are too close to their functions and know too much about the work. Then, too, it is against the fundamental principles of administration for a staff agency to issue directives and pass them down to be implemented, even if the staff agency consists of a committee of line officers. Mr. Smith's ignorance on these points again demonstrates his unfitness to record these important occurrences. He oversimplifies the whole problem because, of course, there are many more channels than the one he describes and many, many more clearances before a directive is issued by the hierarchy of the command. Even a journalist should have taken some pains to familiarize himself with Washington procedures before presuming to describe them.

Finally, the book is just full of contumacy and insubordination and will have a very bad influence on the minds of young people entering the government service. For example, on page 89, Mr. Smith having been assigned a capable civil service girl as secretary, absolutely refuses to carry out her orders! When she asks, "But if you didn't have an office, how would you answer your mail, and your telegrams, and dictate your memoranda?" he replies, "I'm not going to dictate any memoranda. Not a one." When she insists, "But you have to dictate memoranda. People write you memoranda, and you have to write them back. Why, already you've received a whole envelope full, and I've got them with me, in case you care to work here. You see, you're quite an important man, Mr. Smith, being Special Assistant to the Director, and so you get copies of all the really important memoranda that originate in National Re-fertilization, plus the important inter-office and inter-departmental memos, even those classified secret and top secret," all this untrained, unprepared man can think of replying is "Under no circumstances—not ever—will I write a memorandum to anyone about anything. That is a pledge. May God strike me dead if I do!"

Unfortunately we have no way of censoring this volume, but I certainly think it should be kept off the shelves of colleges and universities where young people are training for public service.

Very sincerely yours,
BURATOMIC ISOCRAT

Report of Conference Sessions— Annual Meeting of the American Society for Public Administration, 1947

THE following summaries of the sessions of the annual meeting of the Society, prepared by their secretaries, are presented in order that members who could not be present may have some information relative to the sessions. The two luncheon addresses are also printed in this issue of the *Review*. President Ascher opened the conference with an address of welcome in which he said, in part:

In times of domestic and international difficulty and confusion, and an apparent faltering of leadership, these meetings are a renewed affirmation of faith.

At a time when the cry is the need for tax reduction, when a Senator says "Every federal department can be better run for 10 per cent less"—we must make our voice heard to show what can be done with precision tools used by skilled hands. For this reason I commend to you the sessions on Administrative Planning and Control Techniques, and on Managerial Units: Control or Service Agencies?

At a time when the cry is return to free enterprise, remove government controls, we must make our voice heard to show the continuing vital role of government as more than an umpire. We therefore will hear Dr. Nourse on Public Administration and Economic Stabilization, and will discuss Linking Public and Private Planning.

At a time when the cry is "return to the states"—"no centralized control"—we must make our voice heard to show how the complex field operations and intergovernmental relations of a federal state can be effectively managed. We have sessions on The Coordination of Field Services and on New Patterns in Federal-State-Local Relations.

At a time when policy changes of the most dramatic nature are forced on us with startling rapidity, we must make our voice heard to

show how the managerial task of the policy-maker can be eased, so that the administrative branch becomes a responsive and flexible instrument. The sessions on The Chief Executive and Departmental Policies and on The Role of Interdepartmental Committees should throw light on this problem.

At a time when executive and legislative relations are on a new footing, when the possibilities of a slip threaten to precipitate us into a chasm, we must make our voice heard to proclaim the techniques of cooperation between legislative and executive staffs and technical aides. We have a session on this subject.

At a time when an unprecedented part of what the public regards as expenditures for national safety are really research programs of basic profundity and breathtaking scope, with easy opportunity to demand secrecy in the name of security, it is proper for us to canvass the Administration of National Research Programs.

At a time when a man who was in the Army six days but who was discharged because he was allergic to wool socks can go to the head of an eligible list as a disabled veteran, with absolute preference over men with years of experience, when one after another of our ablest career administrators resigns on the ground that he cannot afford longer to serve the public, when one of our greatest democratic statesmen is relentlessly pilloried for two months as a condition of his elevation to higher office, we must make our voice heard to proclaim the essentials of Better Public Administration.

At a time when our involvements with other nations become dizzyingly complex, and when our eagerness to deal with world problems impels us to proliferate international agencies with necessarily undefined scopes of action, we must make our voice heard for Administrative

Organization for Integrating Foreign Policy and for Coordination of United Nations Agencies.

Finally, at a time when insecurity and frustration seem more evidently and conspicuously to elevate the irrational, when officials and citizens alike seem prone to compulsive actions, when we deem world security to depend upon our ability to modify customs of whole peoples, when tolerance and understanding of alien traditions are an essential base of world peace, we must make our voices heard for the recognition of the emerging "science of man" and its significances for the governance of men. We can explore some of these problems in our session on Human Relations in Administration.

To lead in the discussions of these high and profound problems there are assembled here men and women from four continents—engineers, anthropologists, statisticians, journalists, economists, lawyers, men from the universities, from industry, from international, federal, regional, state, and local governments, legislators, and administrators.

Members and friends of the Society, I welcome you to full and free participation in our deliberations. I declare the Annual Conference in session and turn the chair over to Dr. William Haber, who will preside at our first general discussion: The Chief Executive and Departmental Policies.

The Chief Executive and Departmental Policies

Chairman—William Haber, University of Michigan

Participants—Wayne Coy, *The Washington Post*; Leslie Lipson, Swarthmore College; Paul L. Ross, Office of the Mayor, New York City; Herman Somers, U. S. Office of Temporary Controls

Secretary—Betsy Abraham, National Housing Agency

As government becomes increasingly complex, the chief executive, whether at the federal, state, or local level, finds that his role is more and more one of coordinating and influencing departmental policy. The large number of departments and agencies and their multi-

tudinous interrelationships make coordination of policy a primary problem of public administration.

Recently, efforts have been made to coordinate departmental policy below the level of the chief executive. The establishment of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion represented such an attempt in the federal government; the office of the deputy mayor, in New York City. If such "coordinators" are to be effective, it is essential that: (a) the coordinator be identified closely with the chief executive, and be regarded as a personal aide or chief of staff, (b) that the coordinator derive his authority solely from the chief executive and have no independent powers or responsibilities; (c) that the sphere of the coordinator's authority be as broad as that of the chief executive with no major programs removed from his jurisdiction.

The contributions of the chief executive to departmental policy vary with the capacities of the individual. If he has executive ability, he may be able to bring about improved management practices. In any case, as an elected official, he should be able to contribute to the departments the values of "general political intelligence."

In conclusion, it was pointed out that not only the coordination of departments, but real political leadership as well, requires that an over-all, government-wide policy be developed by the chief executive to which lesser policy can be related and adapted.

The Coordination of Field Services

Chairman—James W. Fesler, University of North Carolina

Participants—Leland Barrows, National Housing Agency; Warner W. Gardner, U. S. Department of the Interior; M. George Goodrick, U. S. Department of Commerce; Byron T. Hippie, New York State Department of Social Welfare; Joseph W. Rupley, U. S. Bureau of the Budget, San Francisco Field Office; Dean Snyder, Federal Security Agency.

Secretary—J. Meisel, Civilian Production Administration

The discussion was opened with a description of specific problems of coordination of

field operations in each of the agencies represented on the panel. Despite the variety of functions and types of organization described there was developed a considerable body of common difficulty encountered. The principal problem areas may be listed as follows:

1. Resistance on the part of established organization units and individuals within such units to supporting any program which presents an encroachment, either actual or imagined, upon traditional methods of operation or previously established authority.
2. Determination of the extent to which authority may safely be delegated to field units. Practice as described by the panel ranges from virtually complete delegation permitting independent action in such self-contained units as the Bonneville Dam Administration of the Department of Interior to fairly complete central office control exercised by means of direct line authority as exemplified by control of regional directors and local managers of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce through the chief of the field service section in Washington.
3. Identification of programs which can and should be decentralized and their separation from others which by their nature must be retained under immediate central office control.
4. Maintenance of central control of operations after delegation to the field.
5. Resolution of jurisdictional conflicts between functional specialists in the headquarters office and line supervisors of field operations.
6. Lack of office space in which separate activities under a single control may be housed together.
7. Suspicion of appropriation groups with regard to attempts to regroup or otherwise reorganize previously uncoordinated activities.

Although the panel could formulate no cure-all for problems of field coordination, there was general agreement that important elements in any attempt at field coordination at any level of organization are mutual education as to objectives and work being done by the parts of the organization; clear-cut delegations of authority; full and detailed communication to the field as to headquarters philosophy, policy, and objectives; mutual interchange of

opinion and comment between field and headquarters; and, wherever feasible, consolidation of all field activities of an agency under a single direction. There was some difference of opinion as to the relative merits of authoritarian control as against reliance upon educational and persuasive techniques. All of the agencies represented utilize both approaches to some extent.

Managerial Units: Control or Service Agencies?

Chairman—Kenneth O. Warner, Federal Security Agency

Participants—R. L. Duffy, Hartford Finance Department; James B. Lowell, Connecticut State Department of Finance and Control; Harry W. Marsh, U.N.R.R.A. Bureau of Administration; William W. Parsons, U. S. Treasury Department

Secretary—Carolyn Friedman, Office of Housing Expediter

The panel defined the role of managerial units as heterogeneous in character, consisting of planning, service, control, and leadership functions. Emphasis on a particular aspect of management varies with the level and point of operation at which contact with departments is made, there being greater stress on planning functions at higher levels and earlier stages of operation.

The ideal relationship between staff and line units exists when staff groups train operating personnel so that the need for further staff assistance is minimized and when all actions emanating from managerial officials stem from the authority of the organization's executive head. Administrative processes cannot compensate for unsound legislative controls, which are often excessively restrictive. An undue burden is frequently placed on budget and personnel functions by a lack of program planning and policy control on the part of line officials.

All managerial services involve some degree of control; however, responsibility for constructive guidance and counsel to operating units cannot be neglected, and first-hand understanding of operating problems and human

relationships is absolutely essential to the effective performance of staff functions.

If constructive service based on familiarity and grasp of operating problems is offered, centralized managerial units, such as personnel, planning, and budget, can serve as fair and efficient safeguards against chaotic operating conditions. Procedural manuals and written standards should be utilized to maintain central authority over decentralized control functions, affording managerial units maximum opportunity for leadership in their respective organizations. The complete severance from operating units of management groups in their service, control, or research aspects is unwise if leadership, effectiveness, and recognition of staff operations are to continue.

Linking Public and Private Planning

Chairman—E. J. Coil, National Planning Association

Participants—Eugene Burgess, General Mills, Inc.; Lincoln Gordon, Harvard University; Marion Hedges, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Arthur Macmahon, Columbia University; Robert E. Merriam, Chicago City Council (Alderman-elect)

Secretary—Lillian Orden

Using the report of the Council of Economic Advisers as a springboard, the panel members quickly came to the conclusion that exhortation alone is not a sufficient device to secure the coordination of public and private planning. Nor can such integration of public and private policies be brought about by mere consultation at the top national level between government officials and representatives of private organizations. Lines of communications need to be established between the national and local levels, and between the private segments of our economy. The field development activities of the Committee for Economic Development and the agriculture, business, and labor committees of the National Planning Association are examples of the extension of the lines of communication of private groups.

At present, the attitude of the Congress is to diminish governmental planning activities, but there seems to be a growing interest among industrial and labor leaders in nongovernmental

planning. Although a minority, these leaders recognize that enlightened self-interest demands that their policy decisions be made with due regard to their effects on others in the economy. The past decade has witnessed a growth in the recognition of the relationship of the policies of business, labor, and government to the maintenance of the national income.

The statement that public and private planning cannot be linked adequately unless there are some agreed objectives among labor, capital, agriculture, and government precipitated a discussion of collective bargaining. The future of government and private planning, stated the panel chairman, is tied in with successful collective bargaining. Both labor and industry are limited in their vision of the need for the benefits of research and planning; but the scope of collective bargaining is being gradually broadened, and increasing attention is being given not only to the economic position of the company and the industry, but also to the relationships between industries. There was a general agreement that legal limitations on industry-wide bargaining would be undesirable, although the problem of properly defining an industry was noted. How to get cooperation for the expansion and stabilization of production, rather than collusion for restriction, was another basic question in industry planning posed by the chairman. One answer was "open covenants openly arrived at," but this was qualified by the need for someone to be able to veto these covenants if they are anti-social. In other words, we need some device in the governmental administrative machinery to safeguard the public in these industry-wide agreements.

Services and informational facilities for industry and labor to be furnished by the Departments of Commerce and Labor, analogous to the services furnished by the Department of Agriculture to the farmer, were suggested as means of linking more closely public and private planning. Such services can come about, however, only if there is a demand for them. It was also agreed that incentives, such as tax incentives, to stimulate private planning and programming have not yet been sufficiently explored.

In conclusion, the chairman spoke against

the short view which may be a dark view and in favor of planning now the government's role in extension of services so as to extend the lines of communication between public agencies and private organizations.

New Patterns in Federal-State-Local Relations

Chairman—Luther Gulick, Institute of Public Administration

Participants—George Bigge, Federal Security Agency; George W. Burgess, U. S. Department of Commerce; John Burton, New York State Budget Division; J. Harold De Nike, New York State Department of Commerce; C. A. Harrell, City of Norfolk; Thomas H. MacDonald, Federal Works Agency

Secretary—Hugh F. Loweth, Social Security Administration

What have been the significant changes of recent years in the interrelationship of federal, state, and local governments? From the reports of the members of the panel, representing these several levels of government, it was apparent that, with few exceptions, changes have represented a continuation of trends rather than the development of new patterns in federal-state-local relations.

At the federal level, the grants-in-aid for welfare, public health, vocational education, rehabilitation, and highway construction have remained the most widely known and well established federal-state programs. A development is now under way in the Federal Security Agency, under Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1946, to improve federal-state relations by the issuance of joint instructions to states, the creation of common standards for state practice, and the submittal of single state plans for operation where several related health and welfare grant-in-aid programs are administered by various constituents of the Agency.

In at least one instance a significant change has occurred in federal-state relations with the coming of the "air age." George Burgess of the Department of Commerce pointed to the assistance of the states to the federal government—a reversal of the usual trend—in the enforcement by state officers of federally imposed rules and regulations for the licensing of men

and aircraft and for the safe operation of the air transport system throughout the country.

And one further change resulting directly from the ending of the wartime restrictions—mentioned by the chairman as a footnote to the discussion—has been the return of the Employment Service to state operation.

New York State, represented by its Budget Officer, John Burton, and air transport bureau chief, J. Harold De Nike, was the exemplification, at this round table, of state experiences in relations with local and federal governments. Increased financial aid to localities and, more specifically, assistance to cities in the promotion of a system of airports and the analysis of and planning for air commerce have marked recent trends in the Empire State.

The comprehensive and integrated state-local developments in New York State include: reduction of local financial responsibility for relief to twenty percent; increase of state aid for education, health, and highways, in spite of New York's already advanced position on state aid; consolidation of all other special grants into a lump sum, distributed on a per capita basis which gives cities \$6.75 per capita, towns \$3.55 per capita, and villages \$3.00 per capita; division of state budget into two parts, one for the state government itself and one for the state aids to local governments; the establishment of stabilization reserves, now approaching \$118,000,000, set aside to guarantee the equal flow from year to year of tax resources, in spite of the fluctuation in collections from income, corporation, and other elastic sources; and finally the new delegation of power to local governments to tax retail sales, amusements, luxuries, and the like.

C. A. Harrell, Norfolk city manager, regretted the encroachment of the state in the direct supervision of urban activities. Cities should have the right to act independently and impose taxes to support their actions without the necessity for state permission. But most of all they should be consulted in the development of federal and state programs.

William Anderson, of the University of Minnesota, summarizing from the floor recent trends in the relations of federal, state, and local governments, stressed the need for continued and strengthened cooperative research

and planning in the development of federal, state, and local programs—cooperation federal with state, and state with local, levels. While large cities have been faring badly without the expansion of taxable resources, through mutual effort localities, counties, states, and the federal government should find added capacity to accomplish their objectives. This is the hoped-for development in the pattern of federal-state-local relations for the future.

Human Relations in Administration

Chairman—Pendleton Herring, Carnegie Corporation of New York

Participants—Joseph M. Goldsen, Nejelski and Company, Inc.; Alexander H. Leighton, Cornell University; George F. F. Lombard, Harvard University; Spencer Platt, U. S. Bureau of the Budget

Secretary—Joseph M. Ray, University of Maryland

The problem is: how can managers maintain the spontaneous cooperation of the people in the organization, how can they understand and become more conscious of human beings. Any institution, wherever found, is highly autocratic. Furthermore, as the organization becomes larger, the human factor tends to become more complex. The narrow objective of an institution is getting out the work. The true end goal should be getting out the work with the fullest expression of individual personalities.

There are several principles involved. Clarification is essential, with respect both to responsibilities and to the end goals of the organization. Participation is also important; the individual should be accorded meaningful participation in the handling of problems. Individual gratification is clearly involved; the human personality responds to other rewards besides money, prestige, and authority; the goal of the institution must become a rewarding thing for the people involved.

The discussion yielded practical answers to the problem. The following methods were suggested: (1) clarify institutional goals and policies at all levels; (2) select people at all levels with full attention to human relations factors; (3) train people in the area of human relations as well as in technical fields; (4) train manage-

ment at all levels in the techniques of group decision-making; (5) analyze operations for factors contributing to excessive psychic costs; (6) examine the temperamental and social relations factors of each job; (7) perform group autopsies on administrative failures; (8) read the rule book for permission rather than for defeat—take a positive approach to suggestions and recommendations; (9) call for suggestions for improvement, making sure that division chiefs receive due credit for suggestions arising under them; (10) seek to synthesize personal goals with institutional goals; where the two are divergent, both the institution and the person may make adjustments leading toward synthesis. In general, the answer is continuing attention to problems, with an increasing sensitivity to a range of human relations factors.

Relationships Between Legislative and Executive Aides

Chairman—Rowland Egger, University of Virginia

Participants—Roy Blough, University of Chicago; Ernest S. Griffith, Legislative Reference Service; Bertram M. Gross, Council of Economic Advisers

Secretary—Ben Yoshioka, Office of the Housing Expediter

A meaningful legislative program can be achieved only when there are harmonious relationships between Congress and the executive branch. Legislative decisions should be based on factual data presented by the legislative and executive staffs in an atmosphere of candor and mutual confidence, especially in regard to the exchange of confidential information. What are the difficulties in achieving this harmony and how can they be overcome?

The need for an audit of the executive function as well as the need for streamlining its committee structure led Congress to pass legislation to reorganize itself. A principal instrumentality of Congress is the legislative staff of which there are three types—aides to the top party leaders, committee staffs, and the Legislative Reference Service. Discussion was limited to the latter two types.

The role of the legislative staff is to present

an unbiased analysis of any legislative proposal or recommendation which can serve as a factual basis for congressional action. The staff should not attempt to formulate policy for Congress. It should determine the intent of the legislative proposals; postaudit the executive budget; evaluate hidden compromises within a proposal resulting from differences of opinion on the part of the sponsors; and make available to Congress information on alternative administrative policies which were considered by an executive agency in carrying out legislation.

The success of the legislative staff in carrying out its role depends upon its working relationships with the executive staff. One difficulty is the reticence of the executive staff to tell the "whole truth" for fear it may prejudice the committee chairman who can steer the course of legislation. Another difficulty is the tendency of Congress not to debate proposed legislation thoroughly enough. Unwillingness to produce detailed data often results in a "monolithic" or one-sided presentation of a proposal, especially if it represents a strongly advocated Administration bill.

A suggested solution is for Congress to utilize staff from the executive branch more freely. However, the fluid exchange of personnel might be impeded by the administrator who fears that intimate knowledge of his organization may result in a shift of agency control.

It is too early to make any predictions about the relationships that will be worked out between the legislative and executive staffs. The Legislative Reference Service reports very satisfactory relationships to date. The crucial test lies in the committees. The kind of committee staffs selected, the use of the data analyzed, and the extent of liaison to be maintained with the executive staff are dependent upon the will of the committee and the committee chairman.

Administrative Planning and Control Techniques

Chairman—John Corson, The Washington Post

Participants—Leonard W. Hoelscher, U. S. Bureau of the Budget; John D. Millett, Columbia University; Ewing W. Reilley, McKinsey and Company; Frank Rowland, Life Office Management Association

Secretary—Harvey Sherman, U. S. Bureau of the Budget

In recent years, management has paid more attention than ever before to the use of administrative planning and control techniques. This development has been true in the Armed Services, private industry, and civilian government. Although administrative planning and control activities have been carried on under a variety of names, they generally involve giving consideration to the following factors: (1) the relationship of the planning and control activities to the chief executive, (2) organization planning, (3) procedure planning, (4) financial planning, (5) the setting of objectives or standards, (6) measurement of performance, and (7) the creation of human incentives by proper utilization of the previous six factors. Large organizations frequently have created specialized staffs to carry on these activities. In small organizations, the function is often performed on an informal basis. Where specialized staffs are set up, those at the top level generally act in an advisory and coordinating capacity, while those located at a lower level in the organization work on the more concrete, day-to-day problems.

The control division of the Army Service Forces was described as an example of a specialized staff unit created to perform administrative planning and control activities. Its mission was to improve management, but not to take it over. In accomplishing this mission, the division carried on three categories of work: organization planning, procedural improvement, and quantitative measurement of performance. Its success was attributed to the full support given it by General Somervell and to the unique environment brought about by the radical departure in War Department organization and traditions which followed the reorganization of the department shortly after Pearl Harbor.

The growing size and complexity of private businesses have resulted in the frequent creation of specialized staff units to foresee, detect, analyze, and solve management problems. These specialized administrative planning and control units are an aid to management not because of superior knowledge or ability, but

because the nature of their work gives them several basic advantages—time, specialized analytical techniques, objectivity, and a questioning, experimental viewpoint. The primary requisites for the success of these units are: (1) the staff must be good, (2) line executives must be trained in the proper use of the staff, and (3) the staff must have top management support.

Two administrative planning and control techniques developed by the insurance business, but not yet in general use, were discussed. These techniques were (1) the office operations audit, a periodic inspection and appraisal of every factor affecting the quality and quantity of office operations, and (2) institutional management research, a method of enlisting the technical talents of a number of companies on a given problem.

In the federal government, planning and control techniques have been the concern of each government agency and, on a government-wide basis, of the Bureau of the Budget. The principal planning and control techniques used in the federal government include program planning (still in its infancy), organization and procedure planning, budget formulation and administration, administrative accounting, work measurement, staffing patterns and control (such as tables of organizations), and quality control. In addition, control is exercised through simplification and standardization of common activities such as personnel and fiscal procedures and records, and through the establishment of criteria for service, operation, and cost of these common activities. A significant development of recent origin has been the holding of interdepartmental conferences dealing respectively with organization and methods, budgetary formulation, and budgetary administration.

The Role of Interdepartmental Committees

Chairman—George A. Graham, Princeton University

Participants—John Gange, U. S. Department of State; Henry Hubbard, Council of Personnel Administration; David Novick, U. S. Office for Emergency Management; Mary Trackett Reynolds, Hunter College; John

Sherman, Air Coordinating Committee; Elmer Staats, U. S. Bureau of the Budget; Harold Stein, U. S. Office for Emergency Management.

Secretary—Margaret A. Ryan, Central Intelligence Group

The panel members attempted to draw from the experience of recent years points bearing on the success and failure of interdepartmental committees. It was noted throughout the discussion that committees vary widely in character. Recent experience with committees seems to indicate that their effectiveness is aided by:

1. Reasonably clear definition of tasks and responsibilities.
2. A clear basic policy or decision under which the committee can operate. It was generally agreed that a committee can effectively work out detailed interdepartmental arrangements to implement a broad decision.
3. Existence of established machinery for interpreting and carrying out committee decisions.
4. Giving of authority to committee members to make decisions without excessive referral back for departmental review or approval.
5. Assistance of a secretariat to facilitate the deliberations of the committee and to follow up its decisions.
6. Fixed dates for making decisions and clear understanding as to whom the committee will report.
7. Genuine willingness on the part of the committee members to work toward an integrated decision, i.e., some willingness to give and take.

Interdepartmental committees have made effective contributions in many ways. They have assisted in formulating legislation and also in interpreting legislation and policy to obtain more uniform acceptance and application. The Council of Personnel Administration is a good illustration of this point. They have crystallized United States policy in certain areas and made recommendations for consideration by international bodies. The Air Coordinating Committee and the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy are examples. There

was some feeling that a committee can lead the individual administrator to look beyond his immediate problems and to work in a broader group. At times, too, the committee may be politically expedient. It not only provides a way of gracefully shelving a problem (!), but also can provide the means for focusing public attention on an important issue.

The interdepartmental committee, however, does have certain limitations. Many germane problems are never referred to the committee or they are referred too late for really effective action. The committee is not very successful in settling disputes, although it can sometimes be used to prevent them from arising. Committee activity is time consuming. It adds to the duties of the administrator and it is inappropriate for making quick decisions. There was some feeling that the interdepartmental committee had been used to excess.

The panel agreed that interdepartmental committees will always be needed to deal with the inevitable residue of issues which cut across even the most logical organization. The interdepartmental committee will serve to complement staff agencies and other liaison groups rather than as a substitute for them. American democracy, based on the theory that "two heads are better than one," will frequently prompt the use of the interdepartmental committee to deal with complex issues when it is more important to find the most satisfactory solution than to reach a quick decision.

Administrative Organization for Integrating Foreign Policy

Chairman—Alger Hiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Participants—Thomas C. Blaisdell, U. S. Department of Commerce; Paul T. David, U. S. Delegation to Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization; Ernest A. Gross, U. S. Department of State; Easton Rothwell, Brookings Institution

Secretary—Robert L. Rupard, Office of the Foreign Service, Department of State

By what administrative means—what organization or system of procedure—can the federal

government establish a greater degree of teamwork among the executive departments in the formulation and execution of foreign policy?

Under modern world conditions, a number of federal departments and agencies logically insist upon having a voice in the formulation and execution of our foreign policy because of its direct effect upon the successful execution of the responsibilities of these departments. Conversely, a coordinated supervision, from a foreign policy standpoint, of certain actions of various departments is necessary because these actions have a direct impact on the foreign policy of the United States.

The United Nations organization and the specialized agencies, by expanding the area of international negotiation, have resulted in a re-emphasis of the need for integration. Moreover, the need for coordinated re-examination of issues increases tremendously where the basic pattern of negotiations is multilateral rather than bilateral, and such negotiations pose new issues of coordinating execution of policy. Ideally, perhaps, our delegates to the United Nations should merely carry out policy formulated at Washington. It is not always possible to adhere to this approach, however, because of the complexity of the problems which may unexpectedly come up for consideration. Consequently, frequent references to Washington for instructions or information may be necessary and in other cases latitude must be left to the representatives charged with negotiation. It is on occasions such as these where the effectiveness of coordinating machinery is put to the test.

Subject to certain limitations, the device of interdepartmental committees appears to offer the most satisfactory means of achieving the needed integration and coordination in Washington. Because of the number and varying terms of reference of these committees a further problem is presented of "coordinating the coordinators." This task can be simplified through (1) rigorous exclusion from committee consideration of matters not actually requiring coordination; (2) use of joint subcommittees of separate interdepartmental committees; (3) informal discussion of common problems between members of different com-

mittees; (4) greater utilization of the central secretariat provided by the State Department; (5) greater emphasis on complete staff work by the secretariats of the various committees; and (6) greater exchange of information by the various secretariats.

Coordination of United Nations Agencies

Chairman—Donald C. Stone, U. S. Bureau of the Budget

Participants—H. T. Andrews, Minister to the United States, Union of South Africa; William O. Hall, U. S. Department of State; S. K. Kirpalani, India Government Trade Commissioner; David Owen, United Nations; Leo Pasvolsky, Brookings Institution; James B. Reston, *The New York Times*; Howard Tolley, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; Francis O. Wilcox, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Secretary—Philip M. Burnett, U. S. Department of State

The United Nations is the center of a "planetary" system of various specialized agencies, which, though perhaps confusing to the public in its complexity, reflects the historical necessities surrounding its establishment. Coordination of the activities of these diverse bodies is obviously essential, yet must rest on agreement and recommendation rather than on legislation. Within the framework of the agreements concluded between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, coordination on the level of administration is being sought by informal means such as personal consultations and working parties on common problems. Much will depend on whether governments can coordinate their own problems so as to speak with the same voice in the different organizations of which they are members.

The rapid proliferation of international bodies, however, is creating compelling reasons for sterner efforts at coordination. Legislatures in many countries are beginning to insist, not only on economy, but also on being presented with a coherent picture of the activities now carried on by international organizations. Although it is probably true that, during the first years, a good deal of latitude should be given

in their respective fields to specialized agencies which are feeling their way, the passage of time will make clear the desirability of more comprehensive regulation from some central authority.

The authority to achieve such coordination rests with the General Assembly and, under it, with the Economic and Social Council, although aside from policy pronouncements, the process of coordination is an executive function and thus must be carried on primarily by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in conjunction with the administrative heads of the specialized agencies. Present authority—in Article 17, paragraph 3, and Articles 63 and 64 of the Charter—will require implementation and expansion. The next session of the General Assembly will not be too early to begin the task of examining the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies. A consolidated budget for United Nations and specialized agencies is eventually to be looked for as a means of satisfying both administrative and political requirements.

Three other factors are significant: (1) at present, when the various agencies are feeling their way, apparent overlapping is more often to be found in planning than in performance; at a later stage, there may be overlapping in actual operation; (2) the Secretary-General of the United Nations should exercise strong leadership in encouraging "self-coordination" by and between the several agencies; and (3) the centralization of headquarters would simplify coordination and the United Nations is tentatively planning construction of adequate space and facilities so that other agencies may locate in New York.

Management Aspects of the Administrative Procedure Act

Chairman—Walter Gellhorn, Columbia University

Participants—John H. Marion, U. S. Bureau of the Budget; Oscar Pogge, Federal Security Agency; Ross Pollock, U. S. Civil Service Commission

Secretary—Herbert Kaufman, Intern, National Institute of Public Affairs

A possible result of the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act is that the isolation of adjudicatory and rule-making functions may open the way to greater executive integration of the purely administrative functions. Because of the act's provision for publication of procedures and organization, some agencies have given renewed consideration to these matters and have already effected some important improvements.

However, a number of serious problems are indicated. Foremost among these are questions of staffing. Should examiners now employed be retained automatically, or should they be required to compete for their positions or to pass only qualifying tests? Since hearing officers must be used in rotation "so far as practicable," must they all be equally paid? Does rotation preclude the use of more experienced personnel in more difficult cases? Examiners may perform additional duties not inconsistent with their duties as hearing officers; how, then, shall their salaries be determined? How shall cases that occasionally arise overseas be handled with the speed they require? Shall agencies staff their examiner groups for peak loads or average loads? If examiners are used in administrative posts during slack periods, how can they be brought within the executive chain of command without violating the act? These and other questions have not yet been fully answered. It appears that the solutions will depend in part upon how the courts interpret the law; but equally, and perhaps even more, the solutions will depend upon the readiness of the Civil Service Commission and the agencies themselves to interpret the act in ways which will permit the administrative process to function effectively.

The problem of setting qualifications for hearing examiners was subjected to detailed scrutiny. The consensus opposed an ironclad requirement that all such officers be lawyers because, in the first place, many individuals more than compensate for their lack of legal training by technical knowledge and a general understanding of judicial standards of fair procedure and, second, many determinations rest only on technical investigation rather than adversary proceedings. It was suggested that law schools might give basic courses in the elements of legal procedure for those who want to get this groundwork without necessarily sacri-

ficing technical experience for a knowledge of the law.

The meeting closed on a comment from the floor that although the act was apparently aimed at some of the newer agencies, these have usually attempted to strengthen their positions by careful observance of procedural requirements. Thus, ironically, it is the older departments against which few complaints have been lodged that might possibly be most affected by the act if it were to be extensively and rigidly applied. It was suggested that long-tested and satisfactory procedures which are consistent with the act's spirit and purposes perhaps need not be abruptly discarded while the scope of the act's commands remains somewhat unclear.

Administration of National Research Programs

Chairman—J. Donald Kingsley, The White House Office

Participants—Edward U. Condon, U. S. Department of Commerce; Philip M. Hauser, U. S. Department of Commerce; David Langmuir, Joint Research and Development Board; Robert Steadman, President's Scientific Research Board; Alan Waterman, Office of Naval Research

Secretary—Jack Merritt, U. S. Bureau of the Budget

Annual federal expenditures for research and development have grown from an annual rate of forty million dollars in 1932 to a present rate of one billion dollars, a figure which represents about 50 per cent of the total national expenditure for research. The magnitude of the federal research program has become so important that government policies controlling research programs should be critically examined.

For example, national security requirements conflict directly with the traditional free flow of scientific information necessary for a maximum rate of discovery of new knowledge. There are two aspects to the problem: first, ascertaining the loyalty of individual scientists, and second, determining to what extent the flow of information should be restricted by compartmentalization. The former problem requires investigations by one central specialized agency. Restricting the flow of informa-

tion by compartmentalization is a two-edged sword. Too conservative a policy of declassification may jeopardize the national security by retarding our own rate of progress just as effectively as too liberal a policy of declassification. At some midpoint there is a nice balance which maximizes the national security. The determination of this point requires the active participation of scientists.

In addition to limitation in the interests of security there may be other government policies and procedures which hinder research, particularly basic research. For example, the annual appropriation procedure does not permit long-range planning and budgeting. A further problem is the difficulty of justifying basic research expenditures to lay administrators and the Congress.

The administration of research within the government offers some special problems such as the proper relation between the formulation of policy and the requirements for scientific freedom. One procedure is to isolate policy and scientific decisions. A more workable proced-

ure might be to integrate the two by giving scientists a greater voice in policy formulation. Another problem of government research is the necessity for coordination, particularly in the field of applied research. The Joint Research and Development Board, established by the secretaries of War and Navy, has been co-ordinating the research activities of these two departments by allocating responsibility for development. The necessity for establishing such a coordinating body pointedly raises the question of the desirability of providing some mechanism for the coordination of research activities of other government agencies.

Quite clearly, there are many problems concerned with the federal research program which will greatly affect the national security and general welfare. The President's Scientific Research Board is the most recent effort to deal with some of these problems. It would seem that a more permanent agency such as a national science foundation should be established. The federal research program has become too important to be determined by random policies.

News of the Society

THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE

The American Society for Public Administration held its annual conference in Washington, D. C., Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, March 14-16, 1947. Over 500 people attended the meetings which were held at the Hotel Statler. This was the first time the Society met independently of other organizations.

In recognition of the excellent program arranged by John Miller, National Planning Association, who was program chairman for the annual meeting, the Society unanimously passed a resolution expressing to him its deep appreciation.

A general session was held each morning of the conference and three simultaneous sessions each afternoon. The annual business meeting and a general session of the conference were held Friday evening. No dinner meetings were scheduled. The two principal addresses of the conference delivered at luncheons Friday and Saturday and brief reports of the other conference sessions, prepared by members of the Washington Chapter serving as secretaries, appear on other pages of this issue of the *Review*.

Newly elected members of the Council of the Society are:

President—Leonard D. White, professor of public administration, University of Chicago

Vice President—Leland Barrows, special assistant to the commissioner, Federal Public Housing Administration

Council Members—M. P. Catherwood, commissioner, New York State Department of Commerce

Lyman S. Moore, city manager, Portland, Maine

Edward W. Weidner, assistant director of research in intergovernmental relations, University of Minnesota (junior Council member)

The President and the Vice President are

elected for a period of one year; the three new members of the Council, for three years, through 1949 or until the next annual meeting thereafter may be held. Charles S. Ascher as past president automatically becomes a member of the Council.

The Editorial Board for 1947 includes:

Editor-in-Chief—Rowland Egger, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia

Board Members—Lincoln Gordon, associate professor of business administration, Harvard University School of Business

Lee S. Greene, professor of political science, University of Tennessee

Avery Leiserson, department of political science, University of Chicago

John D. Millett, department of public law and government, Columbia University

Lloyd M. Short, director of public administration center, University of Minnesota

Donald C. Stone, assistant director, U. S. Bureau of the Budget

John A. Vieg, department of government, Pomona College

The Society adopted by a rising vote the following statement of appreciation of its past president, Harold D. Smith, read by Paul H. Appleby:

The American Society for Public Administration recognizes a continuing indebtedness to Harold D. Smith. In a particularly vivid way, his career symbolized the purpose of all of us. His work in local government, as a state and federal official, and in an international agency proved the possibility of a fruitful and rewarding career in the public service for Americans of the highest order of ability. His devotion to the ideals of the career public service enabled him, while exercising great influence on national policy, to convince leaders of all parties and all points of view of his impartiality, to win

their respect for his position as a professional administrator. He made to this Society a special contribution as its President, as a constantly active member, and as a sustained and pervasive influence for broadening and strengthening the basis on which the science and art of public administration may be developed. The Society wishes to record its enduring appreciation of him as a man, as a public servant, and as a leader in accomplishing the purposes to which it is dedicated.

An expression of appreciation to Public Administration Clearing House was unanimously passed for the maintenance of the Society's secretariat and the contribution of a subvention to the Society's treasury during the past year. At the meeting of the Council, Herbert Emerich announced that the Clearing House would continue the arrangement through 1947 or until the next annual meeting.

It was the consensus of the Council that in view of the exceedingly favorable response to the 1947 conference, the next annual meeting should be arranged independently of any other organization. It was further agreed that the next annual meeting should be held in Washington, D. C., in the Spring of 1948, and that the Society should encourage a regional meeting during each year, possibly in conjunction with another regional group.

The Society accepted the invitation of the American Section of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences to become a "collective member" of the American Section of the Institute. The International Congress on Administrative Sciences, at which the Society will be represented, will be held July 22-30, 1947, in Berne, Switzerland.

In response to suggestions made at the meeting of members on Friday, March 14, the Council directed the secretariat to promote the creation of student chapters after consultation with regular existing chapters in the same areas and to explore the possibilities of cooperation with Canadian public administration groups.

The annual report of the secretary-treasurer for the year ending December 31, 1946, shows a total enrollment of 2917—a net increase of over 400 for the year. Progress since the founding of the Society in 1939 has been as follows:

Year Ending Dec. 31	Total	Enrollments		
		New	Resig- nations	Net Increase
1940	1209			
1941	1927	832	114	718
1942	2052	563	438	125
1943	2055	493	490	3
1944	2125	443	373	70
1945	2500	653	278	375
1946	2917	724	307	417


About 56 per cent of the enrollment represent the public service and 22.5 per cent are teachers in universities and colleges. The chart on the following page shows the distribution of members by professions. The geographical distribution, as displayed by the Membership Listing issued in December, 1946, is much the same as in former years with almost one-quarter of the total membership residing in the vicinity of the District of Columbia. All but six states maintained or increased enrollments during 1946, with greatest gains in Wisconsin, New York, Illinois, and Connecticut.

During 1946 the secretariat issued a Membership Listing, giving the professional connections of each member where the information was available, and a Chapter Directory to facilitate the work of chapter officers.

Of the eighteen chapters which have been organized since the founding of the Society, fifteen held a total of fifty meetings during the past calendar year. New chapters were formed during the year in Kentucky, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico. The Virginia Chapter, first organized in 1940 and inactive during the war, was reactivated during 1946.

In 1946 the *Review* printed 28 articles and 17 essay-reviews. In most instances essay-reviews were comparable in content to articles. Subjects ranged from local to international administration and represented a wide variety of problems.

In November, 1946, the George Banta Publishing Company, who had printed the *Review* for three years, declined to renew the contract.



for 1947. Like all printers they faced serious problems in the reconversion period. After an extended canvass of possible new printers in which the members of the Editorial Board and the Council of the Society gave substantial assistance, satisfactory arrangements for printing the *Review* in 1947 have been made with the Vermont Printing Company of Brattleboro, Vermont.

The statement of income and disbursements of the Society shows a small balance at the end of the year despite rising prices. For the first five years of the Society's existence the Public Administration Clearing House donated the staff of the secretariat, paying for all salaries, cost of travel, space, equipment, and so forth, and the Society's statements showed only out-

of-pocket expenses such as printing, mimeographing, mailing and postage, stationery and supplies, and the like. During the sixth year (1945) the Society continued to receive donated services from the Clearing House, but made partial restitution by repaying the Clearing House the sum of \$3600 during the year.

In 1946 the Society's accounting was put on a new basis. The Society paid for all direct services and expenses, including salaries, and accepted from the Clearing House a fixed subvention of \$4800. During 1947 the Clearing House subvention will be \$3600. From the financial statement, reproduced herewith, it may be seen that less than one-quarter of the total income during 1946 came from subvention.

AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION STATEMENT OF
INCOME, DISBURSEMENTS AND
BALANCE FOR THE YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1946

Earned Income

Membership and Subscriptions

Senior Members	\$ 8,282.50
Junior Members	663.00
Sustaining Members	313.75
Subscriptions	2,903.75
 Total	 \$12,163.00
Sales of Journal	1,519.01
Sales of Reprints	387.93
Miscellaneous Income	185.21
Conference Income	237.22
 Total	 \$14,492.37

Subvention from Public Administration

Clearing House	4,800.00
Total Income	\$19,292.37

Disbursements

General Operations

Personal Services	\$ 8,308.89
Telephone and Telegraph	215.70
Stationery and Supplies	989.69
Postage and Express	731.37
Mailing Charges	448.98
Printing and Mimeographing	795.70
Annual and Other Charges	303.24
Accounting Services	540.00
Conference Expense	1,090.43
Travel Expense	512.42
Advertising	185.00
Building Service Fee	768.00
 Total	 \$14,839.42

Public Administration Review

Commissions	\$ 32.44
Postage and Express	146.21
Mailing Charges	119.90
Printing	3,628.90
Reprints	356.54

Total \$ 4,283.99

Total Disbursements \$19,123.41

Excess of Earned Income over Disbursements \$ 168.96

Balance carried forward January 1, 1946 \$ 9,661.01

Excess of Earned Income over Disbursements, 1946 168.96

Balance at December 31, 1946 \$ 9,829.97

*Deferred Income (dues paid in 1946 applicable to 1947) 6,416.50

Total Balance and Deferred Income \$16,246.47

Represented by

Cash in Banks	\$ 16,176.47
Petty Cash Fund	10.00
Accounts Receivable	60.00

Total Cash and Receivables \$16,246.47

During the first five years when the Clearing House made such generous contribution, the Society was able to accumulate a small surplus. This amount is now on deposit and will serve as a backlog for the Society to draw upon if necessary as the amount of subvention declines each year. The Society is steadily coming nearer to being self-sustaining, and with the continued cooperation of members enrollment will undoubtedly continue to increase.

* Dues received are not considered earned income until the quarters to which they are properly allocable, thus the item of deferred income represents a liability.

CHAPTER NEWS

Connecticut

The Connecticut Chapter met March 7 at the Hotel Garde in Hartford. The principal speakers of the meeting, James B. Lowell, state commissioner of finance and control, and Robert H. Weir, state director of the budget, talked on "State Revenues and Expenditures." The discussion was led by Nelson L. Carpenter, a member of the state legislature.

District of Columbia

The Washington, D. C. Chapter held its February dinner meeting at Barker Hall on February 12. Arthur S. Flemming, U. S. civil service commissioner, spoke on "Decentralizing the Personnel Aspects of Administration."

The Chapter cancelled its March meeting in favor of the national meeting of the Society in Washington, March 14-16, in which the Chapter cooperated.

Kentucky

The Kentucky Chapter held a dinner meeting January 14. The principal speaker was Louis Lyon, chief of examining and placement, U. S. Civil Service Commission, Region Six, who discussed postwar policies and program of the commission as they apply to problems of administration.

At the meeting held March 5 the panel discussion was concerned with "Purchasing Problems," with representatives of city, state, and federal governments participating.

Massachusetts

The Massachusetts Chapter met February 19 in the Littauer Lounge, Harvard Square, Cambridge. Charles S. Ascher, regional housing expediter, National Housing Agency, and president of the American Society for Public Administration, addressed the chapter on "The Administrator and His Public."

The Chapter met March 7 to hear an address by Paul H. Appleby, dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse University. The subject of his address was "Big Government."

Minnesota

The Minnesota Chapter met January 28 to hear an address by Professor Leslie Lipson, former head of the department of political science and public administration at Victoria College, Wellington, New Zealand, and now at Swarthmore College. The subject of Mr. Lipson's address was "Public Administration in New Zealand."

New York—Capital District

The Capital District Chapter met January 9 in Hearing Room No. 2 in the State Office Building. The subject of the meeting was "Education for Public Administration." William J. Ronan, director of the graduate division for training in public service, New York University, discussed the role of the university in training for public service. Warren W. Coxe, director of education research, New York State Department of Education, discussed the role of in-service training programs in developing administrative personnel. Charles F. Gosnell, New York State librarian, discussed the role of the state library in the training of public administrators.

The Chapter met on the evening of February 19 to discuss the "Role of a Planning Staff in State Agencies." The moderator was Murray Nathan, director of the office of planning and procedures, New York State Department of Health. Harry H. Fite, management improvement branch, U. S. Bureau of the Budget, discussed the role of the planning staff in problems of organization and reorganization; Karel F. Ficek, chief of planning, division of placement and unemployment insurance, New York State Department of Labor, the role of the planning staff in preparation and conduct of special studies; and Ellis T. Riker, methods and procedures division, New York Department of Taxation and Finance, the role of the planning staff in planning for production.

On March 20 the Chapter discussed "Techniques of State Supervision of Locally Administered Functions," which included such topics as degree of participation of local officials in developing objectives and goals, training and staff development, institutes for local officials and other forms of supervisory techniques, such as inspection, audit, and reporting. Mem-

bers of the panel included Henry J. McFarland, director, Bureau of Municipal Service, New York State Department of Civil Service; Marion Sheahan Bailey, director of public nursing, New York State Department of Health; and Francis E. Griffin, director of rural administration, New York State Department of Education.

New York—Metropolitan Area

The New York Metropolitan Chapter met February 18 for dinner in the faculty dining room of Hunter College to hear William E. O'Dwyer, Mayor of the City of New York, talk on "Some Thoughts on the Job of Administering the City's Affairs."

At this meeting the following officers were elected for the year 1947:

President—Paul L. Ross, administrative secretary to the mayor of New York

Vice President—Esther Bromley, municipal civil service commissioner

Directors—Margaret Barnard, M.D., New York City Department of Health
Carl Chatters, Port of New York Authority
George E. Cohron, Social Security Administration

John D. Millett, Columbia University, was re-appointed secretary-treasurer of the New York Metropolitan Chapter.

Oregon

The Oregon Chapter met January 22 for dinner at the Portland Chamber of Commerce. S. J. Barrick, director of research, Oregon Tax Study Commission, summarized the work of the Commission in a discussion on "State and Local Tax Problems in Oregon."

Puerto Rico

The Puerto Rico Chapter held an organization meeting on February 6 at which a membership drive was agreed upon, programs for future meetings discussed, and officers elected as follows:

President—Roberto de Jesus, budget director, Insular Government of Puerto Rico

Vice President—Guillermo Nigaglioni, chairman, Civil Service Commission of Puerto Rico

Secretary-Treasurer—James R. Watson, director, Public Administration Program, University of Puerto Rico

Directors—Guillermo Atiles Moreu, director, State Insurance Fund of Puerto Rico

Israel Planell, chief, in-service training division, Civil Service Commission of Puerto Rico

Francisco Verdiales, Puerto Rico Conciliation Service

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